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Treating mental illness in primary care improves access to care, but it is unclear how to 
encourage family physicians to provide adequate mental health services. One approach may be 
changing how they are remunerated. The objectives of this thesis were to: 1) review the literature 
on the association between physician remuneration and provision of mental health services, and 
2) assess the impact of blended capitation, compared to blended fee-for-service (FFS), on mental 
health services provision by family physicians using billings database in Ontario. The review 
found that capitation appears to be associated with fewer services; however, studies of ED visits 
for mental health reasons were limited. The impact of remuneration models of Ontario 
physicians was assessed using longitudinal administrative data from ICES and analyzed using 
fixed-effects linear regression models. Blended capitation was associated with fewer mental 
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Summary for Lay Audience 
Many patients with mental illness are not receiving treatment. One method of addressing this gap 
may be changing how physicians are remunerated, to encourage them to provide more mental 
health care; research has shown that physicians change how they provide care in response to how 
they are paid.  
In recent years, most Ontario family physicians (FPs) are paid by blended fee-for-service (FFS) 
or blended capitation. In FFS, physicians are paid based on how many services they provide; 
they are incentivized to provide more care, but may provide unnecessary services to increase 
their income. In blended FFS, physicians are paid mostly by FFS but also receive other bonuses. 
Under capitation, physicians are paid by the number of enrolled patients they have and are 
expected to provide a basket of services to these patients; they are unlikely to provide 
unnecessary services, but may not provide needed care unless payments are appropriately risk-
adjusted. In blended capitation, physicians receive the bulk of their income from capitation 
payments, and receive bonuses similar to blended FFS. Previous studies have found that 
physicians paid by capitation generally provided fewer mental health services compared to FFS, 
but the effect on emergency department (ED) visits for mental health reasons was not clear. 
Furthermore, as most previous studies are from the US, these findings may not be applicable to 
Canada.  
To assess the association between physician remuneration and provision of mental health 
services in Ontario, we analyzed mental health services from health administrative databases 
over ten years (2007-2016). FPs who were in blended FFS and switched to blended capitation 
were compared to those who were in the blended FFS throughout the study period. Mental health 
services provided by the FP using billings database, and ED visits for mental health reasons were 
assessed. We found that FPs paid by blended capitation tended to provide fewer mental health 
services overall, but provided more mental health services during after-hours. Furthermore, 
although they provided fewer mental health services, capitation was also associated with fewer 
ED visits for mental health reasons. These findings may reflect better access to mental healthcare 
under blended capitation.   
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1.1 Mental illness 
Mental illnesses can be defined as disorders characterized by a change in emotions, thoughts, 
behaviour, and/or relationships with others.1 Due to this broad definition, it covers many 
illnesses with a wide range of different symptoms. Some commonly used categories include 
mood disorders (e.g. bipolar disorder and depression), anxiety disorders (e.g. phobic anxiety 
disorders and obsessive compulsive disorder), psychotic disorders (e.g. schizophrenia and 
delusional disorder), and substance use disorders (SUD).2 Meta-analyses studies have estimated 
that the proportion of people who had a mental illness in the past twelve months to be between 
13% to 18%, and that 29% of people will have a mental illness at some point in their life.3,4 In 
2017, 16% of Canadians had mental illness or a substance use disorder, with 5% having an 
anxiety disorder and 4% having depression.3 Due to its high prevalence, mental illness exerts a 
large economic burden: in 2010, the global cost of mental illness was $2.5 trillion USD, with 
$800 million spent on treatment and nearly $1.7 trillion due to indirect costs such as lost 
productivity. This cost is expected to more than double by 2030.5 Canada spends $11.3 to $18.1 
billion CAD annually for treating mental illness, and indirect costs are estimated at $50 billion 
per annum.6,7  
In addition to the economic burden, mental illnesses contribute a substantial non-fatal health 
burden, primarily through the increased risk of other diseases. In a study of 195 countries, mental 
illnesses were found to be a major cause of years lived with disability (YLDs): in 2016, they 
accounted for 19% of all YLDs, or approximately 150 million YLDs, and were also the leading 
causes of YLDs in young adults.8 For patients with schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and major 
depressive disorder, compared to patients without mental illness, there is strong evidence that 
they have increased risk of HIV, cardiovascular disease, obesity, metabolic syndrome, 
hyperlipidemia, and obstetric complications, and moderate evidence for increased risk of 





illness also complicates the treatment of physical illness, as medications for mental illness may 
adversely affect patients’ physical health.10 For example, many antipsychotic medications have a 
risk of weight gain, and it has been found that for patients with psychosis or bipolar disorder, 
having diabetes is associated with greater risk of complications and diabetes-related death 
compared to diabetic patients without mental illness.11 Patients with schizophrenia have also 
been found to be less likely to spontaneously report physical symptoms.12 This may be due to 
their focus on treating their mental illness, sidelining their physical health.  
Direct deaths due to mental illnesses are rare, but mental illnesses are attributed to a significant 
number of indirect deaths, due to their increased risk of physical illnesses such as cardiovascular 
disease, respiratory disease and cancer13,14  as well as substance use disorders, and suicide; 
patients with mental illness have a 2.7 to 19.9 times greater risk of suicide depending on the 
mental illness.3 When assessing all-cause mortality, mental illness is associated with a reduced 
life expectancy of approximately 10 years,15 or a 2.2 times higher relative risk of mortality, 
attributing to 14% of deaths worldwide.15  
Many mental illnesses are treatable, though medications and therapies such as psychotherapy.16–
19 However, there are gaps in receiving treatments. Studies of Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) countries suggest that approximately 30% of patients with 
severe mental illness and 15% of patients with moderate mental illness have not been in 
treatment over the past twelve months.20 This treatment gap may be even higher in lower income 
countries.21 YLD rates have not changed by more than 10% for most mental illnesses from 1990 
to 2016, aside from bulimia for which YLDs has increased by nearly 20%.8 Understanding how 
to bridge this treatment gap can help to improve patients’ quality of life. 
1.2 Mental Illness in Primary Care 
There are several arguments in favour of treating mental illness in primary care. In many 
countries, primary care providers like general practitioners or family physicians (FPs) are the 
gatekeepers to mental healthcare: across OECD countries, 73% of people who reported using 
mental health services saw a general practitioner or FP.22 Studies have also found a high 
prevalence of mental illness in patients who present to primary care, ranging between 23% and 





Patients with mental illness often have physical illnesses as well, so integrating mental healthcare 
into primary care, where most physical illnesses are already treated, will help patients to be 
treated in a more holistic manner. It is also a cost-effective way to deliver care for patients with 
mental illness, and may enhance accessibility as it is often easier to access primary care than 
specialty care.28,29 Accessible and appropriate mental health care in primary care can help to 
prevent or reduce the symptoms of severe mental illness, and decrease healthcare costs by 
reducing hospital and emergency department (ED) usage.21,30,31  
Despite the importance of primary care in the treatment of mental illness, less than a quarter of 
patients with a psychiatric diagnosis use mental health services in primary care; most come for 
physical health concerns.23,32 About 65% of Canadians with a SUD did not seek any mental 
health services over the past twelve months, including informal care (e.g. support from family 
and friends); for those with a mood or anxiety disorder, 26% did not seek any help; those with 
both a SUD and a mood/anxiety disorder, 12% did not use any services or supports. When 
excluding those who only used informal care, only 85%, 41%, and 34% of those with a SUD, 
mood/anxiety disorder, or both used professional mental health services, respectively.33 These 
numbers may reflect patient choice to not access mental health services for reasons such as 
stigma around mental illness, or lack of confidence in their FP’s ability to treat mental illness.34  
Another factor contributing to this treatment gap may be difficulty accessing primary care: 
although over 94% of Ontarian patients with mental illness report having a regular FP, 39% to 
41% report having difficulty accessing care on the same day or next day, and 52% to 60% find it 
difficult to find after-hours care without using the ED.34 FPs may choose to fill up their working 
hours in advance and leave little time for same-day or next-day appointments to ensure they are 
seeing many patients a day, and also may only provide very limited after-hours care. This can 
make it difficult for patients who cannot take time off work during the day for a physician 
appointment or have an unexpected crisis to see them on short-notice, and thus these patients 
may turn to the ED as an alternative source of care. This may explain why approximately one-
third of patients who go to the ED for a mental illness or addiction have no previous documented 
outpatient contact for a mental health reason, and why only 36% of patients see a FP or 
psychiatrist within seven days of discharge after a psychiatric hospitalization.35 Some of these 





to the ED being a more stressful environment for patients, avoidable ED usage is costly to the 
healthcare system and drives up wait times for everyone, including those with unavoidable 
emergencies. FPs can also provide follow-up care after a mental health hospitalization; timely 
follow-up is also considered an important aspect of care, as it provides the opportunity for a 
physician to determine if there are any lingering problems and can address them before the 
symptoms worsen and the patient is re-admitted to the hospital.35 Low follow-up rates may lead 
to more readmissions and poorer health outcomes for patients.  
In summary, timely and appropriate mental health services in primary care has been highlighted 
as a cost-effective method of treating mental illness,28 but research shows that treatment gaps 
remain. If more patients use mental health services in primary care, this may reduce ED usage 
and hospitalizations. One method used by policy makers is through changing how they are 
remunerated: research has shown that the way physicians are remunerated influences their 
behaviour, including how many hours they work and how many patients they choose to provide 
comprehensive primary care services to.36 Thus, altering FP payment models may help improve 
provision of mental healthcare in primary care.  
1.3 Ontario’s Primary Care Reform  
Historically, the vast majority of FPs in Canada were paid by fee-for-service (FFS), where 
physicians are remunerated for each service provided. This began to change in the early 2000s, 
following the release of two high-profile commissions in 2002 that stated FFS may encourage 
overprovision of unnecessary services, and lead to poorer quality of care and the lack of 
continuity of care.37,38 By being paid for each service rendered, FPs may be incentivized to 
provide more services regardless of the actual need, which costs health care system resources 
without benefiting patients. FFS worked well in the past because it was simple and easy to 
deliver, particularly in the context of acute care.39 However, as more focus is put on preventative 
care and monitoring for chronic diseases, it has been argued that FFS is no longer an appropriate 
method of remunerating FPs, and alternative payment models like capitation, where physicians 
receive a base payment for each enrolled patient, should be considered.38,39 Under capitation, 
there is no financial incentive to provide unnecessary services. Instead, it should encourage 





lead to negative consequences, such as selection of rostering of healthy patients or under-
provision of necessary care.40 It has been suggested that blended models, which combine aspects 
of different ‘pure’ payment models, may counterbalance the negative aspects of each model and 
thus lead to better quality of care at a lower cost.41 
Following these commissions, reforms to the healthcare system began across Canada. The 
Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care (MOHLTC) made changes to the province’s 
primary care system to improve access to and quality of primary care to Ontarians. These 
reforms included the introduction of new payment models for FPs. Most of these new models are 
patient-enrolment models with blended remunerations, where physicians are required to enrol 
patients and commit to provide comprehensive primary care and ensure continuity of care. In the 
2015/2016 fiscal year, 8,810 FPs were in a patient-enrolment model, outnumbering the number 
of FPs remunerated by the traditional FFS.42 Two patient-enrolment models that have become 
very popular are the Family Health Group (FHG), a blended FFS model introduced in 2003, and 
the Family Health Organization (FHO), a blended capitation model introduced in 2006; 
approximately 7,600 FPs are in one of these two models in 2015/16. Blended FFS is similar to 
the traditional FFS in that FPs receive the vast majority of their income through FFS billings for 
services rendered, but also includes comprehensive care capitation payments for enrolled patients 
and incentives for a variety of targeted services, including after-hours care, preventative care and 
chronic disease management.43 In blended capitation, FPs are remunerated primarily through 
capitated payments (age and sex-adjusted) for each enrolled patient, and are in turn expected to 
provide comprehensive basket of health services  to their patients. It is blended rather than pure 
capitation because they also receive 15% of the FFS amount for these in-basket services and 
incentives for providing the targeted services. They also receive an access bonus to encourage 
providing in-basket services; this bonus is reduced if their rostered patients use in-basket services 
from other physicians.14 For out-of-basket and services provided to non-enrolled patients, they 
receive 100% of the FFS amount, up to a hard cap limit.44 Though the models use different 
reimbursement methods, they are otherwise very similar, with the same minimum group size, 
targeted financial incentives, and after-hours care requirements.45,46  
Since the introduction of new models of primary care, research has been underway assessing 





outcomes than the others. It is of interest to know whether blended capitation is better or worse 
than blended FFS at improving patients’ health, so that appropriate changes can be made to 
ensure Ontarians are receiving quality healthcare. A number of studies have been conducted on 
several outcomes, indicating mixed results: for example, blended capitation relative to blended 
FFS has been found to be associated with improved quality of diabetes care,48,49 but lower 
follow-up rates after discharge from the ED for atrial fibrillation and heart failure.50 No 
difference has been found between these models on hospitalization rates51 or cancer screening.49 
There is also some evidence indicating that FPs under blended capitation may be avoiding sicker 
patients by selectively rostering relatively healthy patients, also known as ‘cream-skimming’,52,53 
and increasing referrals to specialists.54 As patients with mental illness are more likely to use in-
basket services from outside primary care sources, FPs may selectively avoid enrolling these 
patients to avoid penalties to the access bonus.55 
How these new models are affecting patients with mental illness is unclear. FFS incentivizes 
physicians to schedule shorter appointments and focus on providing services that do not take 
much time. Since mental health services like counselling can often be time-consuming, FPs 
under FFS may be discouraged to provide such services if they feel the fee they receive for these 
services is inadequate relative to non-mental health services. In comparison, under capitation, 
FPs are not remunerated for each service provided – under blended capitation models like FHO, 
they receive only a portion of the FFS fee – so they may be comparatively less likely to focus on 
maximizing the number of services provided. However, capitated FPs may choose to roster more 
patients to increase their income, which in turn may lead to shorter appointments, which in turn 
discourages them from providing time-consuming mental health services. FPs in capitation 
practices are comparable to FPs in FFS practices in enrolling patients with serious mental 
illnesses (SMI) like psychotic or bipolar disorders as they are incentivized the same way, but FPs 
in capitation-based models tend to enroll fewer patients with other mental illnesses, compared to 






1.4 Gaps in the Literature Regarding the Impact of Remuneration Models on the 
Provision of Mental Healthcare  
Ontario, as well as several states in the United States, have introduced capitation to replace FFS 
with the hopes it will reduce healthcare costs while improving quality of healthcare. Some 
studies, primarily from the US, have been conducted to examine whether the introduction of 
capitation has led to changes in the provision of mental health services in primary care or the ED, 
pointing out mixed results. Part of this variation may be due to differences between studies, such 
as how they measured use of mental health services (e.g. number of services provided vs. 
proportion of patients who used services,). However, studies from outside the US are limited. 
Furthermore, many of these studies focus on pure remuneration models, so the effect of blended 
remuneration models is unknown. In Ontario, only two studies assessed the impact of 
remuneration models on patients with mental illness, and one was focused on the number of 
enrolled patients with mental illness without assessing service usage.56 In the other study, mental 
health service provision was assessed for patients with SMI only.57 As they focused only on 
patients with SMI, it is unclear whether their findings extend to patients with other mental 
illnesses. Both also used cross-sectional study design, and there is a lack of longitudinal studies 
to control for confounders. 
Thus, there is a gap in the literature regarding how remuneration models affect patients with 
mental illnesses in the context of a publicly funded healthcare system, like Canada. Assessing 
how remuneration models impact provision of mental health services can help to inform 
policymakers on the effectiveness of reforms in primary care. This will not only help Ontario and 
Canada, but also other countries looking to improve the provision of mental health services in the 
primary care setting. 
1.5 Research Objectives  
The main objective of this thesis was to examine the impact of switching FPs from FHG 
(blended FFS) to FHO (blended capitation) on mental health service utilization in primary care 
and the ED by enrolled patients. This study was conducted using longitudinal health 





model on April 1st, 2007 and then switched to a blended capitation model were compared to FPs 
who remained in the blended FFS model throughout the entire study period.  
1.6 Thesis Overview 
This thesis will use an integrated article format. Chapter 2 presents the literature review 
assessing remuneration models (capitation vs. FFS) on provision of mental health services in 
primary care and ED usage for mental health reasons. A manuscript focused on the impact of 
FPs switching from FHG to FHO on the provision of mental health services in primary care and 
ED visits for mental health reasons based on billings data, is presented in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 
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Chapter 2  
2 The Relationship Between Physician Remuneration Model and Provision of 
Mental Healthcare in Primary Care and Emergency Department Settings: A 
Review of the Literature 
 
2.1 Introduction  
Mental illnesses affect millions of people each year, and it is estimated that 29% of people will 
experience mental illness at some point in their life.1–3 Having a mental illness is associated with 
a reduced life expectancy of approximately 10 years, and it contributes to 14% of deaths 
globally.4 Mental illness is also a major cause of disability worldwide, and is the leading cause of 
disability among young adults.5 In 2010, the global cost of treating mental illness was $800 
billion USD. Indirect costs such as lost productivity, has been estimated at approximately $1.7 
trillion USD.6 Understanding how to improve treatment of mental illnesses has the potential to 
improve life expectancy, and reduce disability and costs enormously.  
The World Health Organization recommended that treatment of mental illnesses be integrated 
into primary care.7 In primary care, patients with mental illness should be able to receive a 
diagnosis, followed by treatment where possible and a referral to specialized care, if necessary. 
Providing services in primary care helps keep these services accessible to patients with common 
mental illnesses, and is an affordable option for both patients and the healthcare system.8,9 Even 
for patients with more severe mental illnesses, FPs can help to coordinate their care and manage 
their physical symptoms, as mental health problems and physical health conditions are often 
comorbid. Patients who can seek mental health services in primary care are also more likely to 
seek help early on, before their symptoms worsen to the point they need to seek help from the 
ED or hospital.7 Existing evidence indicates that primary care for mental illnesses leads to 
improved outcomes.10 Understanding which factors encourage or discourage the provision of 
mental health services in primary care can help decision makers determine what policies are 





Research has shown that physicians respond to the provision of care depending on how they are 
being remunerated.11,12 For example, FFS involves paying physicians for each service provided, 
which may encourage physicians to provide as many services as possible in order to maximize 
their income. In comparison, physicians under capitation are paid a base fee for rostering 
patients, and are expected to provide care to these patients over a period of time (i.e. monthly or 
annually); this model incentivizes keeping patients healthy so that they visit their FPs less 
frequently.13 Historically, FFS was widely used to pay FPs in the United States and Canada, but 
concerns about growing healthcare costs, overprovision of unnecessary services, and the lack of 
incentive to provide preventive care has led to some jurisdictions introducing capitation payment 
models.14,15 However, capitation incentivizes physicians to work fewer hours, which may lead to 
patients having difficulty accessing care, and may even lead to under-provision of necessary 
services.14 Thus, research is needed to determine how physician remuneration impact mental 
health service provision and patient outcomes to ensure patients with mental illness are receiving 
appropriate care.  
A number of studies, mostly from the United States, have assessed whether different 
remuneration models affects mental health service usage. To my knowledge, there are no 
currently existing reviews on this topic. The objective of this review was to summarize the 
existing literature on the association between physician remuneration models and mental health 
service provision in primary care, and the associated impacts on ED visits for mental health 
reasons. 
2.2 Method 
2.2.1 Search Strategy and Study Selection 
I developed an electronic search strategy to identify relevant published studies. Three research 
databases were used: MEDLINE using the Ovid platform, EMBASE, and Scopus. The concepts 
of mental illness, primary care, remuneration model, and the outcomes of interest (primary care 
and ED visits) were combined using MeSH headings and keywords. An example of the search 
performed in the MEDLINE-Ovid database is presented in Appendix A2.1. From the studies 
identified initially, the references were searched to identify any additional studies missed by my 





Articles retrieved from the literature search were screened by title and abstract to identify 
relevant papers based on a set of inclusion and exclusion criteria. The remaining articles then 
underwent a full text review to ensure that they met the following inclusion criteria: (i) the study 
compared different physician remuneration models; and (ii) the study assessed mental health 
service use in primary care or ED. Studies were excluded if they were duplicates, were not 
available in English language, or were not primary research (e.g. commentaries or opinions).  
2.2.2 Main Search Results 
The literature search on the relationship between physician remuneration model and mental 
health service provision identified 1,067 articles. After removing duplicates and conducting title 
and abstract screening, there were 167 articles left remaining for full-text review. Of those, 15 
articles met the inclusion criteria for this review. The manual search of reference lists was 
conducted on these articles, and two additional studies were identified and included, for a total of 
17 studies included in this review.  
Of the included studies, 13 assessed the association between the number of visits or patients who 
accessed mental health outpatient services, four studies assessed the cost of outpatient mental 
health services, and three assessed ED use for mental health reasons. Some studies assessed 
multiple outcomes. A summary of the findings from each study is presented in Appendix A2.2 
(Tables 2.2 and 2.3).  
2.2.3 The Relationship Between Remuneration and Mental Health Services in Primary Care 
2.2.3.1 Service utilization  
A total of 13 studies were identified that assessed the number of visits or patients accessing 
mental health services. Due to the heterogeneity across studies, the summary below is grouped 
by population studied (general population or no restriction by diagnosis; patients with SMI; 
chronic mental illness; and substance abuse), then further grouped by how service utilization was 
measured (proportion of patients who used services; total number of services used) as needed.  
General population: Volume of services. Two studies assessed the impact of physician 





1997) found no difference between remuneration models,16 whereas the other (Xiang et al., 
2019) found a lower volume of services in capitation.17 In Utah, Stoner et al. (1997) assessed the 
impact of the introduction of a prepaid mental health plan and assessed the number of mental 
health outpatient visits per 1,000 eligible patients. They found no significant difference over one 
year between areas that switched to capitation and areas that remained in FFS on number of 
visits for mental health reasons.16 Xiang et al. (2019) assessed the introduction of capitation in 
some areas of Illinois in May 2011, compared to the city of Chicago which remained in FFS. 
Data from July 2010 to May 2011 (pre-capitation) were compared to data from January 2012 to 
June 2012 (post-capitation). They assessed number of visits per month per 100 persons in 
Illinois, and found that areas that switched to capitation had used fewer outpatient visits (2.8 
fewer visits) compared to areas that remained in FFS.17 Both studies used a pre-post comparison 
with two groups (one group switched from FFS to capitation, compared to a group that remained 
in FFS). Notably, the two studies varied substantially in their number of outpatient visits, 
perhaps due to the time period of the studies: in Stoner et al.’s study, pre-capitation there were 
around 15 to 20 (FFS) or 25 to 35 (capitation) mental health outpatient visits per 100 enrolled 
patients per month, whereas in Xiang et al.’s study, there were 110 to 116 visits per 100 enrolled 
patients per month. Stoner et al.’s study also had differences in baseline usage across groups 
which makes the findings difficult to interpret, and they also controlled for fewer covariates 
compared to Xiang et al. Thus, limited evidence suggests that, capitation is associated with lower 
utilization of mental health services.  
Patients with SMI: Proportion of patients who used outpatient care. One study found no 
difference between physician remuneration and the proportion of patients with SMI who used 
outpatient care,18 while three studies found fewer patients using mental health services in 
capitation models.19–21 Leff et al. (2005) assessed capitated managed behavioural health 
programs compared to FFS programs across five states in the US, and measured outcomes in 
terms of the proportion of patients who received mental health service over three months. They 
found no difference across most outcomes, including all measures of mental health care.18 
Morrissey et al. (2002) assessed the impact of randomizing patients who were originally in FFS 
to a fully capitated health maintenance organization, compared to patients whose providers 
continued to be paid by FFS. They found that six months after the change, those who were in the 





odds of receiving case management.19 Bloom et al. (2002) assessed the introduction of capitation 
in Colorado, with three groups: areas that continued to use FFS, areas that switched to capitation 
(community mental health centres (CMHCs) would continue to provide the services directly to 
patients on a not-for-profit basis, but funding was switched from FFS to capitation), and areas 
that switched to a joint ventures (funding was switched to capitation, but the services were 
outsourced by the CMHC to a for-profit managed behavioural health organization. They found 
that when assessing patients’ probability of service use, both capitated areas had reduced 
outpatient use in the second year after changing to capitation, compared to areas that continued 
to use FFS.20 Busch et al. (2004) had a similar design to Bloom et al., comparing areas where 
CMHCs switched to capitated payments, to areas where CMHCs continued to be paid by FFS, 
though their data came from Massachusetts. Using six years of data, they found that in areas that 
switched to capitation, patients were less likely to receive psychosocial rehabilitation, individual 
therapy, or group therapy.21 Leff et al. only assessed three months of data, and aggregated data 
from multiple areas while noting all areas may not be equivalent or comparable. In comparison, 
the studies which did find a difference had longer observation periods. Overall, this suggests that 
capitation may lead to patients with SMI being less likely to access mental health services in 
primary care, relative to FFS. This could be due to cream-skimming under capitation, if FPs feel 
the capitated fee is not sufficient to treat patients with SMI. These patients may also be seeking 
care elsewhere, such as through community services and psychiatrists.  
Patients with SMI: Volume of services. Five studies examined the impact of physician 
remuneration model on the volume of mental health services provided to patients with SMI. One 
study (Warner and Huxley, 1998) found no difference,22 and two studies (Popkin et al., 1998; 
Steele et al., 2014) found a decrease in volume of services in capitation.23,24 Warner and Huxley 
(1998) included patients with schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder assessed before and after 
the introduction of capitation (n = 100 at each time point). They found that the mean number of 
outpatient contacts over six months was slightly higher before capitation was introduced (186.5 
contacts versus 150.3 contacts), but this difference was not statistically significant.22 Popkin et 
al. (1998) assessed the impact of the introduction of a prepaid mental health plan in Utah on 
patients with schizophrenia, and found the number of psychotherapy visits per patient dropped 
more in the prepaid group compared to areas that continued to use FFS.23 In Ontario, Steele et al. 





to their FPs compared to blended FFS.24 The two remaining studies were based on the same data 
from Colorado but using different statistical methods, comparing direct capitation (not-for-profit) 
and MBHOs (capitated, but for-profit; described in the previous section, the study by Bloom et 
al. (2008)). Both Chou et al. (2005) and Grieve et al. (2008) found a greater decrease in the for-
profit capitation group compared to FFS, and no difference was found between FFS and the not-
for-profit capitation group.25,26 Chou et al. (2005) also found differences in trends for other types 
of mental health services: the for-profit group reported lower usage of therapy, day treatment, 
and case management, while the not-for-profit group only saw a reduction in medication 
monitoring. In Utah, Liu et al. (1999) and Bianconi et al. (2006) assessed the impact of the 
introduction of a capitated plan on patients with schizophrenia by comparing areas that 
implemented the new plan to areas that chose to remain in FFS. The capitated areas saw a larger 
decrease in day treatment, but greater increases in medication and individual therapy compared 
to FFS areas, with no difference found for group therapy or crisis visits.27,28 
Warner and Huxley did observe a decrease in service use after the introduction of capitation: this 
difference was statistically non-significant, possibly due to the small sample size of just 100 
patients per time point. Popkin et al. assessed 377 patients at both baseline and post-capitation, 
which may have helped to remove some individual-level variation and thus led to a statistically 
significant finding. Both studies relied on pre-post comparisons without controlling for 
covariates. Finally, Steele et al. (2014) assessed over 125,000 Ontarian patients who had billings 
for psychotic or bipolar disorders, and used a regression analysis that controlled for various 
patient and physician characteristics. As their study was cross-sectional, it is possible that the 
patients under capitation were different from the patients under FFS and this may not have been 
completely controlled for by the inclusion of covariates in their regression model. The existing 
evidence suggests that patients with SMI tend to use fewer mental health services in primary care 
when their physicians are under capitation models, relative to FFS.  
Substance use disorders. Two studies focused on patients being treated for substance use 
disorders. Alterman et al. (2000) assessed patients in Philadelphia who were receiving either 
capitated or FFS funding for their treatment, and found no difference in proportion of patients 
who used mental health services over the first two weeks.29 Bigelow et al. (2004) assessed 





difference over time in the proportion of patients who used mental health services, up to three or 
four years post-conversion.30 Thus, the literature indicates that for substance use disorders 
specifically, capitation does not appear to lead to substantial differences in service use compared 
to FFS. 
Summary. Overall, capitation appears to be associated with decreased volume of services both in 
the general population as well as patients with SMI when compared to FFS; SMI patients appear 
to be less likely to use outpatient mental healthcare. Conflicting findings between studies may be 
attributed to factors such as the differences in adjustment for covariates, the geographical area 
being studied, and the follow-up time after the switching to a capitation model. For example, 
stigma against mental illness may be higher in some areas or in older studies, resulting in little 
change in service utilization.  
2.2.3.2 Cost of services 
Four studies assessed the impact of physician remuneration model on costs of outpatient mental 
health services.16,20,25,31 All studies were conducted in the United States.  
General population. Stoner et al. (1997) compared areas that introduced capitation to areas that 
remained in FFS over two and a half years and found no difference in outpatient costs.16 
However, as discussed previously, the groups had different levels of baseline service usage and 
thus costs, which may be masking the effect of switching to capitation.  
Patients with SMI. Three studies examined the association between physician remuneration 
model on cost of services for people with SMI. Reed et al. (1994) assessed patients with SMI 
who had spent at least 45 days over the last three years in a state hospital for psychiatric reasons, 
and found no difference in costs of outpatient MH services; with one exception, case 
management was higher for capitation compared to FFS.31 In the two studies of Colorado 
patients with SMI, Bloom et al. (2002) found that only for-profit capitated programs had reduced 
outpatient costs compared to FFS, whereas the not-for-profit capitated programs did not differ 
from FFS;20 Using a non-parametric statistical method, Grieve et al. (2008) found the for-profit 
capitated model to have similar outpatient costs compared to FFS, whereas not-for-profit 





to lower costs, which may be reflected in how prior to the introduction of capitation, the not-for-
profit areas expanded outpatient services in a bid to reduce the more costly inpatient services, 
while the for-profit areas did not. 
Summary. Overall, capitation does not appear to lead to reduced costs for the population with 
mental illness or for patients with SMI, though this may vary depending on factors such as what 
services are available under capitation or other structural factors (e.g. for-profit versus not-for-
profit).  
2.2.4 The Relationship Between Physician Remuneration Model and Use of Emergency 
Department Services for Mental Health Reasons 
Three studies were identified that looked at the association between physician remuneration 
model and ED visits for mental health reasons.18,24,32  
General population. Catalano et al. (2005) assessed the introduction of capitation in Colorado, 
comparing areas that switched from FFS to capitation to areas that remained in FFS, with two 
years of data: one year before the introduction of capitation and up to one year after the 
introduction of capitation. They found capitation to be associated with a decrease in the ED visits 
per week for mental health reasons compared to areas that continued to be under FFS.32  
Patients with SMI. Leff et al. (2005) compared capitated and FFS programs across five US 
states: while slightly fewer SMI patients utilized emergency mental health services under 
capitation (5.3%) compared to FFS (9.2%) this difference was not statistically significant. The 
authors also warned the groups may not be comparable due to variation across sites.18 In Ontario, 
Steele et al. (2014) examined ED visits for mental health reasons among patients with SMI using 
two years of data. They also found no difference between capitation and FFS on number of ED 
visits for a mental health reason, except for patients who were in team-based capitation models 
with mental health workers, who were found to be more likely to have an ED visit for a mental 
health reason compare to patients in FFS models.24  
Summary. Existing evidence suggests that capitation may lead to a decrease in the use of the ED 
visits for mental health reasons,32 but not for patients with SMI.18,24 It is possible that capitation 





be seeing improved access to primary care under capitation; however, FPs may not be able to 
manage patients with SMI well and thus these patients continue to use the ED regardless of the 
physician remuneration.  
2.3 Summary of Literature Review and Gaps in the Literature  
The literature review found considerable variation in the conclusions, likely driven at least in 
part due to study heterogeneity. Existing studies suggest that capitation may be associated with a 
reduced volume of services for both the general population and for patients with SMI, and with a 
lower likelihood of using outpatient care for patients with SMI. Prior studies also suggest that 
capitation is associated with a decrease in the use of the ED for mental health reasons for the 
general population, but not for patients with SMI.  
In general, the current evidence base suggests that capitation is associated with a decrease in the 
volume of mental health services provided in primary care setting. However, most studies did not 
find that this decrease led to a corresponding increase in use of the ED for mental health reasons. 
These trends may be due to improved efficiency in primary care, patients seeking care from other 
providers, or selective rostering of patients with less severe mental illness. Only Steele et al. 
(2014) found patients under team-based capitation models, which included a mental health 
worker, to have greater use of the ED for mental health reasons, compared to blended FFS; non-
team-based capitation practices did not differ from blended FFS. It is not clear what is causing 
the difference between the team-based and non-team-based capitation practices.  
It is noteworthy that the vast majority of studies have come from the United States, and it is 
unclear to what extent American studies can be generalized to other countries due to differences 
in the healthcare systems. Many Americans rely primarily on private insurance for much of their 
healthcare, and some of these studies were focused on the insurance payment (e.g. FFS-based 
insurance versus capitated insurance plans) rather than how the physicians are paid. Studies that 
compared insurers who received capitated fees but did not put providers are at financial risk for 
service overprovision (i.e., paying them by FFS or salary) to insurers that received FFS fees 
largely found no difference on usage of outpatient mental health services.33–35 One study did find 





health hospitalizations compared to FFS, though this decrease was to a smaller extent compared 
to capitated providers.36  
 In comparison to the US, many other countries including Canada primarily use a publicly 
funded healthcare system with private insurance playing a limited role.37 Only one study using 
data from non-US data was found, and it was focused on patients in Ontario with SMI.24 Thus, it 
is unclear whether these findings are generalizable to patients in Ontario with other mental 
illnesses. Assessing the impact of remuneration models for access to and utilization of mental 
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Appendix A2.1: Literature search table 
Table 2.1: Literature search performed in MEDLINE-Ovid for remuneration model (fee 
for service or capitation) and mental health services in primary care or emergency 
department. 
 
# Searches Results 
1 exp Mental Disorders/ or exp Mental Health Services/ or (mental ill* or 
mental disorder*).mp. 
- Search term for mental illness and related topics. 
1247337 
2 Community Health Centers/ or community health centres.mp. or 
Community Health Services/ or Primary Health Care/  
105951 
3 primary health care/ or General Practitioners/ or physicians, family/ or 
physicians, primary care/ or general practice/ or family practice/ or Family 
Doctor*.mp. or Family Physician*.mp. or Family Practice.mp. or General 
Practice.mp. or Primary medical care.mp. or Primary health care 
delivery.mp. or Primary health care.mp. or Primary healthcare.mp. or 
Family medicine.mp. or General practi*.mp. or Primary care physician*.mp. 
or Primary care.mp. 
268204 
4 Community Mental Health Services/ or Community Mental Health Centers/ 
or community mental health.mp. 
23204 
5 outpatient*.mp. or Outpatients/ or psychiatric hospitalization.mp. or 
Hospitals, Psychiatric/ or Emergency Services, Psychiatric/ or Emergency 
Service, Hospital/ or psychiatric emergency.mp. 
167986 
6 2 or 3 or 4 or 5 556314 
 - Search term for outcomes: primary care usage, psychiatric 
hospitalizations, or psychiatric ED usage.  
 
7 exp capitation fee/ or exp fee-for-service plans/ or (Fee for service or 
capitat*).mp 
17233 
 - Search term for remuneration models: capitation or fee for service.  
8 1 and 6 and 7 267 
 - Final search. 
 
 
-Comments added describing the specific sections of the search are italicized  




Appendix A2.2: Literature review summary tables 
Table 2.2: Literature review table for papers that assessed the relationship between physician remuneration (FFS vs 








Methods Study Findings Strengths/ Limitations 
Alterman et al. 
(2000) 







• Service usage in 
first two weeks 
of treatment  
• Used ASI to measure patient status at baseline, 
then at a two-week follow-up 
• Logistic regression and Mann-Whitney U-test 
to analyze outcome use (received vs did not 
receive service) 
• No differences found in MH 
service usage 
• Patient level data 




• Small sample size 
(n=294) 
Bianconi et al. 
(2006) 
• Capitated MC 
programs vs 










• Interviews at baseline and at 6-month follow-
up 
• Stepwise linear/ logistic regressions conducted 
with demographics, history measures to predict 
initial outcomes as well as to predict initial and 
follow-up outcomes 
• Covariates: sex, age, race, education, marital 
status, disability, clinical history (diagnosis, 
medications, psychiatric hospitalizations, 
suicide attempts), ever arrested 
• At baseline and 6-month 
follow-up, MC patients use 
more MH residential services; 
FFS patients report more 
partial/day treatment, self-
help outpatient services 
• At follow-up only, MC 
patients reported using fewer 
MH outpatient services, more 
group therapy  
• No difference in crisis/ 
emergency outpatient use 
• Patient-level data 
• Cross-sectional 
study 
• Small sample size 
(n = 305 at start, 
n=294 for follow-
up interview) 
Bigelow et al. 
(2004) 
• Conversion of 
Medicaid 
from FFS to 
capitation in 
Oregon  
• ASI to assess 
severity 
• At six-month 
interview, asked 
if they obtained 
MH services in 
past six months 
• Three cohorts assessed at beginning of 
treatment and post- 6 months: one cohort 
before implementing capitation, another 
interviewed 2 years after, and another 3-4 years 
after  
• Logistic regression used to determine if any 
variables (pre- vs post-MC, demographics, ASI 
score) predicted whether MH services were 
received 
• Covariates: age, sex, race, if patient lived in 
controlled environment in last 30 days, 
composite ASI score 
• No difference: pre- versus 
post-MC status did not predict 
if MH services were received  
• Only ASI psychiatric score at 
baseline predicted if patient 
would receive MH services 
during first 6 months 
• Patient-level data 
• Three cohorts 
(before and two 
after MC) 
• Small sample sizes 
(n=168, each 
cohort had 49-66 
patients) 











Methods Study Findings Strengths/ Limitations 















• MH service 
utilization and 
costs for patients 
with SMI 
• Random selection of patients with SMI 
(schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, or one 24-
hour inpatient stay with a primary MH 
diagnosis); FFS controls matched by poverty, 
degree of rurality, comparable industrial bases  
• Data collected in year before introduction of 
capitation policy and two years after 
• Administrative data used to assess service 
utilization and costs 
• Two-part model: probability of service use 
(dichotomous outcome, all subjects) and 
utilization amount (patients who used services) 
• Covariates: age, sex, ethnicity, diagnosis, prior 
costs 
• Reduced outpatient use in 
capitated areas compared to 
FFS by second post-period 
• MBHOs saw reduced MH 
outpatient costs in second 
year; DC no change 
• Patient-level data 
• Three years of data 
• Modest sample 
size (N=522) 
Busch et al. 
(2004) 














• Medicaid enrolees with a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia (at least two billings) 
• Data collected from July 1 1994 to June 30 
2000; switch to capitation occurred in 1996 
• Administrative data  
• Covariates: age, sex, race, Medicaid eligibility 
category (social security insurance, aid to 
family with dependent children, or otherwise), 
social security insurance status, presence of 
substance use disorder comorbidity, months 
enrolled in the program in a given fiscal year 
• Analysis: enrolees in the before period (1994-
1996) matched to enrolees in the after period 
(1996-2000) on Medicaid eligibility category 
and race, then logit regression on matched 
groups 
• Enrolees in areas that 
switched to capitation had 
significantly lower odds of 
receiving psychosocial 
rehabilitation (OR = 0.313),, 
any individual and/or group 
therapy (OR = 0.195), any 
individual therapy (OR = 
0.266), and any group therapy 
(OR = 0.188); all p < 0.001 
• Patient-level data 




switch period for 
each region 
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• Use of MH 
outpatient 
services  
• Sample of patients with SMI who reported at 
least one inpatient visit 
• Pre-post design: one year before capitation and 
two years after  
• Control variables: diagnosis, age, gender, cost 
risks, ethnicity 
• Stratified by low vs high cost (previous year) 
• Analysis using two-part model: logistic 
analysis for probability of service use and OLS 
regression for quantity of service use (log-
transformed), both compared to FFS 
• MBHO model less likely to 
use day treatment and 
individual psychotherapy in 
both post-years 
• Baseline levels (pre-
capitation) of service 
utilization were higher in 
capitated groups than FFS, 
before declining to FFS levels 
• Patient-level data 
• Relatively small 
sample (N=522) 







• Outpatient MH 
service use 
• Random sample of Medicaid beneficiaries with 
SMI 
• Census data used to obtain area-level poverty, 
rurality, industrial base  
• Cost and outpatient data collected from 
administrative databases for 1 year pre-
capitation and two years post-capitation (1995-
1998) 
• Genetic matching used to match DC and 
MBHO to FFS on age, gender, ethnicity, 
diagnosis, pre-capitation utilization, QALYs, 
cost 
• Analysis: non-parametric Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test  
• MBHO had a significantly 
larger drop in outpatient 
service use compared to FFS; 
no difference between DC and 
FFS 
• MBHO had comparatively 
lower costs post-capitation 
than FFS; DC had higher 
costs than FFS 
• Matching methods 
reduced differences 
between groups 
• Pre-post design 
• Relatively small 
sample size 
(N=453)  










• Access (% who 
received MH 
services in past 3 
months) 
• Services under 
‘less intensive 
MH care’ 
• Combination of sample survey data, 
interviews, claims and encounter data of 
patients with SMI 
• Data from five sites (five US states) 
• Covariates: gender, marital status, education, 
race, disabled, age at first treatment 
• Adjustments made for each site separately 
• Analysis: meta-analytic random-effects model 
and equivalence testing  
• No difference in use of less 
intensive MH care, outpatient 
SA services 
• However, sites are not 
equivalent on all outcomes 
except treatment services (too 
much variability) 
• Patient-level data 




sites makes effect 
size difficult to 











Methods Study Findings Strengths/ Limitations 
Liu et al. 
(1999) 
• Introduction 






areas that did 
not participate 
and remained 











• Sampled patients with schizophrenia 
• Data collected by in-person interviews: one at 
baseline and follow-up after 1, 2, 3, and 3.5 
years 
• Capitated providers were not at risk until 3 
years, so focus on comparisons between 
baseline-3 and baseline-3.5  
• Outpatient measures computed as change 
scores (compared to baseline)  
• Covariates: age, gender, race, income, rurality, 
education, marital status, employment, baseline 
MH and physical health status 
• Sampling weights used to adjust for 
disproportionate sampling, sample loss, item 
non-response 
• Analysis: regression 
• Capitated areas saw greater 
decrease in day treatment use 
compared to FFS group at all 
post-time points 
• Capitated areas had greater 
increases in medication and 
individual therapy visits at 3 
and 3.5 years  
• No significant differences 
between capitated areas and 
FFS in group therapy or crisis 
visits  
• Patient-level data  
• ~4.5 years of data 
• Focus on 
schizophrenia 
patients  
• Potential of false 



























• Assessed patients with severe mental illness 
(not defined how, though appears to include 
schizophrenia) 
• Data collected at baseline, six months post-
baseline, then appx. ~1.5 years post-baseline 
via interviews with patients 
• Analysis: logistic regression to estimate an 
adjusted OR for each key psychiatric, 
controlling for symptom severity and physical 
health status at time 1 
• Patients in capitated areas 
have lower adjusted odds of 
receiving contact with a 
psychiatrist (AOR = 0.36) or 
counselling (AOR = 0.48) 
• Patient-level data 
• Small sample size 
(N=204) 
• Potential of false 
recall or failure to 
recall 














• Adult Medicaid beneficiaries with 
schizophrenia  
• Administrative data from CMHCs 
• CMHCs that switched to capitation were 
compared to CMHCs that remained in FFS, 
with data pre- and post-introduction of 
capitation up to three years post 
• Analysis: t-test  
• Patients’ number of 
psychotherapy visits dropped 
more in prepaid group than 
FFS by third year compared to 
baseline  
• Patient-level data 
• Modest sample 
(N=377) 
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• Cost of 
outpatient MH 
services  
• Patients with SMI pre-randomized to either 
experimental capitation or traditional FFS  
• Administrative data for costs during first and 
second year after implementation  
• Separate analyses for continuous (>270 days in 
state hospital before enrolment) and 
intermittent (45-270 days); only continuous 
patients were completely capitated 
• Analysis: t-tests  
• For both continuous and 
intermittent patients, per-
person costs in capitated 
groups higher for case 
management in first and 
second year compared to FFS; 
no outpatient service costs 
were significantly different  
• Patient-level data  
• Randomization to 
groups 
• Modest sample 
(N=201) 
• Large attrition of 
experimental group 
(>50%)  
Steele et al. 
(2014) 









• Use of MH 
services by 
patients with 
SMI over two 
years (2009-
2011) 
• Cross-sectional studying using administrative 
databases 
• Analysis: negative binomial regressions, GEEs 
accounting for clustering  
• Covariates: patient factors (age group, sex, 
rurality, recent registrants, ADGs, RUBs, 
diabetes, hypertension, congestive heart failure, 
income quintile), physician factors (gender, 
years since graduation, IMG, practice size) 
• Patients in TBC or blended 
capitation used fewer MH 
services compared to 
enhanced FFS 
• Those in blended capitation 
had slightly higher rates of 
psychiatrist visits compared to 
enhanced FFS; TBC had 
lower rates 
• Patient-level data 
• Large sample 
(N=125,233) 
•  





plan in Utah 
• Outpatient MH 
visits and 
expenditures  
• Administrative data (Medicaid claims) 
• CMHCs that switched to capitation were 
compared to CMHCs that remained in FFS 
• Comparisons over three time periods: pre-
capitation, transition period, and later (one 
year) 
• Analysis: linear regression  
• Covariates: time, rural, % of population that 
was: blind/aged/ disabled, medically needy, 
pregnant/child, on financial aid for families 
with dependent children  
• No significant difference over 
time in the capitated vs FFS 
group in number of visits or 
expenditures  
• Aggregated data 
• Sample size not 
provided 
• Other differences 
between counties 


















• Randomly selected patients with schizophrenia 
or schizoaffective disorder (age 18-50) one 
year before capitation and one year after 
capitation (44/100 were in both) 
• Patients interviewed for demographic data 
• Administrative databases used to capture 
outpatient use  
• Analysis: t-test 
• No significant difference in 
outpatient treatment contacts 
pre- or post-capitation 
• Patient-level data 
• Relatively small 
sample (N=100 at 
each time point) 
• Outpatient services 
not clearly defined  











Methods Study Findings Strengths/ Limitations 
Xiang et al. 
(2019) 
• Introduction 









• Administrative data 
• Compared suburban group that began in FFS 
and switched to capitation to urban group that 
stayed in FFS over same time 
• Inverse propensity score (PS) weighting used 
to match groups 
• Covariates for PS weighting: age, ethnicity, 
sex, type of Medicaid home and community-
based services waivers, nursing home resident 
status, total months enrolled in Medicaid, 
behavioural health category, physical health 
conditions, baseline monthly number of visits 
and expenditures  
• Analysis: weighted regression; covariates: 
time, time x group interactions  
• During 6-12 months after 
introducing capitation, 
significant reduction in 
utilization of behavioural 
health-specific outpatient 
visits in capitation relative to 
FFS (-34.6 visits per 100 
people per month) 









• Relatively short 
time of analysis 
due to policy 





MC: managed care; FFS: fee-for-service; ASI: Addiction Severity Index; MH: mental health; SMI: serious mental illness; CMHC: Community Mental 
Health Centers; DC: direct capitation; MBHO: Managed Behavioural Health Organization; OR: odds ratio; OLS: ordinary least squares; QALYs: quality-
adjusted life years; SA: substance abuse; AOR: adjusted odds ratio; GEE: generalized estimating equation; ADG: Aggregated Diagnostic Groups; RUB: 






Table 2.3: Literature review table for papers that assessed the relationship between remuneration (FFS vs capitation) on ED 




Exposure Variable(s) Outcome 
Variable(s) 
Methods Study Findings Strengths/ Limitations 
Catalano et al. 
(2005) 
• Introduction of 
capitation in 
specific areas of 
Colorado (others 
remain in FFS) 
• Number of 
psychiatric 
ED visits by 
adults  
• Administrative data of visits to EDs by adults 
with a primary MI or SA diagnosis  
• Weekly number of psychiatric emergencies 
over 105 weeks beginning in July 1994: 
capitation implemented at week 53 
• Analysis: interrupted time-series analysis 
comparing capitated areas to FFS areas 
• After implementation of 
capitation, use of 
psychiatric ED services 
decreased lower than 
areas using FFS 
• Detailed weekly data 
• No adjustment for 
covariates 






(compared to FFS 
programs) 
• Access (% 
who received 
MH services 




• Combination of sample survey data, 
interviews, claims and encounter data of 
patients with SMI 
• Data from five sites (five US states) 
• Covariates: gender, marital status, education, 
race, disabled, age at first treatment 
• Adjustments made for each site separately 
• Analysis: meta-analytic random-effects 
model and equivalence testing  
• No difference between 
MC and FFS 
• Non-equivalent groups 
• Patient-level data 
• Good sample size 
(N=1969) 
• SMI patients only 
• Considerable variation 
between sites makes effect 
size difficult to interpret 
for most outcomes  
Steele et al. 
(2014) 






• Number of 
MH ED 
visits  
• Cross-sectional studying using administrative 
databases 
• Analysis: negative binomial regressions, 
GEEs accounting for clustering  
• Covariates: patient factors (age group, sex, 
rurality, recent registrants, ADGs, RUBs, 
diabetes, hypertension, congestive heart 
failure, income quintile), physician factors 
(gender, years since graduation, IMG, 
practice size) 
• Patients in blended 
capitation or TBC with no 
MH workers did not 
significantly differ from 
FFS in # of MH ED visits 
• Patients in TBC with MH 
workers were more likely 
to have MH ED visits 
• Large sample (N=125,233) 
• Focus on SMI patients 
 
 
FFS: fee-for-service; ED: emergency department; MI: mental illness; SA: substance abuse; MH: mental health; SMI: serious mental illness 
(schizophrenia or bipolar disorder); MC: managed care; TBC: team-based capitation; GEE: generalized estimating equations; ADG: aggregated 
diagnostic groups; RUB: Resource Utilization Band; IMG: international medical graduate 





3 Analysis of Billings Data to Evaluate Patterns of Mental Health Services in 
Primary Care and Emergency Departments by Blended Fee-For-Service and 
Blended Capitation Models in Ontario, Canada  
 
3.1 Introduction 
Globally, the prevalence of mental illnesses is estimated to be in the range of 13% to 18%, which 
is likely to be underestimated because of the stigma, under-diagnosis, and under-reporting of 
mental illnesess.1,2 In OECD countries, about 20% of the working age population meets the 
clinical threshold for a mental disorder, and approximately 25% to 50% of the population will 
have a mental disorder at some point in their life.3 Mental illness places a huge burden on 
countries: the estimated total cost in 2010 was $2.5 trillion USD. For OECD countries, the 
estimated cost of mental illness is 2% to 5% of the gross domestic product.4 The direct costs for 
treating mental illnesses range from 5% to 18% of total health expenditures.4 Indirect costs such 
as absenteeism, presenteeism, unemployment, and underemployment make up two-thirds of the 
total costs of mental illnesses.5 In Canada, it is estimated that one in five have a mental illness at 
any given time, and that by age 40 approximately 40% of Canadians have had a mental illness.6 
The direct cost of treating mental illnesses in Canada is estimated to be between $11.2 and $18.1 
billion per annum, and the cost of lost productivity is estimated at $50 billion per annum.7  
As mental illness is a leading cause of disability8 and is associated with increased risk for other 
illnesses and mortality,9,10 improved diagnosis and treatment at the early stage of mental illness 
is critical. Evidence suggests that under-treatment is still a major issue in many countries. Across 
OECD countries, a large proportion of patients with mental illness do not receive treatment: 
about one-third of patients with schizophrenia do not receive treatment, while for patients with 
milder mental illnesses like anxiety and depression, more than half do not receive treatment.4,11 
Treatment gaps are also found in Canada: in 2012, only 16% with a substance use disorder  saw 




both substance use disorder and a mood/anxiety disorder, only 66% sought professional mental 
health services.12 
Numerous reports and commissions have emphasized the importance of improving treatment of 
mental illness in primary care setting.4,13 Treating mild to moderate mental illness in primary 
care setting through accurate diagnoses, initiating and managing appropriate treatment, and 
coordinating with other health professionals, including referrals to psychiatrists, may not only 
reduce the costs of mental illnesses14,15 but also improve the health of this population.14,16 Indeed, 
some evidence suggests that integrating mental health services into primary care enhances access 
to these services in a cost-effective manner.13 Treatment in primary care also provides an 
opportunity for a more holistic care by coordinating referrals to necessary specialists and other 
providers.  
FPs are in the best position to provide the bulk of mental health services to their patients before 
their mental illnesses reaches a crisis point requiring emergency or inpatient care. Many 
developed countries have reformed primary care in order to improve access to comprehensive 
primary care, including mental health services. Many of these reforms involved introducing 
blended remuneration for FPs combined with formal patient enrollment and pay-for-performance 
incentives.17–19 The limited research to date assessing how physician remuneration affects supply 
of mental health services has produced mixed results (see section 3).  
No study has explicitly examined the impact of blended remuneration on the provision of mental 
health services. We filled this gap by studying the provision of mental health services (focusing 
on psychiatric illnesses such as schizophrenia and other psychoses, mood disorders, anxiety 
disorders, and substance use disorders) in Ontario’s blended FFS and blended capitation models. 
Because there is the potential for physician selecting into different remuneration models, we 
accounted for the systematic differences between switchers and non-switchers using inverse 
probability weighting and fixed-effects regressions. The number of mental health services 
provided by FPs per 1000 patients and the value of these services (2006 dollars) were assessed to 
determine if and the extent to which the remuneration models influence the volume of mental 
health services provided by FPs. We also investigated whether these services were provided 




ED visits for mental health reasons was compared between groups. We found that blended 
capitation was associated with a decrease in the total number of mental health services provided 
and the value of these services, but an increase in the number and value of mental health services 
provided during after-hours. Despite providing fewer services, blended capitation was also 
associated with a decrease in mental health-related ED visits, primarily during regular-hours.  
3.2 Institutional Context  
Canadian FPs have historically been paid by a FFS remuneration system, in which they were 
paid for each unit of service provided to their patients. In the early 2000s, Ontario, which is 
Canada’s most populous province, introduced new payment models for FPs.20 Two new 
remuneration models that have become very popular are the Family Health Group (FHG), a 
blended FFS model introduced in 2003, and the Family Health Organization (FHO), a blended 
capitation model introduced in 2006.21 In FHO, FPs receive the base capitation payment for their 
enrolled patients, adjusted for the patient’s age and sex to provide a defined basket of services; 
they also receive 15% of the FFS amount for each in-basket service provided to enrolled patients. 
They receive 100% of the FFS amount for services provided outside the basket with no limit, as 
well as for all services to non-enrolled patients up to the annual hard cap limit.22 FHO physicians 
are also eligible to claim targeted financial incentives in the area of illness prevention (influenza 
vaccination, pap smear, mammography, childhood immunization, colorectal screening), chronic 
disease management (diabetes management, smoking cessation counselling fee, heart failure 
management incentive), and after-hours care (specific services rendered after 5PM on weekdays, 
or at any time on weekends and statutory holidays; the premium was originally 10% but 
increased to 15% in April 2005, then was increased to 20% in April 2006, and then increased to 
30% in April 2011).20 In contrast, blended FFS is similar to the traditional FFS in terms of the 
base payment, but also includes the same targeted financial incentives as in FHOs;20,21 thus, FHG 
and FHO have different base remunerations. As of March 31st 2016, approximately 54% of 
Ontario’s FPs were in one of these two models, covering 92% of enrolled patients.23 The main 
characteristics of FHG and FHO models are presented in Table 3.1.  
One of the reasons blended remuneration models were introduced is that pure FFS encourages 




in patients’ health.24,25 Capitation, on the other hand, eliminates provision of unnecessary 
services, but may also lead to withholding of necessary services unless payments are 
appropriately risk-adjusted. Evidence suggests that compared to FPs paid by FFS, capitated FPs 
tend to provide fewer services,26 which may be partly due to reduction in elective procedures and 
unnecessary prescriptions.27 It is unclear whether overprovision of mental health services occurs 
under FFS.1 Capitation may also result in physicians avoiding high-needs patients, known as 
cream-skimming.28 In Ontario, the capitation fee is only adjusted for age and sex. Thus, between 
two patients who are the same age and sex but have differing levels of health, capitation 
incentivizes enrolling the healthier patient.24 Capitation has also been found to be associated with 
increased referrals to specialists compared to FFS, suggesting potential offloading of care.26,29  
It has been suggested that blended models, which combine aspects of retrospective and 
prospective payments, may help to attenuate some of the negative effects of FFS and capitation, 
and thus lead to higher quality of care compared to ‘pure’ payment systems.24 For example, 
although capitation may encourage cream-skimming, incorporating some FFS payments may 
provide incentive for physicians to take on and treat complex patients. It is still unclear what 
exact ‘blend’ is best: if models should be more like FFS, or more like capitation, for highest 
quality of care. Ontario’s experiment with blended remuneration models provides an opportunity 
to understand how different types of blended models impact mental health service provision. 
Since the introduction of these new models, a number of studies have assessed their impact on 
service usage and patient outcomes, such as diabetes care and cancer screening.30,31 However, the 
impact on the provision of mental health services for patients with mental illness remains 
unclear, and hence is the focus of this paper.  
3.3 Related Literature 
Although several countries have introduced new payment models, there is a lack of research 
assessing how payment models affect patients with mental illness. The vast majority of studies 
 
1 Under-diagnosis and over-diagnosis of certain mental disorders are documented in Canada. Up to half of 
Canadians with a mood disorder are not diagnosed.71 Approximately one-third of Ontarians who visited the ED for a 
mental health reason during 2006 to 2013 had not previously seen a physician for mental health reasons.72 On the 
other hand, over-diagnosis mental illnesses like bipolar disorder and depression has been noted and may lead to 




comparing different types of remuneration methods and their effect on mental health service 
utilization come from the United States, though some work has been conducted on people with 
SMI (psychosis or bipolar disorder) in Ontario.  
A few studies have assessed capitation versus FFS on volume of mental health services using 
pre-post data. Stoner et al. (1997) found no difference, whereas Xiang et al. (2019) found it was 
lower in capitation.32,33 Xiang et al.’s study had similar baseline measures between groups and 
controlled for more covariates; however, Stoner et al. covered a slightly longer follow-up after 
introduction of capitation. In studies of patients with SMI, two found a decrease in number of 
services used,34,35 while one found a statistically non-significant decrease, although this could be 
due to their study design and small sample size.36 Thus, capitation appears to be associated with 
use of fewer mental health services in both the general population and for patients with SMI.  
Patients who are not receiving adequate care from their FP may turn to the ED for their mental 
health needs instead;37 thus, one measure of quality and accessibility of mental health care 
provision in primary care is ED usage for mental health reasons. Only one study from the US 
assessed ED usage for mental health reasons in the general population, and found capitation to be 
associated with lower ED usage compared to FFS.38 Two studies assessing patients with SMI 
were found: one US study using survey data found no difference between capitation and FFS in 
ED usage over three months,39 and an Ontario study assessing two years of health administrative 
data also did not find a difference.35  
As much of the existing literature comes from the US, and thus are based on enrolment into 
different types of private insurance plans, it is unclear whether these findings can be generalized 
to other countries where the majority of health care is covered under public insurance plans.40 A 
study comparing multiple European countries with different physician payment models argued 
that how physicians are paid may be an important factor for referral and/or treatment of mental 
illness.41 In the Netherlands, a case-mix remuneration model for mental healthcare has been 
introduced to replace salaried payment, and has led to mixed results for efficiency and costs.42 
Some limited work has been done in Ontario on patients with SMI, finding blended capitation to 
be associated with reduced mental health service provision compared to blended FFS, although 




findings apply to patients with common mental disorders is not known. Moreover, they did not 
account for the selection of physicians into different remuneration models and did not utilize 
longitudinal data; thus, they were not able to control for unobserved differences between 
physicians that may otherwise confound the results.  
3.4 Methods 
3.4.1 Study Design 
A retrospective cohort study design using data from April 1st 2007 to March 31st 2016 (i.e. fiscal 
years 2007/08 to 2015/16) was used to compare mental health service provision by FPs in 
blended capitation and blended FFS models. We identified FPs who were practicing in FHGs as 
of April 1st 2007 and they either remained in FHG (i.e. non-switchers) or switched to FHO and 
continued to practice in FHO (i.e. switchers) until March 31st 2016. As our analysis was at the 
physician level, patients’ outcomes and covariates were aggregated to their FP for each year. 
Physicians were excluded if they had less than 200 rostered patients in any year to exclude FPs 
who may have been working part-time at any point during this period. Patients were also 
excluded if they met any of the following exclusion criteria: (a) missing or invalid identifying 
key number; (b) missing or invalid age; (c) age <16 or >105 years old; and (d) missing or invalid 
sex.  
3.4.2 Data Sources and Variables 
This study used health administrative data from ICES (formerly known as the Institute for 
Clinical Evaluative Sciences). These datasets were linked using unique encoded identifiers and 
analyzed at ICES. Physician characteristics were obtained from the ICES Physician Database, 
and included age, sex, IMG status, and rurality. The Corporate Provider Database was used to 
obtain data on physician’s remuneration model and the number of FPs in each practice, while the 
number of enrolled patients were obtained from the Client Agency Program Enrolment database. 
The Ontario Registered Persons Database (RPDB) was used to obtain information on patients’ 
age and sex: average patient age, proportion of patients over 65 years old, and proportion of 




calculate patients’ area-level material deprivation score and ethnic concentration score,2 which 
were then used to sort patients into quintiles. An ICES-derived cohort – Primary Care Population 
– was used to obtain data on whether patients had been diagnosed with a chronic mental 
illnesses, defined as two outpatient or one inpatient visit for a mental health reason over the past 
two years.43 John Hopkins Adjusted Clinical Groups version 10.0 was used to derive patients’ 
Aggregated Diagnostic Groups (ADGs) based on patients’ diagnostic codes, which reflects 
comorbidity in primary care.44,45 An ADG score is based on 32 diagnostic groups, which are 
used as indicator variables and then summed, so a patient may have an ADG score of any integer 
between zero and 32. An ADG score was calculated for each enrolled patient based on diagnosis 
codes from ICES databases, and the mean ADG score for all patients enrolled to each physician 
was calculated. Using postal codes from the RPDB and the Postal Code Conversion File (PCCF), 
patients living in rural areas were identified, with towns of less than 10,000 people considered 
rural.46 The proportion of FP’s patients living in rural areas was used in the analysis. All 
covariates were defined for each fiscal year.  
We used the Ontario Health Insurance Plan (OHIP) database to obtain information on mental 
health services provided by FPs for each fiscal year, including fee codes and the claim amount. 
After-hours services are provided on weekdays after 5:00PM, on weekends, and statutory 
holidays, and services provided outside of these times are considered regular-hours services. 
Mental health services provided during after-hours were captured through a premium code 
(Q012) along with the OHIP billing codes for mental health services; it was assumed that 
services that did not have the after-hours premium code were rendered during regular hours. The 
list of codes used to capture mental health services can be found in Appendix A (Table A.1). The 
mental health service codes were derived from a prior validation study with high specificity and 
adequate sensitivity, with the addition of one code that was introduced after the validation study 
was published.47 The number of services as well as the value of the services (based on 2006 
prices) were obtained from the OHIP database. The value of the services was calculated by 
 
2 Material deprivation is a composite score based on the proportion aged 25+ years old without a certificate, 
diploma, or degree; the proportion of single-parent families; the proportion receiving government transfer payments, 
the proportion those aged 15+ who are unemployed, the proportion considered low-income, and the proportion 
living in homes of in need of major repair; ethnic concentration is a composite score based on neighbourhood level 
proportions, including the proportion who are recent immigrants (within 5 years) and the proportion of those who 




multiplying the number of mental health services provided by its billing value (in 2006 dollars), 
which was then summed to produce the total OHIP claims for mental health services for each 
physician for each fiscal year. Information on referrals to psychiatrists was also obtained from 
the OHIP. Information on SMI was based on combination of diagnostic and billing codes. In 
FHG, any enrolled patient with a diagnostic code 295 (schizophrenia) or billing code Q020 
(tracking code for bipolar disorder) was considered to have SMI, whereas in FHO, any enrolled 
patient that used billing code Q020 or Q021 (tracking code for schizophrenia) was considered to 
have SMI.48,49 
Expected gain in income from switching from FHG to FHO was calculated based on the services 
that physician provided during the previous fiscal year (2006/07) for enrolled and non-enrolled 
patients, using an algorithm derived by the Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care 
(MOHLTC).50 This algorithm uses the following assumptions: (1) a capitation rate of $144.08 
multiplied by the age-sex modifier for each enrolled patient; (2) 10% of FFS value for in-basket 
services to enrolled patients; (3) 100% of FFS value for in-basket services to non-enrolled 
patients up to the hard cap limit; (4) 100% of FFS value for out-of-basket services to any patient; 
and (5) special payment eligibility rules.  
Data on ED visits for mental health reasons were obtained from the National Ambulatory Care 
Reporting System (NACRS). ED visits were stratified by regular-hours and after-hours. The list 
of diagnostic codes used to identify ED visits for mental health reasons can be found in 
Appendix A (Table A2). 
3.4.3 Statistical Analysis 
Given that Ontario FPs choose their remuneration model, there is the potential for selection bias: 
FPs in the switcher group may be systematically different from FPs in the non-switcher group in 
ways that may affect how they provide care. The decision to switch or remain in FHG is likely 
influenced by a variety of factors: for example, it is expected that FPs would be more likely to 
switch from FHG to FHO if they have a relatively high expected gain in income. To address this 
issue, we employed a two-step estimation strategy. In the first stage, we accounted for the 
differences between switchers and non-switchers using an inverse probability weighted (IPW) 




ensures that switchers and non-switchers were comparable in terms of the variables included in 
the PS model at baseline: 
• Provision of mental health services: number of mental health services provided, the 
number of enrolled patients with SMI;  
• Physician characteristics: physicians’ age and its square, sex, rurality, IMG status, group 
size;  
• Patient characteristics, aggregated per FP: average age of enrolled patients, proportion 
of senior patients, proportion of female patients, average ADG score of patients, 
proportion of patients living in areas that were in the lowest two quintiles on the material 
deprivation score, proportion of patients living in areas that were the lowest two quintiles 
on the ethnic concentration score), proportion of patients living in rural areas, and the 
proportion of patients with chronic mental illness in the practice; and  
• Expected gain in income from switching to FHO in the previous fiscal year (2006/07).  
In the second stage, we estimated the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) using inverse 
probability weighted regression models. ATT provides an estimate of the benefit of those who 
received the treatment, which is of interest in this paper as the goal is to determine the impact of 
switching from FHG to FHO on outcomes.  
Covariate balancing between two groups was checked using t-tests for equality of means, 
standardized bias (i.e. the difference of sample means as a percentage of the square root of the 
average of the sample variances), and percentage reduction in bias before and after matching. 
There is currently no universally-agreed upon standard for how much standardized bias is 
appropriate, but some have proposed a maximum standardized bias of 10% to 25%.52,53 Even if 
the standardized bias for all covariates is less than 10%, the findings may still be biased. 
Therefore, matching was also performed using the entropy balancing (EB) method, which is 
based on a maximum entropy reweighting scheme that ensures exact balancing on the moments 
of covariate distributions in both groups.54 The EB method has been demonstrated to be robust to 
propensity score mis-specification.55 In this paper, we used the first three moments (mean, 
variance, and skewness) for all continuous covariates and the first moment for all binary 








the weight for each switcher observation is one.  
3.4.4 Regression Models 
Weighted regression models were used to assess the effect of switching on the provision of 
mental health services (the number and value of mental health services, the number of enrolled 
patients with SMI, and ED visits for mental health reasons and the corresponding number of 
patients) using the following equation at the physician level:  
ln𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛿FHO𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽
′𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆𝜏 + 𝑖𝑡, 
where subscripts i and t represent physicians and time, respectively; lnS is the natural logarithm 
of the outcome (number/value of services provided by the FP, patients with SMI, and ED visits 
for mental health reasons; all outcomes were standardized to per 1,000 patients), however, we 
added one to adjust for some zeros in the data; αi is a physician-specific idiosyncratic term 
representing time-invariant factors; FHO is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the physician 
practices in the FHO and 0 if s/he practices in the FHG; X includes age, age squared, sex, 
rurality, IMG status, group size, average age of patients in the physician’s practice, proportion of 
senior patients, proportion of female patients, average ADG score of patients, proportion of 
patients in quintiles 1 or 2 on the material deprivation score, proportion of patients in quintiles 1 
or 2 on the ethnic concentration score, proportion of patients living in rural areas, and proportion 
of patients with chronic mental illness; τ is a time trend; and ε is the error term.  
Regression models were estimated using a pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
ignoring αi, a fixed-effects (FE) regression, and a high-dimensional fixed-effects (HDFE) 
regression that allows for change in αi over time using IPW estimator based on PSM matching 
and EB matching. All regressions were run using robust standard errors clustered at the 
physician level. The OLS regression does not take into account the repeated measurements and 
hence physician-specific differences in outcomes. The FE estimator does account for repeated 
measurements over the same physicians and controls for time-invariant physician-specific factors 
such as altruism, diagnostic ability, and other personal preferences.55 The HDFE estimator not 




these characteristics to vary over time. Using multiple estimators provides insight into 
differences in outcomes when more confounders are controlled for.  
Subgroup analyses were also carried out to examine whether the impact of switching from FHG 
to FHO differed among different subpopulations of FPs. These analyses were conducted for the 
following physician subgroups: (1) sex, (2) age group (younger versus older), and (3) time of 
switch (early versus late switchers). Subgroup analyses were only conducted for mental health 
services provided in primary care and psychiatric ED usage. All analyses were conducted in 
Stata 13.1.  
3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Matching Results 
A total of 2,656 FPs were assessed (switchers: N = 1,420; non-switchers: N = 1,256). Table 3.2 
reports difference in means for variables at baseline before and after PSM, the p value for t-tests 
for equality of means between switchers and non-switchers, standardized bias between groups 
before and after PSM, and the reduction in bias after matching. The before matching results are 
based on an unweighted regression, and the after matching results are based on propensity score 
weighted regression. The t-tests on the before matching data indicate that there were statistically 
significant differences between switchers and non-switchers for all variables, with the 
standardized bias ranging from 3.9% to 49.8%. Physicians who switched tended to be younger, 
female, practicing in a rural area, have graduated from a Canadian medical school, have smaller 
physician group size, have fewer enrolled patients, and have a higher expected gain in income 
relative to non-switchers. On average, the patients of physicians who switched tended to be older 
and have a lower ADG score. Switcher physicians also had higher proportions of senior patients, 
female patients, patients living in less-deprived areas, patients living in areas of low ethnic 
concentration, and patients living in rural areas. Switchers also tended to provider fewer mental 
health services and have fewer patients with SMI at baseline. Following matching and re-
weighting of the non-switcher physicians, the re-weighted group became comparable to the 
switcher group: t-tests indicate that for all variables, after weighting, the difference in means was 




proportion of patients with chronic mental illness, but still remained below 10% and was likely 
due to the small magnitude of the pre-weighting difference.  
The standardized mean difference and variance ratios are presented in Figure 3.1, which shows 
that after matching, the standardized mean difference and variance ratio for nearly all variables 
were closer to 0 and one, respectively. This indicates that the matching procedure was reasonably 
successful in eliminating the baseline covariate differences between switchers and non-switchers. 
Thus, any changes in outcomes over time are likely due to switching of FPs from blended FFS to 
blended capitation.  
3.5.2 Regression Results 
3.5.2.1 Mental health services provision in primary care  
Figure 3.2 presents the PS-weighted mean number and value of mental health services provided 
per 1,000 enrolled patients, per FP for each fiscal year for both switchers and non-switchers. As 
expected, switchers and non-switchers provided similar numbers of services across the total, 
regular-, and after-hours in the first year. For total and regular-hours services, non-switchers 
continued to provide similar number of services, whereas switchers steadily decreased the 
number of services over time. During after-hours, both groups increased the number of services 
as well as the value of services over time.  
The estimated impact of switching from blended FFS to blended capitation on number and value 
of mental health services per 1,000 enrolled patients are presented in Table 3.3. Switching from 
FHG to FHO was associated with a 12.4%, 13.8%, and 13.5% decrease in the number of mental 
health services provided to enrolled patients based on the OLS, FE, and HDFE estimates, 
respectively.3 A similar relationship is seen on the value of mental health services, with 
switching to FHO associated with a 14.9%, 17.8%, and 17.2% decrease in the value of mental 
health services based on the OLS, FE, and HDFE estimates, respectively.  
Switching was associated with an increase in the number of mental health services provided 
during after-hours, with increases of 30.2%, 39.6%, and 21.0% for the OLS, FE, and HDFE 
 





estimates. Switching was also associated with an increase in the corresponding value of these 
services, with increases of 64.9%, 73.8%, and 35.7% respectively. The effect of switching on 
mental health services during regular-hours was very similar to the effect seen on total services: 
switching was associated with a decrease in the number of services by 12.3%, 15.3%, and 14.3% 
based on the OLS, FE, and HDFE estimates, and a corresponding decrease in the value of 
services provided by 14.4%, 18.2%, and 17.4%. In summary, switching from FHG to FHO was 
associated with a decrease in mental health services, driven primarily by a decrease in services 
provided during regular-hours. However, the opposite trend was seen for after-hours services.  
3.5.2.2 Number of patients with serious mental illness (psychosis or bipolar disorder)  
To determine whether switching from FHG to FHO was associated with reduced enrollment of 
patients with SMI, the number of these patients (standardized to per 1,000 enrolled patients) per 
group was assessed. Descriptive analyses using t-tests for each year were conducted, and 
significant differences for eight of the nine years were found (see Appendix A3.4: Table A3.19), 
so regression analyses were conducted.  
The estimated impact of switching from FHG to FHO on the number of enrolled patients with 
SMI per 1000 enrolled patients is presented in Table 3.3. PS-weighted OLS, FE, and HDFE 
estimates indicate a 5.2% increase, 8.0% decrease, and 3.9% decrease, respectively; however, 
only the FE estimate was statistically significant. This suggests that switching to FHO did not 
lead to a change in rostering patients with SMI.   
3.5.2.3 Referrals to a psychiatrist 
Analysis using t-tests of proportions of FPs who referred at least one patient to a psychiatrist 
suggested that in later years, non-switchers were more likely to refer at least one patient to a 
psychiatrist compared to switchers (see Appendix A3.4, Table A3.20). However, only two 
percent of FPs made a referral, making this outcome a relatively rare event. Furthermore, the 
magnitude of the differences was small, with the largest difference being 3.4% in 2015/2016. 
Thus, it was concluded that this data did not support the hypothesis that switchers tend to refer 





3.5.2.4 Use of the emergency department for mental health reasons  
Figure 3.3 presents the PS-weighted mean number of ED visits for mental health reasons and 
number of patients who visited the ED for a mental health reason per 1,000 enrolled patients, per 
FP for each year, by group. The figures indicate that for non-switchers, the number of ED visits 
appeared to be slightly increasing over time beginning around 2009, while remaining stable for 
switchers. Similar patterns were seen across total ED visits, regular-hours ED visits, and after-
hours ED visits, as well as for patients presenting to the ED. 
The estimated impact of switching from FHG to FHO on ED visits is presented in Table 3.4. The 
results indicate that switching was associated with a decrease in the number of ED visits for 
mental health reasons by 5.6%, 7.5%, and 4.6% based on the OLS, FE, and HDFE estimates. 
There was a small decrease in the number of patients using the ED for mental health reasons 
(3.2%, 3.9%, and 2.1% respectively), and this was not statistically significant in the HDFE 
model.  
During regular-hours, switching was associated with a decrease in ED visits by 6.3%, 5.8%, and 
6.5% based on OLS, FE, and HDFE estimates. Switching was associated with a decrease in the 
number of patients by 3.8%, 1.8%, and 3.4%, but the FE model was not statistically significant. 
During after-hours, switching was associated with a decrease in after-hours ED visits by 5.4%, 
7.1%, and 1.2% based on the OLS, FE, and HDFE estimates, and a decrease in the number of 
patients using the ED by 3.4%, 3.9%, and 0.9%. Only the OLS and FE estimates were 
statistically significant. Overall, switching from FHG to FHO was associated with a slight 
decrease in ED visits for mental health, and this seems to be driven largely by a decrease in 
regular-hours ED visits. However, switching did not appear to significantly impact the number of 
patients using the ED.  
3.5.3 Subgroup Analyses 
Subgroup analyses were conducted to determine whether provision of mental health services in 
primary care or ED visits for mental health reasons differ based on physician sex, physician age 
(< 50 or > 50 years old as of April 1st 2007), or timing of switch (April 1st 2007 to March 31st 




ranges. Unweighted and EB-weighted coefficients are available in Appendix A3.3. No 
statistically significant differences were found between subgroups, based on overlapping 95% 
confidence intervals, but some differences in magnitude of the effects were found and are 
discussed.  
Sex. The PS-weighted estimates on switching from FHG to FHO for male and female physicians 
are presented in Tables 3.5 and 3.6. Overall, male and female switchers, compared to the 
respective non-switchers, have comparable changes in the provision of overall mental health 
services and regular-hours mental health services. Female switchers tended to have a larger 
increase in the number of services provided during after-hours (31.3% to 57.5%) compared to 
male switchers (10.2% to 30.6%). This gap was also seen for value of mental health services 
provided during after-hours (female physicians: 53.6% to 119.8%; male physicians: 22.7% to 
57.6%). As previously discussed, switchers may provide more after-hours care because they are 
more incentivized by the premium than non-switchers. It is possible that female switchers are 
responding to incentives to a greater extent than male switchers, given that female switchers 
were providing slightly fewer after-hours services at baseline (in 2007/2008) compared to male 
switcher. As seen in Table 3.6, switching to FHO is associated with a slightly larger decrease in 
ED visits for male switchers (5.2% to 9.9%) compared to female switchers (4.0% to 5.2%), with 
similar differences seen in regular-hours and after-hours ED visits.  
Age. Younger physicians who switched to FHO had a slightly larger change in the number and 
value of mental health services provided compared to older physicians who switched, though the 
ranges overlap and thus this difference is likely non-significant (see Tables 3.7 and 3.8). On 
average, younger switchers provided 12.9% to 16.3% fewer total mental health services 
compared to younger non-switchers; for older physicians, switchers provided 9.3% to 14.9% 
fewer total mental health services. Similar trends are seen for after-hours and regular-hours 
services, as well as the value of mental health services. Younger FPs may be more likely to 
drastically change their practice patterns upon switching, whereas older FPs may be less prone to 
such changes. They did not differ substantially in overall or after-hours ED visits for mental 
health reasons by patients, although older physicians who switch had a larger decrease in number 
of patients who present to the ED during regular-hours (3.6% to 6.3%), compared to younger 




may be relatively more motivated and may work more hours compared to older non-switchers 
who may have chosen to not switch because they are preparing for retirement and thus choose to 
work fewer hours. In comparison, younger switchers may not differ as much from younger non-
switchers in this regard, and hence have a smaller difference.  
Timing of switch. In this subgroup analysis, all non-switchers were compared to either those 
who switched in the first two fiscal years (early switchers; N = 662) or those who switched in the 
last seven years (late switchers; N = 758) to determine whether the effect sizes were different 
between the groups. Early switchers appeared to be largely comparable to later switchers in total 
and regular-hours mental health services; however, the increase in number of after-hours services 
was smaller for early switchers (15.0% to 26.7%) compared to late switchers (23.6% to 49.7%), 
with value following a similar pattern. It is possible that later switchers may be more 
incentivized to provide after-hours care compared to early switchers. Both groups had similar 
coefficients for ED visits, as seen in Table 3.10; early switchers had slightly larger decreases in 
the number of patients using the ED during regular-hours (4.6% to 5.1%) compared to late 
switchers (0.07% to 2.4%).  
3.5.4 Findings From Other Covariates 
Detailed regression results, including coefficients from the covariates, can be found in Appendix 
B. Some covariates were significantly associated with the outcomes. Covariates that were 
consistently associated with outcomes in FE and HDFE regressions are discussed below.  
Mental health service provision in primary care. FPs were likely to provide a higher quantity of 
mental health services (total, as well as during regular-hours and after-hours) if they were 
female, Canadian medical graduates, their patients were on average sicker (as measured by the 
average ADG score in the practice), and if they had more patients with chronic mental illness. 
After-hours service provision tended to be higher with smaller group sizes. The value of mental 
health services provided followed the same trends as the results of number of mental health 
services.  
Female FPs may be more comfortable with treating mental illnesses, particularly in providing 




pharmacotherapy.56 International medical graduates may be provided less training regarding 
mental illness, or be less comfortable in treating mental illnesses due to cultural differences. It is 
possible that the higher ADG score also reflects a higher proportion of patients with co-morbid 
mental illness who use more mental health services. Lower after-hours service provision in larger 
physician groups may be due to fewer members providing most of the after-hours care. Each 
physician group is expected to provide a minimum number of after-hours care; however, it is not 
necessary for all FPs within the group to work after-hours.  
Enrolling patients with SMI. FPs were more likely to have a greater number of patients with 
SMI if they had a higher average ADG score among their patients, more patients in the bottom 
two quintiles on the Ethnic Concentration Score, and had a greater proportion of patients with 
chronic mental illness. Mental disorders are included in ADG scores and patients with SMI are 
also more likely to have physical health illnesses, so it is unsurprising that higher average ADG 
score is associated with more enrolled patients with SMI. Interpretation of the ethnic 
concentration score is slightly difficult, as it is based on area-level measures. One interpretation 
could be that having more patients in the bottom two quintiles of the Ethnic Concentration Score 
indicates having fewer ethnic minorities as enrolled patients. Different ethnic groups have been 
found to have different rates of incidence for schizophrenia: for example, Canadian migrants 
from East Asia tend to have lower incidence rates compared to the general population. However, 
this trend is not consistent for other ethnic groups, such as migrants from the Caribbean and 
Bermuda who tend to have a higher incidence. Furthermore, refugees from certain groups tend to 
have a higher rate of psychotic disorders.57 Since the ethnic concentration variable is a broad 
composite measure based on area-level data, it is unclear if this finding is due to minority 
groups’ differences in incidence of serious mental illnesses. A study found that immigrant status, 
particularly those living in an area with a high ethnic concentration score was associated with 
lower incidence of mental illnesses, including schizophrenia.58  
ED visits for mental health reasons. ED visits for mental health reasons was higher among FPs 
with: smaller group sizes, with a younger average patient age, higher average ADG scores, 
patients in the bottom two quintiles of the Material Deprivation Score, patients in the bottom two 
quintiles of the Ethnic Concentration Score, and patients with chronic mental illness. This was 




proportion of patients with chronic mental illness was not statistically significant in the HDFE 
for after-hours ED visits. When the number of patients was assessed, the covariates were 
significant in the same directions. In addition, FPs with a greater proportion of patients over 65 
years old also tended to have more patients who used the ED for mental health reasons. 
Proportion of patients over 65 was not significant for the regular-hours ED visit regression, but 
was significant for the after-hours ED visit regression.  
Previous research on ED visits has also found that non-ethnic minorities, as well as sicker 
patients, tend to use the ED more frequently, which aligns with the results of our study.59 It is not 
clear why ethnic minorities tend to less likely use the ED; some potential reasons could be 
stigma, worries about language barrier, or the cultural acceptability of ED care. Having a smaller 
physician group size may suggest access to relatively fewer FPs in the practice, which may lead 
to increased use of the mental health-related ED visits. Greater material deprivation was 
associated with lower use of the ED for mental health reasons, which aligns with previous 
research on overall ED usage.60 These patients may be using the ED, rather than primary care, 
for a variety of reasons, such as lack of having a FP or real or perceived difficulties in accessing 
their FP. In general, older patients tend to use the ED more than younger patients.61 In an 
Australian study that interviewed older patients who used the ED, 59% expressed difficulties 
accessing after-hours primary care without using the ED.62 It is possible that Canadian seniors 
also have a real or perceived difficulty in seeing their FP during after-hours, and thus turn to the 
ED.  
3.6 Discussion  
We found that FPs who switched from FHG to FHO tended to provide fewer mental health 
services compared to FPs who remained in FHG. Previous research has documented that FHO 
physicians provide fewer overall health services compared to physicians in FHGs,63,64 and our 
results found that this result holds true for mental health services. The previous studies found 
decreases of 9% to 15% in capitated services and increases of 10% to 22% in FFS and after-
hours services. Although an earlier study found capitation to be associated with lower provision 
of after-hours care compared to FFS,65 this may be due to the fact that this study was conducted 




were still adjusting. The after-hours premium is also now higher in value, which may have 
increased FPs’ provision of after-hours care. Mental health services are within the capitated 
basket, and we found an overall decrease of around 12% to 14%, and an increase in after-hours 
services of 21% to 40%.  
Service provision may decrease during regular hours but increase during after-hours because of 
differences in incentive. FPs in FHO will only earn 15% of the FFS payment for providing 
capitated services during regular-hours, but can earn additional 20 to 30% more if they provide 
these same services during after-hours: therefore, they may choose to provide greater quantity of 
those services during after-hours. In comparison, FPs in FHGs already earn 100% FFS value of 
services provided during regular-hours. Thus, although FHGs and FHOs have the same 
requirements and incentives for after-hours care, it is possible that FPs in FHOs respond more 
strongly to the incentives; FPs under blended capitation have been found to be more responsive 
to incentives than FPs under blended FFS for other premiums, such as the diabetes management 
incentive66 and for cancer screening.50 Differences in team composition may also play a factor, 
as some FHO practices are team-based and patients may be receiving mental health services 
from non-physician providers, such as nurses or mental health workers. Thus, patients with FHO 
FPs may be obtaining mental health services from these non-physician providers during regular 
hours. After-hours availability may be used as a measure of accessibility, and Canada is notably 
below average compared to many other developed countries; however, this has been improving 
in recent years, and Ontario now has the highest proportion of FPs who report having after-hours 
availability compared to other provinces, possibly due in part to these new payment models.67 
Furthermore, this increase in after-hours service provision may be related to the reduction in ED 
visits, as discussed below. 
Our results are consistent with some previous studies,33–35 but are inconsistent with others.32,36 A 
decrease in mental health service provision under capitation was found in the general population 
by Xiang et al.,33 and patients with SMI by Popkin et al. and Steele et al.34,35  Stoner et al. found 
no difference in the general population, but notably had differences in baseline number of mental 
health outpatient visits (those who switched from FFS to capitation had more visits than FFS in 




find a significant difference in their study of SMI patients, but this could have been due to their 
relatively small sample size and study design.36   
The analysis of enrolled patients with SMI found that switchers tended to roster relat ively fewer 
patients with SMI, though this finding was not statistically significant in the HDFE model. This 
is similar to a previous study by Steele et al., who found the proportion of patients with SMI in 
blended capitation to be slightly lower than blended FFS but was non-significant at the 5% 
level.68 FPs in blended capitation may tend to enroll healthier patients, but this may be partially 
offset by a premium FPs can receive if they roster a minimum number of patients with 
SMI.20,22,48 Whether FPs in FHOs are sending their patients to psychiatrists as a means of off-
loading high-needs patients was also examined. Our results indicate that this is not occurring, 
which is in contrast to previous research on overall referrals to specialists by switchers compared 
to non-switchers.29 This may be due to a shortage of psychiatrists available to refer patients. In 
Ontario, the median wait time for a psychiatrist is 73 days with a 75th percentile of 231.5 days,69 
and both physicians and patients report being frustrated by long waiting lists for psychiatrists.70 
It is thus possible that FPs in FHOs may not be referring more than FPs in FHGs because of 
access difficulties.  
Finally, ED use for mental health reasons was also assessed, as an alternative form of mental 
healthcare that patients may use if their needs are not being met in primary care. Despite 
capitation FPs providing fewer mental health services, their patients did not use the ED more 
frequently: in fact, there was a slight decrease in the number of ED visits, though only by a few 
percentage points. This is similar to the previous study by Catalano et al., who also found 
capitation to be associated with a decrease in psychiatric ED use in the general population.38 In 
comparison, studies assessing patients with SMI have found no difference in ED use for mental 
health reasons between capitation and FFS.35,39 It is possible that capitation may lead to better 
quality of care for patients with milder mental illnesses, leading them to utilize the ED less often; 
but this benefit may not apply to patients with more severe mental illnesses, and thus their usage 
of the ED does not decline. One explanation for our findings may be that under FHG, FPs are 
incentivized to provide unnecessary mental health services to increase their income; though they 
provide more services, their patients still turn to the ED because they may not be receiving the 




are not incentivized to over-provide, and patients who receive their needed treatment are less 
likely to come in again, leading to less work for the FP. We also found that this decrease appears 
to primarily occur during regular hours, as there was no statistically significant difference 
between remuneration models on the number of ED visits during after-hours. This may reflect 
improved access in FHO primarily during regular hours, or mental health workers in team-based 
FHOs providing mental health services during regular hours rather than the FPs. There was also 
no statistically significant effect of remuneration model on the number of patients who utilized 
ED services. It is possible that under FHO, patients may still use ED services but may make 
fewer visits compared to patients under FHG. Switcher FPs may be providing better quality of 
mental health services, and thus their patients go to the ED for mental health reasons less often. 
Switchers may also have better accessibility, such as allowing patients to come in on shorter 
notice or being more likely to provide after-hours care, which would also encourage patients to 
come to them first rather than go to the ED. Previous studies have found that 54% of Ontarians 
report difficulty accessing care during after-hours without going to the ED, and 42% state their 
most recent ED visit could have been avoided if they could have seen their provider.71 It is thus 
possible that because switcher FPs are providing more after-hours services, they are reducing the 
number of avoidable ED visits by their patients.  
These analyses were based on the assumption that having at least 200 enrolled patients indicated 
the physician was working full-time as a FP. To assess the sensitivity of this assumption, 
analyses using different minimum number of enrolled patients were conducted: (1) at least 100 
enrolled patients in all years, and (2) at least 500 enrolled patients in all years. The results of 
these sensitivity analyses were largely consistent with the main results, with a few exceptions. 
When only physicians who had at least 500 patients were analyzed, switchers had significantly 
fewer patients with SMI based on the PS-weighted FE and HDFE analyses (decreased by 9.8% 
and 5.5% respectively), while the OLS regression was statistically non-significant (decreased by 
4.3%). They also had significantly fewer patients who went to the ED for a mental health reason: 
the PS-weighted OLS, FE, and HDFE regressions found statistically significant decreases of 





3.6.1 Comparisons Across Models 
Multiple analyses were employed for each outcome to examine the effects of controlling for 
various confounders. From unweighted to PS-weighted results, one can see the effect of 
controlling for selection bias, while comparing PS-weighted to EB-weighted results indicates the 
effect when differences between groups on these baseline covariates are forced to zeros. The PS-
weighted results were usually substantially different from the unweighted results, highlighting 
the importance of accounting for selection bias. The EB-weighted regressions produced very 
similar results to the PS-weighted regressions, indicating the robustness of our conclusions. 
The OLS regression shows the results if repeated measures are not taken into account; the FE 
regression controls for repeated measures by controlling for the time-invariant physician-specific 
factors, and the HDFE regression goes a step further by controlling for time-variant physician-
specific factors. In general, the FE results were considerably different from the OLS. For mental 
health services in primary care, the FE model resulted in larger magnitudes of effect, indicating 
that unobservable time-invariant physician factors influence these outcomes and if not controlled 
for may partially mask the effect of FHO. The HDFE regressions were usually very similar to the 
FE results, with a few exceptions. One was after-hours mental health services in primary care 
and after-hours ED visits: the magnitude of the HDFE coefficients were much smaller than the 
corresponding FE results. Another exception was enrolling patients with SMI, which also 
decreased the magnitude of the effect to the point the difference between switchers and non-
switchers was statistically non-significant. This may indicate the impact of time-varying 
physician-specific factors on after-hours care and enrolling of patients with SMI.  
3.6.2 Strengths, Limitations, and Future Research 
This study adds to the literature assessing the relationship between blended physician 
remuneration models and mental health service utilization in the general population in a publicly 
funded health care system. This is the first study to use longitudinal data from Ontario and quasi-
experimental methods that control for confounding. As the analysis covered nine years of data, 
this provides time for switchers to adjust to their new model. The quasi-experimental design 




provide stronger evidence for a potential causal relationship between blended remuneration 
models and provision of mental health services.  
This study has some limitations. Although baseline characteristics of patients and physicians as 
well as outcomes were controlled for using PS weighting, there may still be some unmeasured 
differences between two groups that could be impacting these findings; thus, a definite causal 
conclusion cannot be made. The conclusions drawn are also based on the assumptions that the 
propensity score model was correctly specified, and that the untested conditional independence 
assumption holds true. These statistical methods also required us to only include physicians who 
had data for every year; therefore, these findings may not apply to other FPs. Furthermore, we 
can only account for observable characteristics that are available in the ICES databases. Other 
non-observable characteristics that may influence physician switching and/or service provision 
were not accounted for; for example, physicians may be more likely to switch if their peers have 
switched. We applied a log transformation for simplicity and because it allowed us to use the 
HDFE analysis and easier interpretation of the regression results; however, it is possible that a 
different transformation would have fitted the data better but cumbersome to interpret the 
coefficients. The number and value of services were assessed, but it is not clear if the efficiency 
and/or quality of the services provided by switchers versus non-switchers is the same, which is 
an area for future research. Descriptive analyses of the proportion of patients with chronic mental 
illness do suggest FHO FPs are under-rostering such patients compared to FHG FPs (Appendix 
A3.4, Table A3.21). We controlled for the proportion of patients with chronic mental illness and 
average ADG score in the practice in our PS model as well as the regressions, but these may not 
be perfect for adjusting for patient complexity. The proportion of patients with chronic mental 
illness does not take into account patient severity, which is another limitation of this 
measurement: it would not distinguish between a patient group that has a 20% prevalence of 
mild depression, from a patient group that has a 20% prevalence of severe schizophrenia. 
Though this would likely be at least partially adjusted through the SMI and/or ADG covariates, it 
may not be a sufficient adjustment. Though the finding that there was no increase in ED visits for 
mental health reasons under capitation is promising, further research on patient outcomes is 
needed to determine whether capitation leads to more efficient care for patients with mental 
illness. Another potential source of confounding is the issue of team-based capitation. 




some groups include a mental health worker.72 It is possible that the decline in mental health 
services found in switchers is because some mental health services are provided by the mental 
health workers instead of the FPs. Being in a team-based model with a mental health worker may 
have an impact, especially patients with SMI.35 As more than three million Ontarians are 
enrolled across over 180 Family Health Teams, it is important to understand the impact of team-
based models.73 This study only assessed services provided by the FP due to our use of billings 
data. Finally, there is the possibility that physicians under FHO may not be submitting all 
shadow billings, especially for patient visits with multiple problems. Thus, we may not have 
captured all mental health services provided by FHO FPs.  
Despite these limitations, this study provides evidence towards how different blended 
remuneration models may influence overall mental health service provided by FPs. Our results 
suggest that blended capitation may be one way to reduce mental health service overprovision by 
FPs without causing patients to turn to the ED as a source of care. Developing a clearer 
understanding of how these remuneration models impact FPs’ provision of mental health 
services can help not only Canadian policymakers make informed decisions about how to pay 
doctors to achieve better healthcare, but also provide potentially applicable lessons to other 
OECD countries with publicly funded healthcare systems. Future studies should assess 
differences between remuneration models in more detail, such as between different mental 
illnesses, provision different types of treatment (e.g. counselling, pharmaceutical treatment), and 
the impact of other health care providers such as other members of teams in team-based FHOs 
and psychiatrists.  
3.7 Conclusions 
Our findings suggest that FPs in blended capitation tend to provide fewer mental health services, 
but provide more after-hours care relative to FPs in blended FFS. Despite this decrease in service 
provision, FPs in blended capitation model are not referring their patients to psychiatrists more 
often, and their patients are not using the ED for mental health reasons relative to blended FFS. 
This indicates that their patients are not turning to psychiatrists or the ED as a substitute for 
primary care, which may reflect a reduction in service overprovision rather than a reduction in 




3.8 Table and Figures 
Table 3.1: Characteristics of Family Health Groups and Family Health Organization (modified 
from Hutchison and Glazier (2013)).  
 Family Health Group Family Health Organization 
Year introduced 2003 2006 
Physician remuneration Blended fee-for-service Blended capitation 
Formal patient enrolment Yes Yes 
Minimum group size 3 physicians 3 physicians 
Governance Physician-led Physician-led 
Interprofessional team 
members 
Yes, limited  Yes, limited unless part of the 
Family Health Team 
After-hours care requirements Yes Yes 






Fecal occult blood testing fee Yes Yes 
Chronic disease management 
(diabetes management 
incentive, smoking cessation 
counselling fee, heart failure 
management incentive) 
Yes Yes 
Premiums for providing 
services to rostered patients 
diagnosed with serious 
mental illness (bipolar 







Table 3.2: t-test and standardized bias before and after propensity score (PS) weighting.  
 
 Before PS weighting After PS weighting 





p value of t-
test before 
PSM 





p value of 
t-test after 
PSM 
% bias % reduction 
in |bias| after 
PSM 
Physician characteristics 
Age 49.020 51.561 <0.001 -27.4 49.020 49.369 0.309 -3.8 86.2 
Age2 2486.90 2745.80 <0.001 -27.4 2486.90 2521.2 0.321 -3.6 86.8 
Sex (% female) 0.416 0.375 0.032 8.3 0.416 0.4216 0.769 -1.1 86.7 
Rural (%) 0.057 0.027 <0.001 15.2 0.057 0.0740 0.069 -8.5 44.3 
IMG (%) 0.130 0.270 <0.001 -35.5 0.130 0.1252 0.685 1.3 96.4 
Group size 50.334 63.967 <0.001 -16.7 50.334 54.282 0.164 -4.8 71.0 
Expected gain in income (1000 $) 109.840 67.230 <0.001 43.0 109.840 107.23 0.463 2.6 93.9 
Patient characteristics (averaged per FP) 
Average age 46.382 45.119 <0.001 28.8 46.382 46.432 0.755 1.1 96.1 
Senior (%) 17.420 15.349 <0.001 25.6 17.420 17.388 0.915 0.4 98.4 
Average ADG score 3.479 3.591 <0.001 -22.6 3.479 3.5 0.214 -4.4 80.8 
Female (%) 56.645 55.205 0.010 10.0 56.645 56.892 0.648 -1.7 82.8 
% in Q1 or Q2 of Deprivation 
Score (ONMARG) 
48.738 44.320 <0.001 25.7 48.738 48.699 0.952 0.2 99.1 
% in Q1 or Q2 of Ethnic 
Concentration Score (ONMARG) 
33.732 22.237 <0.001 49.8 33.732 34.755 0.271 -4.4 91.1 
% living in rural area  9.537 4.716 <0.001 28.2 9.537 10.345 0.315 -4.7 83.2 
% with CMI 27.763 27.370 0.321 3.9 27.763 28.327 0.123 -5.5 -43.4 
Baseline services (2007/2008) per 1000 enrolled patients 
# of MH services  372.35 419.5 0.002 44.2 372.35 395 0.070 -5.6 52.0 
# enrolled patients with SMI 6.953 5.732 0.001 47.8 6.953 7.291 0.430 -3.7 72.3 
 
ADG: Aggregated Diagnostic Groups, from Johns Hopkins ACG Case-Mix System, version 10; IMG: international medical graduate; Q1: quintile 1; Q2: 
quintile 2; ONMARG: Ontario Marginalization Index; CMI: chronic mental illness, defined as having had at least two outpatient or one inpatient visit for 








MH serv.: mental health services; SMI: serious mental illness; IMG: international medical graduate; pats.: 
patients; avg ADG: average Aggregated Diagnostic Groups; % low depriv.: proportion in Q1 or Q2 on the 
Material Deprivation score; % low ethnic: proportion in Q1 or Q2 on the Ethnic Concentration score; CMI: 
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Table 3.3: Coefficient of FHO on the number and value of mental health services provided, and 
number of rostered patients with SMI, per 1000 enrolled patients (PS-weighted) 
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Observations = 23,904; Physicians = 2,656 
OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects; MH: 
mental health.  
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2656 clusters. 
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1 







Figure 3.3. Average number of visits and number of patients who had emergency department 
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Table 3.4: Coefficient of FHO on ED visits for mental health reasons (total visits and number of 
patients) per 1000 enrolled patients (PS-weighted)  
 
 
OLS FE HDFE 
Log of number of visits 




















Log of number of patients 





















Observations = 23,904; Physicians = 2,656  
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1 
Tables present IRR and 95% confidence intervals.  






Table 3.5: Coefficient of FHO on the number and value of mental health services per 1000 rostered patients: by physician sex (PS-
weighted) 
 
 Male physicians  Female physicians   
OLS FE HDFE OLS FE HDFE 


























































































Observations 14,409 14,409 14,409 9,495 9,495 9,495 
Physicians 1,601 1,601 1,601 1,055 1,055 1,055 
 
MH: mental health; OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.  
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for clusters (number of physicians). 
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1 






Table 3.6: Coefficient of FHO on ED visits for mental health reasons (total visits and number of patients): by physician sex (PS-
weighted) 
 
 Male physicians  Female physicians   
OLS FE HDFE OLS FE HDFE 
Log of number of visits 
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Observations 14,409 14,409 14,409 9,495 9,495 9,495 
Physicians 1,601 1,601 1,601 1,055 1,055 1,055 
 
ED: emergency department; OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.  
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for clusters (number of physicians). 
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1 






Table 3.7: Coefficient of FHO on the number and value of mental health services per 1000 rostered patients: by physician age (PS-
weighted) 
 
 Younger physicians (≤ 50 in 2007) Older physicians (> 50 in 2007)  
OLS FE HDFE OLS FE HDFE 


























































































Observations 12,312 12,312 12,312 11,592 11,592 11,592 
Physicians 1,368 1,368 1,368 1,288 1,288 1,288 
 
MH: mental health; OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.  
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for clusters (number of physicians). 
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1 





Table 3.8: Coefficient of FHO on ED visits for mental health reasons (total visits and number of patients): by physician age (PS-
weighted) 
 
 Younger physicians (≤ 50 in 2007) Older physicians (> 50 in 2007)  
OLS FE HDFE OLS FE HDFE 
Log of number of visits 
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Observations 12,312 12,312 12,312 11,592 11,592 11,592 
Physicians 1,368 1,368 1,368 1,288 1,288 1,288 
 
OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects; ED: emergency department.  
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 1,368 clusters. 
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1 






Table 3.9: Coefficient of FHO on the number and value of mental health services per 1000 rostered patients: by physician time of 
switch (PS-weighted) 
 
 Early switchers (switched before April 2009) Late switchers (switched during/after April 2009)  
OLS FE HDFE OLS FE HDFE 
























































































Observations 17,082 17,082 17,082 17,946 17,946 17,946 
Physicians 1,898 1,898 1,898 1,994 1,994 1,994 
 
MH: mental health; OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.  
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for clusters (number of physicians). 
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1 






Table 3.10: Coefficient of FHO on ED visits for mental health reasons (total visits and number of patients): by physician time of 
switch (PS-weighted) 
 
 Early switchers (switched before April 2009) Late switchers (switched during/after April 2009)  
OLS FE HDFE OLS FE HDFE 
Log of number of visits 








































Log of number of patients 








































Observations 17,082 17,082 17,082 17,946 17,946 17,946 
Physicians 1,898 1,898 1,898 1,994 1,994 1,994 
 
OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects; ED: emergency department.  
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for clusters (number of physicians). 
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1 
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Appendix A3.1: Billing and diagnosis codes 
Table A3.1: Billing and diagnosis codes used to capture mental health services in primary care 
The OHIP database was used to capture primary care service provision. Services provided by 
FPs were included if they fell into either of the following categories:  
• Any of the listed A feecodes in combination with any of the listed diagnostic codes, OR 
• Any of the listed K feecodes, regardless of diagnosis code. 
 
Fee codes Description 
A001 Minor Assess. -F.P./G.P. 
A003 Gen. Assess. -F.P./G.P. 
A004 Gen.Re-Assess-F.P./G.P. 
A007 Intermed.Assess/Well Baby Care-F.P./G.P./Paed. 
A008 Mini Assessment-F.P./G.P. 
A888 Partial Assessment Em.Dept Equivalent 
A901 Individual Care per 1/2 hr 
A005 Consultation -F.P./G.P. 
A006 Re-consultation-F.P./G.P. 
A905 General/family practice-limited consultation 
A957 Focused practice assessment - addiction medicine 
K005 Individual care per 1/2 hr 
K007 Ind. Psychotherapy per half these - GP 
K623 Cert.mental.ill.appl.psych.assess.history exam.form 1 
 
Diagnostic code Description 
295 Schizophrenia 
296 Manic depressive psychosis, involutional melancholia 
297 Paranoid states 
298 Other psychoses 
300 Anxiety neurosis, hysteria, neurasthenia, obsessive compulsive neurosis, 
reactive depression 
301 Personality disorders (e.g., paranoid personality, schizoid personality, 
obsessive compulsive personality) 




306 Psychosomatic disturbances 
309 Adjustment reaction 
311 Depressive or other non-psychotic disorders, not elsewhere classified 
303 Alcoholism 
304 Drug dependence, drug addiction 
897 Economic problems 
898 Marital difficulties 
899 Parent-child problems (e.g., child-abuse, battered child, child neglect) 
900 Problems with aged parents or in-laws 
901 Family disruption, divorce 
902 Educational problems 
904 Social maladjustment 
905 Occupational problems, unemployment, difficulty at work 
906 Legal problems, litigation, imprisonment 





Table A3.2: Diagnosis codes used to capture emergency department visits for mental health 
reasons 
 
The NACRS database was used to capture emergency department usage. A visit was included if:  
• DX10CODE1 = F04 to F69, or F99, or  
• X or Y codes in DX10CODE2 to DX10CODE10, and DX10CODE1 is not between F04 
to F99 (captures self-harm visits) 
 
Any codes ending with x indicate that all codes that begin with that prefix should be included; 
e.g. F1x includes F10, F100, F101, etc. up until F199. Visits with suspect diagnoses were 
included. Visits were excluded if they were scheduled visits or if they were transfers from 




F04x Organic amnesic syndrome, not induced by alcohol and other psychoactive 
substances 
F05x Delirium, not induced by alcohol and other psychoactive substances 
F06x Other mental disorders due to brain damage and dysfunction and to physical 
disease 
F07x Personality and behavioural disorders due to brain disease, damage and 
dysfunction 
F09x Unspecified organic or symptomatic mental disorder 
F1x Mental and behavioural disorders due to use of substances 
F2x Schizophrenia, schizotypal disorder, psychotic disorders, schizoaffective 
disorders, other nonorganic psychotic disorders 
F3x Mania, bipolar, depressive disorders, other mood disorders 
F4x Anxiety disorders, obsessive-compulsive disorder, stress/adjustment disorders, 
dissociative disorders, somatoform disorders 
F5x Eating disorders, nonorganic sleep disorders, sexual dysfunctions, disorders 
associated with the puerperium, factors associated with other disorders classified 
elsewhere, abuse of non-dependence-producing substances 
F6x Personality disorders 






X6x Intentional self-poisoning  
X7x Intentional self-harm  
X80 Intentional self-harm by jumping from a high place 




X82 Intentional self-harm by crashing of motor vehicle 
X83 Intentional self-harm by other specified means 
X84 Intentional self-harm by unspecified means 
Y1x Poisoning 





Appendix A3.2: Unweighted, PS-weighted, and EB-weighted main analyses 
 
Table A3.3a: Log of total number of mental health services per 1,000 patients (unweighted) 
 
 OLS FE HDFE 
FHO -0.161*** -0.130*** -0.138*** 
 (-0.198, -0.125) (-0.155, -0.106) (-0.162, -0.114) 
Year 0.008*** 0.037***  
 (0.004, 0.012) (0.019, 0.054)  
Age 0.003 -  
 (-0.012, 0.018)   
Age2 -0.00007 -0.0003*** -0.0003 
 (-0.0002, 0.00007) (-0.0005, -0.0002) (-0.001, 0.0008) 
Sex (Female) 0.120**   
 (0.0480, 0.193)   
Rurality -0.119^ 0.011 0.094 
 (-0.243, 0.005) (-0.067, 0.089) (-0.075, 0.263) 
IMG -0.179***   
 (-0.230, -0.129)   
Group size -0.0002 -0.00003 -0.00008 
 (-0.0005, 0.0001) (-0.0002, 0.0002) (-0.0003, 0.0001) 
Avg. patient age 0.011 -0.0049 -0.007 
 (-0.005, 0.027) (-0.021, 0.011) (-0.030, 0.016) 
Prop. of patients >= 65 -0.009* 0.002 0.012^ 
 (-0.017, -0.0002) (-0.005, 0.011) (-0.0008, 0.024) 
Avg. ADG score 0.075** 0.256*** 0.258*** 
 (0.028, 0.122) (0.191, 0.322) (0.204, 0.311) 
Prop. of female patients -0.007*** -0.008* -0.001* 
 (-0.009, -0.004) (-0.015, -0.0003) (-0.019, -0.00009) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation 
Score 
0.003*** 0.002 0.0006 
(0.002, 0.004) (-0.001, 0.006) (-0.004, 0.005) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic 
Concentration Score 
0.004** -0.002* -0.002* 
(0.003, 0.005) (-0.004, -0.0003) (-0.004, -0.0001) 
Prop. of rural patients 0.002^ 0.005* 0.005 
 (-0.0001, 0.004) (0.0002, 0.010) (-0.001, 0.011) 
Prop. of patients with chronic 
mental illness 
0.058*** 0.040*** 0.036*** 
(0.056, 0.061) (0.037, 0.044) (0.033, 0.039) 
Constant -12.92** -68.78***  
 (-20.69, -5.138) (-103.6, -33.99)  
R2 0.617 0.352 0.217 
# of physicians 2656 2656 2656 
# of observations 23904 23904 23904 
 
OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.  
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters. 
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ̂ : p < 0.1 




Table A3.3b: Log of total number of mental health services per 1,000 patients (PS-weighted) 
 
 OLS FE HDFE 
FHO -0.133*** -0.149*** -0.145*** 
 (-0.172, -0.093) (-0.178, -0.119) (-0.171, -0.120) 
Year 0.012*** 0.052***  
 (0.008, 0.016) (0.031, 0.074)  
Age 0.017*   
 (0.0009, 0.034)   
Age2 -0.0002* -0.0004*** -0.0007 
 (-0.0004, -0.00004) (-0.0006, -0.0002) (-0.002, 0.0005) 
Sex (Female) 0.102**   
 (0.027, 0.177)   
Rurality -0.097 0.036 0.108 
 (-0.240, 0.046) (-0.0585, 0.130) (-0.068, 0.284) 
IMG -0.163***   
 (-0.217, -0.108)   
Group size -0.00009 -0.00006 -0.00005 
 (-0.0004, 0.0002) (-0.0003, 0.0001) (-0.0003, 0.0002) 
Avg. patient age 0.003 -0.005 -0.011 
 (-0.012, 0.018) (-0.021, 0.011) (-0.034, 0.013) 
Prop. of patients >= 65 -0.007 0.0003 0.012^ 
 (-0.016, 0.002) (-0.009, 0.009) (-0.002, 0.025) 
Avg. ADG score 0.122*** 0.290*** 0.262*** 
 (0.068, 0.177) (0.191, 0.389) (0.195, 0.328) 
Prop. of female patients -0.006*** -0.005 -0.003 
 (-0.009, -0.003) (-0.012, 0.002) (-0.014, 0.008) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation 
Score 
0.003*** 0.003^ -0.0001 
(0.002, 0.004) (-0.0002, 0.007) (-0.004, 0.004) 
Prop. din Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic 
Concentration Score 
0.004*** -0.002* -0.002* 
(0.003, 0.005) (-0.003, -0.00008) (-0.003, -0.0001) 
Prop. of rural patients 0.001 0.002 0.002 
 (-0.001, 0.003) (-0.005, 0.008) (-0.005, 0.009) 
Prop. of patients with chronic 
mental illness 
0.0550*** 0.0380*** 0.0342*** 
(0.052, 0.058) (0.034, 0.042) (0.031, 0.038) 
Constant -19.91*** 2.484***  
 (-27.83, -12.00) (1.432,3.535)  
R2 0.619 0.348 0.212 
# of physicians 2656 2656 2656 
# of observations 23904 23904 23904 
 
OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.  
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters. 
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ̂ : p < 0.1 





Table A3.3c: Log of total number of mental health services per 1,000 patients (EB-weighted) 
 
 OLS FE HDFE 
FHO -0.141*** -0.145*** -0.140*** 
 (-0.180, -0.101) (-0.172, -0.118) (-0.166, -0.114) 
Year 0.011*** 0.052***  
 (0.007, 0.015) (0.032, 0.0719)  
Age 0.011   
 (-0.007, 0.0296)   
Age2 -0.0001 -0.0004*** -0.0003 
 (-0.0003, 0.00003) (-0.0006, -0.0002) (-0.001, 0.0009) 
Sex (Female) 0.098*   
 (0.0148, 0.180)   
Rurality -0.200^ 0.017 0.104 
 (-0.437, 0.036) (-0.062, 0.096) (-0.071, 0.279) 
IMG -0.153***   
 (-0.206, -0.100)   
Group size -0.0001 -0.00005 -0.00008 
 (-0.0004, 0.0002) (-0.0003, 0.0001) (-0.0003, 0.0001) 
Avg. patient age 0.004 -0.007 -0.007 
 (-0.013, 0.021) (-0.024, 0.010) (-0.0307, 0.017) 
Prop. of patients >= 65 -0.008 0.001 0.009 
 (-0.018, 0.002) (-0.007, 0.010) (-0.004, 0.022) 
Avg. ADG score 0.132*** 0.304*** 0.291*** 
 (0.078, 0.186) (0.232, 0.375) (0.235, 0.347) 
Prop. of female patients -0.006*** -0.006^ -0.004 
 (-0.009, -0.003) (-0.014, 0.0009) (-0.015, 0.007) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation 
Score 
0.003*** 0.003 -0.0006 
(0.002, 0.004) (-0.0009, 0.006) (-0.005, 0.004) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic 
Concentration Score 
0.003*** -0.001 -0.001^ 
(0.002, 0.005) (-0.003, 0.0005) (-0.003, 0.0003) 
Prop. of rural patients 0.003 0.004^ 0.003 
 (-0.0009, 0.006) (-0.00004, 0.009) (-0.004, 0.010) 
Prop. of patients with chronic 
mental illness 
0.053*** 0.038*** 0.034*** 
(0.050, 0.055) (0.034, 0.042) (0.030, 0.038) 
Constant -18.66*** -99.60***  
 (-26.95, -10.37) (-138.7, -60.45)  
R2 0.607 0.358 0.222 
# of physicians 2656 2656 2656 
# of observations 23904 23904 23904 
 
OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.  
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters. 
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ̂ : p < 0.1 






Table A3.4a: Log of number of regular-hours mental health services per 1,000 patients (unweighted) 
 
 OLS FE HDFE 
FHO -0.167*** -0.143*** -0.147*** 
 (-0.204, -0.130) (-0.167, -0.119) (-0.172, -0.123) 
Year 0.004* 0.035*** - 
 (0.00003, 0.008) (0.017, 0.052)  
Age 0.003 - - 
 (-0.012, 0.018)   
Age2 -0.00007 -0.0003*** -0.0003 
 (-0.0002, 0.00008) (-0.0005, -0.0002) (-0.001, 0.0008) 
Sex (Female) 0.133*** - - 
 (0.0597, 0.205)   
Rurality -0.138* 0.021 0.094 
 (-0.262, -0.015) (-0.051, 0.092) (-0.068, 0.255) 
IMG -0.188*** - - 
 (-0.240, -0.137)   
Group size -0.0001 0.00004 -0.00003 
 (-0.0004, 0.0002) (-0.0002, 0.0002) (-0.0002, 0.0002) 
Avg. patient age 0.017* -0.004 -0.005 
 (0.001, 0.033) (-0.020, 0.012) (-0.028, 0.018) 
Prop. of patients >= 65 -0.010* 0.002 0.011^ 
 (-0.019, -0.001) (-0.006, 0.010) (-0.002, 0.024) 
Avg. ADG score 0.051* 0.252*** 0.256*** 
 (0.004, 0.099) (0.187, 0.318) (0.202, 0.310) 
Prop. of female patients -0.006*** -0.007^ -0.010^ 
 (-0.009, -0.003) (-0.014, 0.0004) (-0.019, 0.00008) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation 
Score 
0.003 0.002 0.0006 
(0.002, 0.004) (-0.002, 0.005) (-0.004, 0.005) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic 
Concentration Score 
0.004*** -0.002* -0.002^ 
(0.003, 0.005) (-0.004, -0.00004) (-0.003, 0.0001) 
Prop. of rural patients 0.002* 0.005* 0.005 
 (0.0001, 0.004) (0.0002, 0.010) (-0.001, 0.011) 
Prop. of patients with chronic 
mental illness 
0.059*** 0.041*** 0.036*** 
(0.057, 0.062) (0.037, 0.044) (0.033, 0.040) 
Constant -4.537 -64.43*** - 
 (-12.40,3.330) (-98.97, -29.89)  
R2 0.62 0.371 0.224 
# of physicians 2656 2656 2656 
# of observations 23904 23904 23904 
 
OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.  
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters. 
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ̂ : p < 0.1 






Table A3.4b: Log of number of regular-hours mental health services per 1,000 patients (PS-weighted) 
 
 OLS FE HDFE 
FHO -0.137*** -0.162*** -0.154*** 
 (-0.177, -0.097) (-0.191, -0.133) (-0.179, -0.128) 
Year 0.008*** 0.051***  
 (0.004, 0.012) (0.030, 0.073)  
Age 0.019*   
 (0.003, 0.036)   
Age2 -0.0002** -0.0004*** -0.0006 
 (-0.0004, -0.00006) (-0.0006, -0.0002) (-0.002, 0.0006) 
Sex (Female) 0.119**   
 (0.043, 0.194)   
Rurality -0.121^ 0.0474 0.108 
 (-0.263, 0.020) (-0.041, 0.136) (-0.061, 0.277) 
IMG -0.174***   
 (-0.231, -0.117)   
Group size -0.00002 0.000004 0.00001 
 (-0.0003, 0.0003) (-0.0002, 0.0002) (-0.0002, 0.0002) 
Avg. patient age 0.009 -0.00339 -0.00741 
 (-0.006, 0.024) (-0.020, 0.013) (-0.031, 0.016) 
Prop. of patients >= 65 -0.00841  ̂ -0.00008 0.011 
 (-0.017, 0.0004) (-0.009, 0.009) (-0.003, 0.024) 
Avg. ADG score 0.105*** 0.286*** 0.260*** 
 (0.051, 0.160) (0.188, 0.384) (0.195, 0.326) 
Prop. of female patients -0.006*** -0.004 -0.003 
 (-0.009, -0.003) (-0.011, 0.003) (-0.014, 0.008) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation 
Score 
0.003*** 0.003 0.0001 
(0.002, 0.004) (-0.0006, 0.006) (-0.004, 0.004) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic 
Concentration Score 
0.004*** -0.002* -0.002^ 
(0.003, 0.005) (-0.003, -0.00002) (-0.003, 0.00008) 
Prop. of rural patients 0.001 0.002 0.002 
 (-0.0006, 0.004) (-0.005, 0.009) (-0.005, 0.009) 
Prop. of patients with chronic 
mental illness 
0.056*** 0.038*** 0.035*** 
(0.053, 0.058) (0.035, 0.042) (0.031, 0.038) 
Constant -12.96** 2.427***  
 (-20.97, -4.943) (1.361,3.493)  
R2 0.621 0.365 0.219 
# of physicians 2656 2656 2656 
# of observations 23904 23904 23904 
 
OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.  
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters. 
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ̂ : p < 0.1 






Table A3.4c: Log of number of regular-hours mental health services per 1,000 patients (EB-weighted) 
 
 OLS FE HDFE 
FHO -0.144*** -0.158*** -0.148*** 
 (-0.184, -0.105) (-0.184, -0.132) (-0.174, -0.122) 
Year 0.007*** 0.050***  
 (0.003, 0.012) (0.032, 0.069)  
Age 0.0132   
 (-0.005, 0.031)   
Age2 -0.0002^ -0.0004*** -0.0002 
 (-0.0003, 0.00001) (-0.0006, -0.0003) (-0.001, 0.001) 
Sex (Female) 0.111**   
 (0.028, 0.193)   
Rurality -0.213^ 0.0269 0.106 
 (-0.442, 0.016) (-0.044, 0.098) (-0.063, 0.274) 
IMG -0.162***   
 (-0.215, -0.108)   
Group size -0.00006 0.00001 -0.00002 
 (-0.0004, 0.0003) (-0.0002, 0.0002) (-0.0002, 0.0002) 
Avg. patient age 0.009 -0.005 -0.005 
 (-0.009, 0.026) (-0.022, 0.011) (-0.030, 0.019) 
Prop. of patients >= 65 -0.009^ 0.0007 0.008 
 (-0.019, 0.001) (-0.008, 0.009) (-0.005, 0.0218) 
Avg. ADG score 0.115*** 0.298*** 0.288*** 
 (0.061, 0.168) (0.227, 0.369) (0.232, 0.344) 
Prop. of female patients -0.006*** -0.006 -0.004 
 (-0.009, -0.003) (-0.013, 0.002) (-0.015, 0.007) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation 
Score 
0.003*** 0.003 -0.0004 
(0.001, 0.004) (-0.001, 0.006) (-0.005, 0.004) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic 
Concentration Score 
0.004*** -0.001 -0.001 
(0.003, 0.005) (-0.003, 0.0004) (-0.003, 0.00052 
Prop. of rural patients 0.003 0.004* 0.003 
 (-0.0005, 0.006) (0.0002, 0.009) (-0.004, 0.009) 
Prop. of patients with chronic 
mental illness 
0.053*** 0.038*** 0.034*** 
(0.050, 0.056) (0.034, 0.042) (0.030, 0.038) 
Constant -11.39** -95.96***  
 (-19.75, -3.033) (-133.3, -58.60)  
R2 0.61 0.376 0.229 
# of physicians 2656 2656 2656 
# of observations 23904 23904 23904 
 
OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.  
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters. 
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ̂ : p < 0.1 






Table A3.5a: Log of number of after-hours mental health services per 1,000 patients (unweighted) 
 
 OLS FE HDFE 
FHO 0.231*** 0.372*** 0.222*** 
 (0.126, 0.337) (0.281, 0.463) (0.138, 0.307) 
Year 0.085*** 0.135***  
 (0.072, 0.098) (0.079, 0.191)  
Age 0.027   
 (-0.019, 0.072)   
Age2 -0.0003 -0.0008** -0.003^ 
 (-0.0007, 0.0002) (-0.001, -0.0003) (-0.006, 0.0001) 
Sex (Female) -0.093   
 (-0.304, 0.118)   
Rurality 0.363 -0.340 -0.090 
 (-0.083, 0.809) (-0.772, 0.092) (-0.570, 0.391) 
IMG 0.107   
 (-0.031, 0.245)   
Group size -0.0009* -0.001** -0.001*** 
 (-0.002, -0.00003) (-0.002, -0.0003) (-0.002, -0.0006) 
Avg. patient age -0.083*** -0.062* -0.029 
 (-0.127, -0.039) (-0.111, -0.014) (-0.090, 0.032) 
Prop. of patients >= 65 0.015 0.023^ 0.008 
 (-0.007, 0.038) (-0.002, 0.047) (-0.023, 0.038) 
Avg. ADG score 0.468*** 0.325*** 0.150* 
 (0.338, 0.598) (0.191, 0.458) (0.0282, 0.271) 
Prop. of female patients -0.015*** -0.022** -0.008 
 (-0.022, -0.007) (-0.039, -0.006) (-0.027, 0.011) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation 
Score 
0.006*** 0.008 0.003 
(0.002, 0.009) (-0.003, 0.019) (-0.010, 0.015) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic 
Concentration Score 
0.0009 -0.002 -0.007* 
(-0.002, 0.004) (-0.007, 0.003) (-0.012, -0.001) 
Prop. of rural patients -0.012*** 0.002 0.004 
 (-0.018, -0.006) (-0.022, 0.026) (-0.027, 0.034) 
Prop. of patients with chronic 
mental illness 
0.023*** 0.012** 0.015** 
(0.017, 0.029) (0.003, 0.021) (0.005, 0.025) 
Constant -167.2*** -265.7***  
 (-193.5, -140.9) (-376.0, -155.4)  
R2 0.089 0.053 0.013 
# of physicians 2656 2656 2656 
# of observations 23904 23904 23904 
 
OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.  
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters. 
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ̂ : p < 0.1 






Table A3.5b: Log of number of after-hours mental health services per 1,000 patients (PS-weighted) 
 
 OLS FE HDFE 
FHO 0.242*** 0.345*** 0.186*** 
 (0.122, 0.362) (0.244, 0.445) (0.097, 0.274) 
Year 0.083*** 0.125***  
 (0.068, 0.099) (0.055, 0.195)  
Age 0.005   
 (-0.047, 0.0573)   
Age2 -0.00003 -0.0006^ -0.005** 
 (-0.0005, 0.0004) (-0.001, 0.00002) (-0.009, -0.002) 
Sex (Female) -0.278*   
 (-0.516, -0.040)   
Rurality 0.328 -0.386^ -0.115 
 (-0.216, 0.872) (-0.830, 0.058) (-0.587, 0.357) 
IMG 0.177*   
 (0.026, 0.328)   
Group size -0.002** -0.001** -0.002*** 
 (-0.003, -0.0006) (-0.002, -0.0004) (-0.003, -0.001) 
Avg. patient age -0.101*** -0.074* -0.028 
 (-0.147, -0.055) (-0.133, -0.0142) (-0.103, 0.046) 
Prop. of patients >= 65 0.025* 0.025^ 0.001 
 (0.0009, 0.048) (-0.005, 0.0549) (-0.035, 0.037) 
Avg. ADG score 0.449*** 0.363*** 0.194** 
 (0.296, 0.602) (0.209, 0.518) (0.0477, 0.341) 
Prop. of female patients -0.010* -0.023^ -0.006 
 (-0.018, -0.002) (-0.046, 0.0002) (-0.030, 0.017) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation 
Score 
0.005** 0.0003 -0.004 
(0.002, 0.009) (-0.014, 0.015) (-0.019, 0.012) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic 
Concentration Score 
0.001 0.002 -0.007* 
(-0.003, 0.005) (-0.004, 0.008) (-0.013, -0.0006) 
Prop. of rural patients -0.013*** 0.007 0.009 
 (-0.021, -0.006) (-0.024, 0.038) (-0.022, 0.040) 
Prop. of patients with chronic 
mental illness 
0.023*** 0.013* 0.013* 
(0.016, 0.030) (0.002, 0.024) (0.001, 0.024) 
Constant -163.9*** -0.881  
 (-195.0, -132.7) (-3.876, 2.115)  
R2 0.242*** 0.345*** 0.015 
# of physicians 2656 2656 2656 
# of observations 23904 23904 23904 
 
OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.  
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters. 
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ̂ : p < 0.1 






Table A3.5c: Log of number of after-hours mental health services per 1,000 patients (EB-weighted) 
 
 OLS FE HDFE 
FHO 0.185* 0.330*** 0.185*** 
 (0.035, 0.335) (0.215, 0.445) (0.088, 0.281) 
Year 0.087*** 0.138**  
 (0.068, 0.107) (0.0450, 0.231)  
Age -0.005   
 (-0.075, 0.065)   
Age2 0.00009 -0.0007 -0.005* 
 (-0.0005, 0.007) (-0.001, 0.0002) (-0.009, -0.001) 
Sex (Female) -0.263^   
 (-0.544, 0.019)   
Rurality 0.016 -0.361 -0.147 
 (-0.886, 0.918) (-0.813, 0.090) (-0.604, 0.310) 
IMG 0.144   
 (-0.030, 0.318)   
Group size -0.001* -0.001* -0.002*** 
 (-0.003, -0.0002) (-0.002, -0.00009) (-0.003, -0.0009) 
Avg. patient age -0.086** -0.084* -0.007 
 (-0.143, -0.028) (-0.156, -0.012) (-0.091, 0.077) 
Prop. of patients >= 65 0.017 0.031^ -0.009 
 (-0.011, 0.046) (-0.005, 0.067) (-0.053, 0.035) 
Avg. ADG score 0.428*** 0.367*** 0.227** 
 (0.261, 0.594) (0.183, 0.550) (0.078, 0.377) 
Prop. of female patients -0.010^ -0.008 -0.0003 
 (-0.020, 0.0003) (-0.035, 0.019) (-0.026, 0.025) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation 
Score 
0.008*** -0.005 0.0001 
(0.004, 0.013) (-0.022, 0.012) (-0.016, 0.017) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic 
Concentration Score 
-0.0004 0.006^ -0.007* 
(-0.005, 0.005) (-0.001, 0.012) (-0.015, -0.0001) 
Prop. of rural patients -0.006 0.003 0.017 
 (-0.018, 0.007) (-0.031, 0.038) (-0.02, 0.055) 
Prop. of patients with chronic 
mental illness 
0.025*** 0.013* 0.013* 
(0.016, 0.033) (0.001, 0.025) (0.0007, 0.025) 
Constant -172.1*** -271.7**  
 (-211.4, -132.7) (-455.2, -88.12)  
R2 0.085 0.059 0.016 
# of physicians 2656 2656 2656 
# of observations 23904 23904 23904 
 
OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.  
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters. 
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ̂ : p < 0.1 







Table A3.6a: Log of total value of mental health services per 1,000 patients (unweighted) 
 
 OLS FE HDFE 
FHO -0.198*** -0.178*** -0.182*** 
 (-0.243, -0.152) (-0.209, -0.148) (-0.211, -0.153) 
Year 0.011*** 0.043***  
 (0.006, 0.015) (0.022, 0.065)  
Age 0.008   
 (-0.011, 0.026)   
Age2 -0.0001 -0.0003*** -0.0007 
 (-0.0003, 0.00003) (-0.0005, -0.0002) (-0.002, 0.0009) 
Sex (Female) 0.236***   
 (0.150, 0.323)   
Rurality -0.234** 0.001 0.133 
 (-0.396, -0.072) (-0.091, 0.094) (-0.028, 0.293) 
IMG -0.241***   
 (-0.301, -0.181)   
Group size -0.0001 0.00003 0.00003 
 (-0.0005, 0.0003) (-0.0002, 0.0003) (-0.0002, 0.0003) 
Avg. patient age 0.0300** 0.004 0.001 
 (0.011, 0.049) (-0.016, 0.024) (-0.029, 0.032) 
Prop. of patients >= 65 -0.015** 0.0002 0.016 
 (-0.026, -0.005) (-0.011, 0.011) (-0.004, 0.036) 
Avg. ADG score 0.063* 0.282*** 0.281*** 
 (0.005, 0.122) (0.184, 0.380) (0.214, 0.348) 
Prop. of female patients -0.006*** -0.007 -0.008 
 (-0.010, -0.003) (-0.016, 0.002) (-0.020, 0.005) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation 
Score 
0.006*** 0.002 -0.001 
(0.004, 0.007) (-0.002, 0.007) (-0.007, 0.005) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic 
Concentration Score 
0.003*** -0.002^ -0.002 
(0.002, 0.005) (-0.004, 0.0001) (-0.004, 0.0004) 
Prop. of rural patients 0.004*** 0.006* 0.005 
 (0.002, 0.007) (0.0001, 0.012) (-0.002, 0.012) 
Prop. of patients with chronic 
mental illness 
0.063*** 0.043*** 0.038*** 
(0.060, 0.066) (0.039, 0.047) (0.034, 0.041) 
Constant -15.17** -78.92***  
 (-24.41, -5.940) (-122.4, -35.46)  
R2 0.581 0.318 0.202 
# of physicians 2656 2656 2656 
# of observations 23904 23904 23904 
 
OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.  
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters. 
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ̂ : p < 0.1 




Table A3.6b: Log of total value of mental health services per 1,000 patients (PS-weighted) 
 
 OLS FE HDFE 
FHO -0.160*** -0.195*** -0.189*** 
 (-0.213, -0.108) (-0.237, -0.154) (-0.220, -0.158) 
Year 0.015*** 0.062***  
 (0.010, 0.019) (0.031, 0.093)  
Age 0.024*   
 (0.002, 0.046)   
Age2 -0.0003** -0.0005*** -0.001 
 (-0.0005, -0.00009) (-0.0007, -0.0002) (-0.003, 0.0007) 
Sex (Female) 0.210***   
 (0.120, 0.300)   
Rurality -0.266** 0.028 0.150^ 
 (-0.437, -0.096) (-0.074, 0.130) (-0.0183, 0.319) 
IMG -0.231***   
 (-0.297, -0.165)   
Group size 0.00008 -0.00004 0.00006 
 (-0.0003, 0.0004) (-0.0003, 0.0002) (-0.0002, 0.0003) 
Avg. patient age 0.021* 0.004 -0.001 
 (0.002, 0.039) (-0.015, 0.024) (-0.030, 0.028) 
Prop. of patients >= 65 -0.013* -0.003 0.016 
 (-0.023, -0.002) (-0.016, 0.010) (-0.004, 0.035) 
Avg. ADG score 0.113** 0.334*** 0.285*** 
 (0.039, 0.187) (0.170, 0.498) (0.201, 0.368) 
Prop. of female patients -0.006*** -0.004 0.0005 
 (-0.009, -0.002) (-0.013, 0.005) (-0.014, 0.015) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation 
Score 
0.006*** 0.004^ -0.001 
(0.004, 0.007) (-0.0003, 0.008) (-0.007, 0.004) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic 
Concentration Score 
0.004*** -0.002^ -0.002 
(0.002, 0.005) (-0.003, 0.0003) (-0.004, 0.0004) 
Prop. of rural patients 0.004*** 0.003 0.002 
 (0.002, 0.007) (-0.005, 0.011) (-0.007, 0.011) 
Prop. of patients with chronic 
mental illness 
0.059*** 0.041*** 0.036*** 
(0.056, 0.062) (0.036, 0.045) (0.032, 0.040) 
Constant -23.26*** 5.038***  
 (-32.83, -13.69) (3.444,6.633)  
R2 0.575 0.308 0.195 
# of physicians 2656 2656 2656 
# of observations 23904 23904 23904 
 
OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.  
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters. 
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ̂ : p < 0.1 






Table A3.6c: Log of total value of mental health services per 1,000 patients (EB-weighted) 
 
 OLS FE HDFE 
FHO -0.168*** -0.191*** -0.183*** 
 (-0.217, -0.119) (-0.225, -0.158) (-0.213, -0.153) 
Year 0.014*** 0.060***  
 (0.009, 0.019) (0.035, 0.085)  
Age 0.023*   
 (0.002, 0.045)   
Age2 -0.0003** -0.0005*** -0.0006 
 (-0.0005, -0.00008) (-0.0007, -0.0002) (-0.002, 0.001) 
Sex (Female) 0.201***   
 (0.102, 0.300)   
Rurality -0.349** 0.007 0.143^ 
 (-0.608, -0.090) (-0.080, 0.095) (-0.023, 0.310) 
IMG -0.215***   
 (-0.277, -0.153)   
Group size 0.00004 0.00002 0.00003 
 (-0.0004, 0.0004) (-0.0002, 0.0003) (-0.0002, 0.0003) 
Avg. patient age 0.021^ 0.003 -0.0001 
 (-0.002, 0.043) (-0.017, 0.022) (-0.031, 0.031) 
Prop. of patients >= 65 -0.013* -0.002 0.013 
 (-0.026, -0.0004) (-0.013, 0.009) (-0.006, 0.032) 
Avg. ADG score 0.117*** 0.337*** 0.316*** 
 (0.049, 0.186) (0.227, 0.446) (0.248, 0.383) 
Prop. of female patients -0.006*** -0.005 -0.002 
 (-0.010, -0.003) (-0.014, 0.003) (-0.015, 0.012) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation 
Score 
0.005*** 0.00321 -0.002 
(0.004, 0.007) (-0.001, 0.007) (-0.008, 0.004) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic 
Concentration Score 
0.00337*** -0.0012 -0.001 
(0.002, 0.005) (-0.003, 0.0007) (-0.003, 0.0007) 
Prop. of rural patients 0.005** 0.005* 0.003 
 (0.002, 0.008) (0.0002, 0.011) (-0.004, 0.010) 
Prop. of patients with chronic 
mental illness 
0.056*** 0.040*** 0.036*** 
(0.053, 0.060) (0.036, 0.044) (0.032, 0.040) 
Constant -21.56*** -112.5***  
 (-31.53, -11.60) (-161.8, -63.23)  
R2 0.565 0.324 0.208 
# of physicians 2656 2656 2656 
# of observations 23904 23904 23904 
 
OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.  
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters. 
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ̂ : p < 0.1 






Table A3.7a: Log of value of regular-hours mental health services per 1,000 patients (unweighted) 
 
 OLS FE HDFE 
FHO -0.198*** -0.181*** -0.184*** 
 (-0.244, -0.152) (-0.211, -0.151) (-0.213, -0.154) 
Year 0.010*** 0.043***  
 (0.005, 0.015) (0.021, 0.065)  
Age 0.008   
 (-0.011, 0.027)   
Age2 -0.0001 -0.0003*** -0.0007 
 (-0.0003, 0.00004) (-0.0005, -0.0002) (-0.002, 0.0009) 
Sex (Female) 0.241***   
 (0.153, 0.328)   
Rurality -0.241** 0.00291 0.133 
 (-0.405, -0.078) (-0.090, 0.096) (-0.027, 0.293) 
IMG -0.244***   
 (-0.306, -0.183)   
Group size -0.00009 0.00005 0.00004 
 (-0.0005, 0.0003) (-0.0002, 0.0003) (-0.0002, 0.0003) 
Avg. patient age 0.031** 0.005 0.002 
 (0.012, 0.051) (-0.015, 0.025) (-0.028, 0.033) 
Prop. of patients >= 65 -0.016** 0.0002 0.016 
 (-0.026, -0.005) (-0.011, 0.011) (-0.004, 0.036) 
Avg. ADG score 0.059* 0.282*** 0.280*** 
 (0.0004, 0.119) (0.183, 0.380) (0.214, 0.347) 
Prop. of female patients -0.006*** -0.007 -0.008 
 (-0.010, -0.003) (-0.016, 0.002) (-0.020, 0.005) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation 
Score 
0.006*** 0.002 -0.001 
(0.004, 0.007) (-0.002, 0.006) (-0.007, 0.005) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic 
Concentration Score 
0.003*** -0.002^ -0.002 
(0.002, 0.005) (-0.004, 0.0002) (-0.004, 0.0004) 
Prop. of rural patients 0.005*** 0.006* 0.005 
 (0.002, 0.007) (0.00009, 0.012) (-0.002, 0.012) 
Prop. of patients with chronic 
mental illness 
0.063*** 0.043*** 0.038*** 
(0.060, 0.066) (0.039, 0.047) (0.034, 0.042) 
Constant -13.94** -78.02***  
 (-23.31, -4.566) (-121.6, -34.46)  
R2 0.578 0.318 0.199 
# of physicians 2656 2656 2656 
# of observations 23904 23904 23904 
 
OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.  
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters. 
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ̂ : p < 0.1 






Table A3.7b: Log of value of regular-hours mental health services per 1,000 patients (PS-weighted) 
 
 OLS FE HDFE 
FHO -0.160*** -0.198*** -0.190*** 
 (-0.214, -0.107) (-0.240, -0.156) (-0.221, -0.159) 
Year 0.014*** 0.062***  
 (0.009, 0.019) (0.031, 0.093)  
Age 0.025*   
 (0.003, 0.047)   
Age2 -0.0003** -0.0005*** -0.0009 
 (-0.0005, -0.00009) (-0.0007, -0.0002) (-0.003, 0.0008) 
Sex (Female) 0.215***   
 (0.124, 0.305)   
Rurality -0.275** 0.030 0.151^ 
 (-0.447, -0.103) (-0.072, 0.132) (-0.0172, 0.318) 
IMG -0.236***   
 (-0.305, -0.167)   
Group size 0.0001 -0.00002 0.00007 
 (-0.0003, 0.0005) (-0.0003, 0.0002) (-0.0002, 0.0003) 
Avg. patient age 0.022* 0.005 -0.00001 
 (0.003, 0.0401 (-0.015, 0.024) (-0.029, 0.029) 
Prop. of patients >= 65 -0.013* -0.003 0.015 
 (-0.024, -0.002) (-0.016, 0.010) (-0.004, 0.035) 
Avg. ADG score 0.110** 0.334*** 0.284*** 
 (0.036, 0.185) (0.170, 0.498) (0.201, 0.368) 
Prop. of female patients -0.006*** -0.004 0.0006 
 (-0.009, -0.002) (-0.013, 0.005) (-0.0142, 0.0153) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation 
Score 
0.006*** 0.004^ -0.001 
(0.004, 0.007) (-0.0004, 0.008) (-0.007, 0.004) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic 
Concentration Score 
0.004*** -0.002^ -0.002 
(0.002, 0.005) (-0.003, 0.0003) (-0.003, 0.0004) 
Prop. of rural patients 0.005*** 0.003 0.002 
 (0.002, 0.007) (-0.005, 0.0108) (-0.007, 0.011) 
Prop. of patients with chronic 
mental illness 
0.059*** 0.041*** 0.036*** 
(0.056, 0.063) (0.036, 0.045) (0.032, 0.040) 
Constant -22.31*** 5.033***  
 (-32.06, -12.55) (3.431, 6.634)  
R2 0.572 0.307 0.192 
# of physicians 2656 2656 2656 
# of observations 23904 23904 23904 
 
OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.  
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters. 
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ̂ : p < 0.1 






Table A3.7c: Log of value of regular-hours mental health services per 1,000 patients (EB-weighted) 
 
 OLS FE HDFE 
FHO -0.169*** -0.194*** -0.184*** 
 (-0.218, -0.119) (-0.227, -0.160) (-0.215, -0.154) 
Year 0.013*** 0.060***  
 (0.008, 0.018) (0.035, 0.085)  
Age 0.024*   
 (0.003, 0.046)   
Age2 -0.0003** -0.0005*** -0.0005 
 (-0.0005, -0.00008) (-0.0007, -0.0002) (-0.002, 0.001) 
Sex (Female) 0.204***   
 (0.105, 0.303)   
Rurality -0.354** 0.009 0.144^ 
 (-0.613, -0.094) (-0.079, 0.097) (-0.022, 0.309) 
IMG -0.218***   
 (-0.280, -0.155)   
Group size 0.00005 0.00003 0.00004 
 (-0.0004, 0.0005) (-0.0002, 0.0003) (-0.0002, 0.0003) 
Avg. patient age 0.022^ 0.003 0.0005 
 (-0.0008, 0.044) (-0.017, 0.023) (-0.031, 0.032) 
Prop. of patients >= 65 -0.014* -0.002 0.013 
 (-0.026, -0.0007) (-0.013, 0.009) (-0.006, 0.032) 
Avg. ADG score 0.114** 0.336*** 0.316*** 
 (0.045, 0.183) (0.226, 0.446) (0.248, 0.383) 
Prop. of female patients -0.006** -0.005 -0.002 
 (-0.010, -0.002) (-0.01, 0.003) (-0.015, 0.012) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation 
Score 
0.005*** 0.003 -0.002 
(0.004, 0.007) (-0.001, 0.007) (-0.008, 0.004) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic 
Concentration Score 
0.003*** -0.001 -0.001 
(0.002, 0.005) (-0.003, 0.0007) (-0.003, 0.0008) 
Prop. of rural patients 0.005** 0.005* 0.003 
 (0.002, 0.008) (0.0002, 0.011) (-0.004, 0.010) 
Prop. of patients with chronic 
mental illness 
0.056*** 0.040*** 0.036*** 
(0.053, 0.060) (0.036, 0.045) (0.032, 0.040) 
Constant -20.42*** -112.0***  
 (-30.47, -10.38) (-161.1, -62.89)  
R2 0.563 0.325 0.207 
# of physicians 2656 2656 2656 
# of observations 23904 23904 23904 
 
OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.  
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters. 
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ̂ : p < 0.1 






Table A3.8a: Log of value of after-hours mental health services per 1,000 patients (unweighted) 
 
 OLS FE HDFE 
FHO 0.465*** 0.607*** 0.355*** 
 (0.312, 0.618) (0.473, 0.741) (0.226, 0.484) 
Year 0.119*** 0.218***  
 (0.100, 0.138) (0.137, 0.300)  
Age 0.0461   
 (-0.020, 0.112)   
Age2 -0.0005 -0.001*** -0.006* 
 (-0.001, 0.0001) (-0.002, -0.0006) (-0.010, -0.001) 
Sex (Female) -0.0947   
 (-0.399, 0.210)   
Rurality 0.625^ -0.657^ -0.179 
 (-0.063,1.313) (-1.407, 0.093) (-0.988, 0.631) 
IMG 0.178^   
 (-0.021, 0.378)   
Group size -0.001* -0.002** -0.002*** 
 (-0.003, -0.00004) (-0.003, -0.0005) (-0.003, -0.0009) 
Avg. patient age -0.101** -0.079* -0.028 
 (-0.164, -0.038) (-0.152, -0.006) (-0.124, 0.067) 
Prop. of patients >= 65 0.015 0.029 0.008 
 (-0.018, 0.047) (-0.008, 0.067) (-0.039, 0.055) 
Avg. ADG score 0.637*** 0.428*** 0.162^ 
 (0.451, 0.823) (0.231, 0.624) (-0.020, 0.345) 
Prop. of female patients -0.021*** -0.032* -0.009 
 (-0.032, -0.010) (-0.057, -0.007) (-0.038, 0.020) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation 
Score 
0.008*** 0.01 0.003 
(0.004, 0.013) (-0.006, 0.026) (-0.014, 0.021) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic 
Concentration Score 
0.004^ -0.002 -0.009* 
(-0.0005, 0.009) (-0.010, 0.005) (-0.017, -0.0015) 
Prop. of rural patients -0.023*** 0.003 0.00004 
 (-0.032, -0.013) (-0.036, 0.042) (-0.049, 0.049) 
Prop. of patients with chronic 
mental illness 
0.026*** 0.013* 0.020** 
(0.017, 0.0349) (0.0005, 0.025) (0.006, 0.035) 
Constant -235.0*** -430.1***  
 (-273.5, -196.4) (-591.8, -268.4)  
R2 0.082 0.058 0.012  
# of physicians 2656 2656 2656 
# of observations 23904 23904 23904 
 
OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.  
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters. 
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ̂ : p < 0.1 






Table A3.8b: Log of value of after-hours mental health services per 1,000 patients (PS-weighted) 
 
 OLS FE HDFE 
FHO 0.473*** 0.572*** 0.299*** 
 (0.298, 0.647) (0.421, 0.723) (0.163, 0.436) 
Year 0.119*** 0.196***  
 (0.096, 0.141) (0.0932, 0.299)  
Age 0.020   
 (-0.057, 0.096)   
Age2 -0.0002 -0.001* -0.009*** 
 (-0.0009, 0.0005) (-0.002, -0.00008) (-0.015, -0.004) 
Sex (Female) -0.364*   
 (-0.715, -0.014)   
Rurality 0.446 -0.762^ -0.238 
 (-0.425,1.316) (-1.551, 0.026) (-1.030, 0.553) 
IMG 0.279*   
 (0.060, 0.498)   
Group size -0.002** -0.002** -0.003*** 
 (-0.004, -0.0009) (-0.003, -0.0006) (-0.004, -0.001) 
Avg. patient age -0.128*** -0.097* -0.029 
 (-0.196, -0.061) (-0.186, -0.009) (-0.140, 0.081) 
Prop. of patients >= 65 0.028 0.033 -0.003 
 (-0.006, 0.063) (-0.011, 0.077) (-0.056, 0.051) 
Avg. ADG score 0.608*** 0.476*** 0.233* 
 (0.389, 0.827) (0.248, 0.705) (0.0196, 0.446) 
Prop. of female patients -0.015* -0.031^ -0.006 
 (-0.027, -0.003) (-0.065, 0.003) (-0.040, 0.028) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation 
Score 
0.008** 0.001 -0.003 
(0.003, 0.014) (-0.020, 0.022) (-0.026, 0.019) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic 
Concentration Score 
0.004 0.004 -0.011* 
(-0.001, 0.010) (-0.005, 0.013) (-0.021, -0.002) 
Prop. of rural patients -0.022*** 0.016 0.014 
 (-0.035, -0.010) (-0.040, 0.072) (-0.040, 0.067) 
Prop. of patients with chronic 
mental illness 
0.027*** 0.016* 0.018* 
(0.017, 0.037) (0.0006, 0.031) (0.0009, 0.034) 
Constant -233.5*** -1.821  
 (-279.5, -187.5) (-6.382,2.740)  
R2 0.097 0.062 0.015 
# of physicians 2656 2656 2656 
# of observations 23904 23904 23904 
 
OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.  
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters. 
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ̂ : p < 0.1 





Table A3.8c: Log of value of after-hours mental health services, per 1,000 patients (EB-weighted) 
 
 OLS FE HDFE 
FHO 0.401*** 0.555*** 0.305*** 
 (0.179, 0.624) (0.380, 0.730) (0.158, 0.452) 
Year 0.123*** 0.210**  
 (0.095, 0.152) (0.076, 0.345)  
Age 0.005   
 (-0.100, 0.110)   
Age2 -0.000003 -0.001^ -0.008** 
 (-0.0009, 0.0009) (-0.002, 0.0001) (-0.015, -0.002) 
Sex (Female) -0.344   
 (-0.763, 0.075)   
Rurality 0.107 -0.714^ -0.286 
 (-1.207,1.421) (-1.500, 0.0713) (-1.063, 0.492) 
IMG 0.223^   
 (-0.036, 0.482)   
Group size -0.002* -0.002* -0.003*** 
 (-0.004, -0.0002) (-0.003, -0.00001) (-0.004, -0.001) 
Avg. patient age -0.102* -0.113* 0.006 
 (-0.186, -0.019) (-0.217, -0.008) (-0.120, 0.132) 
Prop. of patients >= 65 0.016 0.042 -0.020 
 (-0.026, 0.058) (-0.009, 0.094) (-0.085, 0.045) 
Avg. ADG score 0.569*** 0.456** 0.256* 
 (0.326, 0.811) (0.177, 0.736) (0.033, 0.479) 
Prop. of female patients -0.015^ -0.010 0.003 
 (-0.030, 0.00007) (-0.050, 0.029) (-0.034, 0.041) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation 
Score 
0.011*** -0.006 0.002 
(0.005, 0.018) (-0.030, 0.019) (-0.022, 0.027) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic 
Concentration Score 
0.002 0.008 -0.011 
(-0.006, 0.010) (-0.002, 0.018) (-0.022, -0.0006) 
Prop. of rural patients -0.013 0.009 0.024 
 (-0.031, 0.006) (-0.048, 0.066) (-0.039, 0.088) 
Prop. of patients with chronic 
mental illness 
0.029*** 0.016^ 0.017^ 
(0.018, 0.041) (-0.001, 0.033) (-0.0009, 0.035) 
Constant -243.4*** -414.9**  
 (-300.8, -185.9) (-681.7, -148.1)  
R2 0.079 0.062 0.015 
# of physicians 2656 2656 2656 
# of observations 23904 23904 23904 
 
OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.  
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters. 
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ̂ : p < 0.1 






Table A3.9a: Log of number of patients with SMI, per 1,000 patients (unweighted) 
 
 OLS FE HDFE 
FHO 0.131*** -0.0884*** -0.0413 
 (0.061, 0.201) (-0.140, -0.036) (-0.101, 0.018) 
Year -0.00972* 0.0337*  
 (-0.017, -0.002) (0.005, 0.063)  
Age 0.0371*   
 (0.008, 0.066)   
Age2 -0.0004** -0.0003* 0.001 
 (-0.0007, -0.0002) (-0.0006, -0.00005) (-0.0008, 0.003) 
Sex (Female) 0.106   
 (-0.035, 0.246)   
Rurality 0.324^ -0.121 0.241 
 (-0.038, 0.686) (-0.469, 0.226) (-0.111, 0.593) 
IMG -0.249***   
 (-0.335, -0.163)   
Group size -0.0006* 0.0001 0.0009** 
 (-0.001, -0.00009) (-0.0003, 0.0006) (0.0003, 0.001) 
Avg. patient age 0.046*** 0.014 0.011 
 (0.019, 0.073) (-0.013, 0.042) (-0.030, 0.051) 
Prop. of patients >= 65 -0.013^ -0.009 -0.003 
 (-0.027, 0.002) (-0.022, 0.004) (-0.024, 0.018) 
Avg. ADG score 0.002 0.193*** 0.142*** 
 (-0.079, 0.084) (0.118, 0.268) (0.064, 0.221) 
Prop. of female patients -0.007** -0.018*** -0.016* 
 (-0.012, -0.002) (-0.028, -0.008) (-0.031, -0.002) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation 
Score 
-0.007*** -0.007* -0.006 
(-0.010, -0.005) (-0.013, -0.00004) (-0.015, 0.002) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic 
Concentration Score 
0.001 0.003* 0.004^ 
(-0.001, 0.003) (0.0005, 0.006) (-0.00003, 0.007) 
Prop. of rural patients -0.006* -0.003 -0.016 
 (-0.010, -0.0006) (-0.020, 0.015) (-0.035, 0.004) 
Prop. of patients with chronic 
mental illness 
0.021*** 0.009*** 0.005^ 
(0.017, 0.025) (0.004, 0.014) (-0.0004, 0.011) 
Constant 18.55* -65.53*  
 (3.479, 33.62) (-122.8, -8.233)  
R2 0.089 0.017 0.008 
# of physicians 2656 2656 2656 
# of observations 23904 23904 23904 
 
OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.  
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters. 
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ̂ : p < 0.1 






Table A3.9b: Log of number of patients with SMI, per 1,000 patients (PS-weighted) 
 
 OLS FE HDFE 
FHO 0.054 -0.083** -0.040 
 (-0.030, 0.138) (-0.138, -0.028) (-0.102, 0.023) 
Year -0.005 0.033^  
 (-0.014, 0.004) (-0.0005, 0.067)  
Age 0.0470**   
 (0.012, 0.082)   
Age2 -0.0005** -0.0003^ 0.001 
 (-0.0009, -0.0002) (-0.0006, 0.00001) (-0.0009, 0.004) 
Sex (Female) 0.118   
 (-0.051, 0.287)   
Rurality 0.248 -0.070 0.263 
 (-0.337, 0.832) (-0.432, 0.291) (-0.095, 0.622) 
IMG -0.212***   
 (-0.316, -0.108)   
Group size -0.0006* 0.0001 0.001*** 
 (-0.001, -0.00002) (-0.0004, 0.0006) (0.0004, 0.002) 
Avg. patient age 0.053** 0.017 0.013 
 (0.016, 0.089) (-0.015, 0.049) (-0.042, 0.068) 
Prop. of patients >= 65 -0.016^ -0.011 -0.009 
 (-0.035, 0.003) (-0.026, 0.004) (-0.036, 0.018) 
Avg. ADG score 0.042 0.199*** 0.160*** 
 (-0.0636, 0.147) (0.111, 0.287) (0.069, 0.252) 
Prop. of female patients -0.008** -0.013* -0.013 
 (-0.014, -0.002) (-0.025, -0.0006) (-0.032, 0.005) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation 
Score 
-0.007*** -0.012* -0.011^ 
(-0.009, -0.004) (-0.023, -0.002) (-0.024, 0.001) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic 
Concentration Score 
0.002 0.004* 0.005* 
(-0.0007, 0.005) (0.001, 0.008) (0.001, 0.009) 
Prop. of rural patients -0.004 -0.011 -0.021* 
 (-0.011, 0.003) (-0.031, 0.009) (-0.042, -0.001) 
Prop. of patients with chronic 
mental illness 
0.024*** 0.008** 0.004 
(0.018, 0.030) (0.003, 0.014) (-0.002, 0.010) 
Constant 8.38 0.438  
 (-9.628,26.39) (-1.217,2.092)  
R2 0.09 0.018 0.009 
# of physicians 2656 2656 2656 






Table A3.9c: Log of number of patients with SMI, per 1,000 patients (EB-weighted) 
 
 OLS FE HDFE 
FHO 0.030 -0.069* -0.038 
 (-0.073, 0.133) (-0.126, -0.011) (-0.103, 0.027) 
Year -0.011* 0.0245  
 (-0.021, -0.0008) (-0.0120, 0.0610)  
Age 0.051**   
 (0.0145, 0.088)   
Age2 -0.0005** -0.0002 0.002^ 
 (-0.0009, -0.0002) (-0.0006, 0.0001) (-0.0003, 0.004) 
Sex (Female) 0.175^   
 (-0.013, 0.363)   
Rurality 0.122 -0.104 0.247 
 (-0.349, 0.593) (-0.450, 0.242) (-0.111, 0.605) 
IMG -0.196***   
 (-0.304, -0.089)   
Group size -0.0006^ 0.00009 0.001** 
 (-0.001, 0.00005) (-0.0004, 0.0006) (0.0004, 0.002) 
Avg. patient age 0.042* 0.013 0.005 
 (0.007, 0.077) (-0.019, 0.045) (-0.043, 0.053) 
Prop. of patients >= 65 -0.012 -0.009 -0.005 
 (-0.030, 0.0072 (-0.025, 0.007) (-0.029, 0.019) 
Avg. ADG score 0.055 0.177*** 0.154** 
 (-0.067, 0.176) (0.087, 0.268) (0.060, 0.248) 
Prop. of female patients -0.008* -0.010 -0.013 
 (-0.014, -0.002) (-0.023, 0.002) (-0.031, 0.004) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation 
Score 
-0.007*** -0.011* -0.008 
(-0.010, -0.004) (-0.020, -0.0005) (-0.020, 0.003) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic 
Concentration Score 
0.003^ 0.004* 0.004* 
(-0.00002, 0.006) (0.0004, 0.007) (0.0006, 0.008) 
Prop. of rural patients -0.005 -0.005 -0.018^ 
 (-0.011, 0.0010 (-0.023, 0.013) (-0.038, 0.001) 
Prop. of patients with chronic 
mental illness 
0.021*** 0.009** 0.005 
(0.015, 0.026) (0.004, 0.015) (-0.001, 0.012) 
Constant 20.07* -47.32  
 (0.410, 39.73) (-119.6, 24.99)  
R2 0.076 0.018 0.009 
# of physicians 2656 2656 2656 







Table A3.10a: Log of ED visits for mental health reasons per 1,000 patients (unweighted) 
 
 OLS FE HDFE 
FHO -0.0206 -0.092*** -0.048* 
 (-0.055, 0.013) (-0.121, -0.063) (-0.086, -0.009) 
Year 0.032*** 0.037***  
 (0.028, 0.036) (0.0196, 0.0551)  
Age -0.014*   
 (-0.029, -0.0002)   
Age2 0.0001^ 0.00003 -0.0001 
 (-0.00001, 0.0002) (-0.0001, 0.0002) (-0.001, 0.001) 
Sex (Female) 0.043   
 (-0.026, 0.112)   
Rurality -0.109 -0.240** 0.032 
 (-0.253, 0.034) (-0.399, -0.081) (-0.197, 0.261) 
IMG -0.098***   
 (-0.142, -0.054)   
Group size -0.0008*** -0.0005*** -0.0002 
 (-0.001, -0.0005) (-0.0007, -0.0003) (-0.0005, 0.0001) 
Avg. patient age 0.007 -0.047*** -0.046** 
 (-0.011, 0.024) (-0.066, -0.029) (-0.076, -0.016) 
Prop. of patients >= 65 -0.012** 0.007 0.014^ 
 (-0.021, -0.003) (-0.002, 0.016) (-0.001, 0.030) 
Avg. ADG score 0.146*** 0.162*** 0.158*** 
 (0.102, 0.190) (0.112, 0.211) (0.100, 0.217) 
Prop. of female patients -0.010*** -0.004 -0.003 
 (-0.012, -0.007) (-0.012, 0.003) (-0.014, 0.009) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation 
Score 
-0.008*** -0.007** -0.014*** 
(-0.009, -0.007) (-0.011, -0.002) (-0.021, -0.007) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic 
Concentration Score 
0.006*** 0.006*** 0.003* 
(0.005, 0.007) (0.004, 0.008) (0.0005, 0.006) 
Prop. of rural patients 0.003** 0.007* -0.0004 
 (0.001, 0.005) (0.001, 0.014) (-0.007, 0.006) 
Prop. of patients with chronic 
mental illness 
0.012*** 0.006*** 0.003 
(0.010, 0.015) (0.004, 0.009) (-0.0006, 0.007) 
Constant -61.20*** -71.20***  
 (-69.21, -53.18) (-106.3, -36.08)  
R2 0.191 0.038 0.007 
# of physicians 2656 2656 2656 
# of observations 23904 23904 23904 
 
OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.  
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters. 
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ̂ : p < 0.1 






Table A3.10b: Log of ED visits for mental health reasons per 1,000 patients (PS-weighted) 
 
 OLS FE HDFE 
FHO -0.058** -0.078*** -0.046* 
 (-0.094, -0.021) (-0.108, -0.048) (-0.086, -0.007) 
Year 0.031*** 0.031**  
 (0.027, 0.036) (0.009, 0.052)  
Age -0.006   
 (-0.021, 0.009)   
Age2 0.00005 0.00008 0.0005 
 (-0.00009, 0.0002) (-0.0001, 0.0003) (-0.001, 0.002) 
Sex (Female) 0.031   
 (-0.041, 0.103)   
Rurality -0.023 -0.246** 0.028 
 (-0.250, 0.204) (-0.402, -0.090) (-0.200, 0.257) 
IMG -0.058*   
 (-0.107, -0.010)   
Group size -0.001*** -0.0005*** -0.0003 
 (-0.001, -0.0006) (-0.0007, -0.0003) (-0.0006, 0.00009) 
Avg. patient age 0.008 -0.045*** -0.044** 
 (-0.013, 0.029) (-0.065, -0.024) (-0.076, -0.012) 
Prop. of patients >= 65 -0.013* 0.005 0.014 
 (-0.024, -0.002) (-0.006, 0.017) (-0.003, 0.031) 
Avg. ADG score 0.155*** 0.115*** 0.122*** 
 (0.106, 0.204) (0.0612, 0.168) (0.0516, 0.192) 
Prop. of female patients -0.010*** -0.003 0.002 
 (-0.013, -0.007) (-0.0111, 0.00448) (-0.013, 0.016) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation 
Score 
-0.009*** -0.012*** -0.019*** 
(-0.010, -0.008) (-0.017, -0.006) (-0.030, -0.009) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic 
Concentration Score 
0.005*** 0.006*** 0.004** 
(0.004, 0.006) (0.004, 0.009) (0.001, 0.008) 
Prop. of rural patients 0.002^ 0.007* -0.003 
 (-0.000006, 0.005) (0.00116, 0.0126) (-0.012, 0.005) 
Prop. of patients with chronic 
mental illness 
0.012*** 0.008*** 0.002 
(0.009, 0.015) (0.004, 0.011) (-0.002, 0.006) 
Constant -60.34*** 2.398***  
 (-69.17, -51.51) (1.468, 3.328)  
R2 0.223 0.036 0.007 
# of physicians 2656 2656 2656 
# of observations 23904 23904 23904 
 
OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.  
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters. 
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ̂ : p < 0.1 






Table A3.10c: Log of ED visits for mental health reasons per 1,000 patients (EB-weighted) 
 
 OLS FE HDFE 
FHO -0.061** -0.085*** -0.054** 
 (-0.103, -0.020 (-0.117, -0.054) (-0.094, -0.014) 
Year 0.033*** 0.039**  
 (0.028, 0.039) (0.014, 0.064)  
Age 0.0008   
 (-0.017, 0.018)   
Age2 -0.00002 0.00001 -0.0001 
 (-0.0002, 0.0001) (-0.0002, 0.0002) (-0.002, 0.002) 
Sex (Female) 0.027   
 (-0.056, 0.109)   
Rurality -0.243^ -0.238** 0.028 
 (-0.512, 0.026) (-0.394, -0.0825) (-0.208, 0.264) 
IMG -0.060*   
 (-0.109, -0.010)   
Group size -0.0008*** -0.0006*** -0.0004* 
 (-0.001, -0.0005) (-0.0008, -0.0004) (-0.0008, -0.000003) 
Avg. patient age 0.001 -0.049*** -0.057** 
 (-0.020, 0.022) (-0.072, -0.025) (-0.09, -0.021) 
Prop. of patients >= 65 -0.010^ 0.009 0.026** 
 (-0.021, 0.001) (-0.004, 0.022) (0.007, 0.045) 
Avg. ADG score 0.176*** 0.135*** 0.115** 
 (0.127, 0.226) (0.0799, 0.190) (0.043, 0.188) 
Prop. of female patients -0.010*** -0.005 -0.003 
 (-0.013, -0.007) (-0.014, 0.003) (-0.019, 0.013) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation 
Score 
-0.009*** -0.014*** -0.020*** 
(-0.010, -0.0074 (-0.020, -0.008) (-0.030, -0.010) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic 
Concentration Score 
0.005*** 0.006*** 0.004* 
(0.004, 0.006) (0.004, 0.009) (0.0005, 0.007) 
Prop. of rural patients 0.004* 0.005 -0.003 
 (0.0006, 0.008) (-0.001, 0.012) (-0.013, 0.006) 
Prop. of patients with chronic 
mental illness 
0.009*** 0.008*** 0.002 
(0.007, 0.012) (0.004, 0.012) (-0.003, 0.007) 
Constant -64.43*** -74.12**  
 (-75.28, -53.58) (-123.9, -24.36)  
R2 0.202 0.04 0.008 
# of physicians 2656 2656 2656 
# of observations 23904 23904 23904 
 
OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.  
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters. 
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ̂ : p < 0.1 






Table A3.11a: Log of ED visits for mental health reasons during regular-hours per 1,000 patients 
(unweighted) 
 
 OLS FE HDFE 
FHO -0.027^ -0.072*** -0.069** 
 (-0.060, 0.005) (-0.104, -0.040) (-0.113, -0.025) 
Year 0.024*** 0.029**  
 (0.021, 0.028) (0.00942, 0.0476)  
Age -0.011   
 (-0.025, 0.002)   
Age2 0.00008 0.00003 -0.0009 
 (-0.00004, 0.0002) (-0.0001, 0.0002) (-0.002, 0.0006) 
Sex (Female) 0.025   
 (-0.040, 0.090)   
Rurality -0.085 -0.209* -0.046 
 (-0.231, 0.061) (-0.410, -0.007) (-0.399, 0.306) 
IMG -0.093***   
 (-0.134, -0.053)   
Group size -0.0007*** -0.0004** -0.0002 
 (-0.0009, -0.0004) (-0.0006, -0.0002) (-0.0006, 0.0002) 
Avg. patient age 0.0179* -0.0311** -0.027 
 (0.002, 0.034) (-0.051, -0.012) (-0.061, 0.007) 
Prop. of patients >= 65 -0.0143*** 0.0045 0.007 
 (-0.022, -0.006) (-0.005, 0.014) (-0.011, 0.024) 
Avg. ADG score 0.121*** 0.154*** 0.170*** 
 (0.0811, 0.161) (0.103, 0.206) (0.102, 0.237) 
Prop. of female patients -0.008*** -0.005 0.0004 
 (-0.010, -0.005) (-0.012, 0.002) (-0.013, 0.013) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation 
Score 
-0.008*** -0.008*** -0.015*** 
(-0.009, -0.007) (-0.012, -0.004) (-0.023, -0.007) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic 
Concentration Score 
0.006*** 0.005*** 0.003^ 
(0.005, 0.007) (0.003, 0.008) (-0.0001, 0.006) 
Prop. of rural patients 0.003*** 0.009** 0.002 
 (0.001, 0.005) (0.004, 0.0154 (-0.007, 0.011) 
Prop. of patients with chronic 
mental illness 
0.010*** 0.005** 0.003 
(0.008, 0.012) (0.001, 0.008) (-0.002, 0.007) 
Constant -48.13*** -54.65**  
 (-55.95, -40.30) (-92.41, -16.89)  
R2 0.158 0.019 0.005 
# of physicians 2656 2656 2656 
# of observations 23904 23904 23904 
 
OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.  
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters. 
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ̂ : p < 0.1 






Table A3.11b: Log of ED visits for mental health reasons during regular-hours per 1,000 patients (PS-
weighted) 
 
 OLS FE HDFE 
FHO -0.065*** -0.060*** -0.067** 
 (-0.099, -0.030) (-0.094, -0.026) (-0.112, -0.021) 
Year 0.026*** 0.023^  
 (0.021, 0.030) (-0.00008, 0.045)  
Age -0.004   
 (-0.019, 0.010)   
Age2 0.00003 0.00008 -0.0001 
 (-0.0001, 0.0002) (-0.0001, 0.0003) (-0.002, 0.002) 
Sex (Female) 0.020   
 (-0.047, 0.088)   
Rurality -0.015 -0.216* -0.042 
 (-0.220, 0.189) (-0.422, -0.010) (-0.391, 0.307) 
IMG -0.055*   
 (-0.101, -0.008)   
Group size -0.0009*** -0.0003** -0.0002 
 (-0.001, -0.0006) (-0.0006, -0.0001) (-0.0007, 0.0002) 
Avg. patient age 0.018^ -0.029* -0.020 
 (-0.0003, 0.037) (-0.051, -0.006) (-0.059, 0.019) 
Prop. of patients >= 65 -0.015** 0.003 0.003 
 (-0.024, -0.005) (-0.008, 0.015) (-0.017, 0.023) 
Avg. ADG score 0.138*** 0.111*** 0.120** 
 (0.093, 0.183) (0.054, 0.167) (0.038, 0.203) 
Prop. of female patients -0.008*** -0.003 0.009 
 (-0.011, -0.005) (-0.011, 0.006) (-0.008, 0.026) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation 
Score 
-0.009*** -0.011*** -0.021*** 
(-0.010, -0.007) (-0.017, -0.006) (-0.032, -0.009) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic 
Concentration Score 
0.005*** 0.006*** 0.004* 
(0.004, 0.006) (0.003, 0.008) (0.0007, 0.008) 
Prop. of rural patients 0.003** 0.010** -0.003 
 (0.001, 0.006) (0.003, 0.017) (-0.013, 0.007) 
Prop. of patients with chronic 
mental illness 
0.010*** 0.007*** 0.002 
(0.007, 0.013) (0.003, 0.011) (-0.002, 0.007) 
Constant -50.14*** 1.362*  
 (-59.02, -41.25) (0.319,2.404)  
R2 0.196 0.019 0.005 
# of physicians 2656 2656 2656 
# of observations 23904 23904 23904 
 
OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.  
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters. 
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ̂ : p < 0.1 






Table A3.11c: Log of ED visits for mental health reasons during regular-hours per 1,000 patients (EB-
weighted) 
 
 OLS FE HDFE 
FHO -0.071*** -0.072*** -0.068** 
 (-0.112, -0.030) (-0.108, -0.036) (-0.114, -0.022) 
Year 0.028*** 0.033*  
 (0.0224 0.034) (0.007, 0.059)  
Age 0.001   
 (-0.017, 0.019)   
Age2 -0.00002 0.000004 -0.0003 
 (-0.0002, 0.0001) (-0.0002, 0.0002) (-0.002, 0.002) 
Sex (Female) 0.018   
 (-0.061, 0.096)   
Rurality -0.201 -0.185^ -0.026 
 (-0.469, 0.067) (-0.383, 0.013) (-0.385, 0.333) 
IMG -0.056*   
 (-0.105, -0.008)   
Group size -0.0007*** -0.0004** -0.0003 
 (-0.001, -0.0004) (-0.0006, -0.0001) (-0.0008, 0.0001) 
Avg. patient age 0.012 -0.039** -0.036 
 (-0.008, 0.031) (-0.064, -0.014) (-0.083, 0.011) 
Prop. of patients >= 65 -0.011* 0.010 0.015 
 (-0.021, -0.002) (-0.003, 0.023) (-0.009, 0.040) 
Avg. ADG score 0.155*** 0.130*** 0.116** 
 (0.109, 0.201) (0.0698, 0.190) (0.0344, 0.198) 
Prop. of female patients -0.008*** -0.004 0.004 
 (-0.010, -0.005) (-0.014, 0.005) (-0.014, 0.022) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation 
Score 
-0.009*** -0.013*** -0.020*** 
(-0.010, -0.007) (-0.019, -0.007) (-0.031, -0.009) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic 
Concentration Score 
0.005*** 0.005*** 0.003^ 
(0.004, 0.006) (0.003, 0.008) (-0.0004, 0.007) 
Prop. of rural patients 0.005** 0.005 -0.006 
 (0.001, 0.008) (-0.003, 0.013) (-0.018, 0.006) 
Prop. of patients with chronic 
mental illness 
0.008*** 0.006** 0.001 
(0.005, 0.010) (0.002, 0.011) (-0.004, 0.006) 
Constant -55.29*** -62.65*  
 (-66.68, -43.89) (-113.6, -11.74)  
R2 0.174 0.022 0.005 
# of physicians 2656 2656 2656 
# of observations 23904 23904 23904 
 
OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.  
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters. 
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ̂ : p < 0.1 






Table A3.12a: Log of ED visits for mental health reasons during after-hours per 1,000 patients 
(unweighted) 
 
 OLS FE HDFE 
FHO -0.021 -0.087*** -0.014 
 (-0.054, 0.012) (-0.118, -0.055) (-0.057, 0.029) 
Year 0.032*** 0.046***  
 (0.028, 0.0363 (0.027, 0.065)  
Age -0.010   
 (-0.025, 0.004)   
Age2 0.00009 -0.00003 0.0005 
 (-0.00004, 0.0002) (-0.0002, 0.0001) (-0.001, 0.002) 
Sex (Female) 0.018   
 (-0.050, 0.087)   
Rurality -0.089 -0.238^ 0.049 
 (-0.239, 0.060) (-0.499, 0.024) (-0.150, 0.248) 
IMG -0.076***   
 (-0.118, -0.035)   
Group size -0.0007*** -0.0005*** -0.0002 
 (-0.001, -0.0005) (-0.0007, -0.0003) (-0.0005, 0.0002) 
Avg. patient age 0.001 -0.053*** -0.059*** 
 (-0.0162, 0.019) (-0.072, -0.034) (-0.093, -0.026) 
Prop. of patients >= 65 -0.011* 0.007 0.023* 
 (-0.020, -0.002) (-0.003, 0.017) (0.005, 0.041) 
Avg. ADG score 0.138*** 0.153*** 0.135*** 
 (0.095, 0.182) (0.099, 0.208) (0.070, 0.201) 
Prop. of female patients -0.009*** -0.002 -0.006 
 (-0.012, -0.007) (-0.010, 0.005) (-0.018, 0.006) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation 
Score 
-0.008*** -0.006* -0.012** 
(-0.009, -0.007) (-0.011, -0.001) (-0.020, -0.005) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic 
Concentration Score 
0.005*** 0.006*** 0.004* 
(0.004, 0.006) (0.003, 0.008) (0.0009, 0.007) 
Prop. of rural patients 0.002^ 0.006 0.002 
 (-0.0002, 0.004) (-0.003, 0.014) (-0.008, 0.012) 
Prop. of patients with chronic 
mental illness 
0.011*** 0.006*** 0.004^ 
(0.009, 0.014) (0.004, 0.009) (-0.0006, 0.008) 
Constant -62.58*** -88.61***  
 (-70.83, -54.33) (-126.9, -50.28)  
R2 0.144 0.028 0.004 
# of physicians 2656 2656 2656 
# of observations 23904 23904 23904 
 
OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.  
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters. 
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ̂ : p < 0.1 






Table A3.12b: Log of ED visits for mental health reasons during after-hours per 1,000 patients (PS-
weighted) 
 
 OLS FE HDFE 
FHO -0.056** -0.073*** -0.012 
 (-0.092, -0.020) (-0.107, -0.039) (-0.057, 0.032) 
Year 0.031*** 0.041**  
 (0.026, 0.036) (0.016, 0.065)  
Age -0.002   
 (-0.018, 0.014)   
Age2 0.00002 -0.000007 0.001 
 (-0.0001, 0.0002) (-0.0002, 0.0002) (-0.001, 0.003) 
Sex (Female) 0.004   
 (-0.069, 0.078)   
Rurality 0.007 -0.245^ 0.044 
 (-0.239, 0.252) (-0.499, 0.010) (-0.157, 0.244) 
IMG -0.040^   
 (-0.086, 0.005)   
Group size -0.0009*** -0.0005*** -0.0003 
 (-0.001, -0.0006) (-0.0008, -0.0003) (-0.0007, 0.00009) 
Avg. patient age 0.003 -0.050*** -0.058** 
 (-0.018, 0.025) (-0.072, -0.0275) (-0.094, -0.022) 
Prop. of patients >= 65 -0.013* 0.005 0.024* 
 (-0.024, -0.001) (-0.007, 0.018) (0.004, 0.044) 
Avg. ADG score 0.140*** 0.107*** 0.111** 
 (0.092, 0.189) (0.046, 0.169) (0.035, 0.187) 
Prop. of female patients -0.010*** -0.003 -0.006 
 (-0.013, -0.007) (-0.011, 0.005) (-0.020, 0.009) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation 
Score 
-0.008*** -0.011*** -0.018*** 
(-0.009, -0.007) (-0.017, -0.006) (-0.028, -0.008) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic 
Concentration Score 
0.004*** 0.006*** 0.005** 
(0.003, 0.005) (0.003, 0.009) (0.001, 0.008) 
Prop. of rural patients 0.001 0.005 0.0002 
 (-0.002, 0.004) (-0.003, 0.012) (-0.012, 0.012) 
Prop. of patients with chronic 
mental illness 
0.011*** 0.007*** 0.002 
(0.008, 0.0146) (0.003, 0.011) (-0.003, 0.007) 
Constant -60.33*** 1.914***  
 (-69.55, -51.11) (0.910, 2.917)  
R2 0.163 0.026 0.005 
# of physicians 2656 2656 2656 
# of observations 23904 23904 23904 
 
OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.  
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters. 
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ̂ : p < 0.1 






Table A3.12c: Log of ED visits for mental health reasons during after-hours per 1,000 patients (EB-
weighted) 
 
 OLS FE HDFE 
FHO -0.054** -0.073*** -0.026 
 (-0.095, -0.014) (-0.109, -0.037) (-0.072, 0.020) 
Year 0.032*** 0.048**  
 (0.026, 0.037) (0.019, 0.077)  
Age 0.006   
 (-0.011, 0.023)   
Age2 -0.00006 -0.00008 -0.0003 
 (-0.0002, 0.0001) (-0.0003, 0.0002) (-0.002, 0.002) 
Sex (Female) 0.004   
 (-0.079, 0.086)   
Rurality -0.235^ -0.264* 0.024 
 (-0.495, 0.024) (-0.517, -0.011) (-0.182, 0.230) 
IMG -0.044^   
 (-0.091, 0.004)   
Group size -0.0008*** -0.0007*** -0.0004^ 
 (-0.001, -0.0004) (-0.001, -0.0004) (-0.0009, 0.00003) 
Avg. patient age -0.004 -0.049*** -0.066** 
 (-0.025, 0.017) (-0.075, -0.023) (-0.107, -0.025) 
Prop. of patients >= 65 -0.009^ 0.006 0.034** 
 (-0.020, 0.002) (-0.008, 0.021) (0.013, 0.055) 
Avg. ADG score 0.162*** 0.123*** 0.097* 
 (0.112, 0.211) (0.0577, 0.189) (0.006, 0.187) 
Prop. of female patients -0.010*** -0.005 -0.010 
 (-0.013, -0.0067 (-0.014, 0.004) (-0.026, 0.007) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation 
Score 
-0.008*** -0.012*** -0.018*** 
(-0.009, -0.007) (-0.019, -0.006) (-0.028, -0.008) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic 
Concentration Score 
0.004*** 0.006*** 0.004* 
(0.003, 0.005) (0.003, 0.009) (0.0002, 0.007) 
Prop. of rural patients 0.003 0.008^ 0.004 
 (-0.0007, 0.006) (-0.00005, 0.016) (-0.008, 0.016) 
Prop. of patients with chronic 
mental illness 
0.009*** 0.008*** 0.004 
(0.006, 0.012) (0.005, 0.012) (-0.003, 0.010) 
Constant -61.84*** -92.17**  
 (-72.77, -50.90) (-149.2, -35.13)  
R2 0.147 0.028 0.006 
# of physicians 2656 2656 2656 
# of observations 23904 23904 23904 
 
OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.  
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters. 
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ̂ : p < 0.1 






Table A3.13a: Log of patients who used the ED for mental health reasons per 1,000 patients (unweighted) 
 
 OLS FE HDFE 
FHO 0.002 -0.050*** -0.020 
 (-0.025, 0.029) (-0.073, -0.027) (-0.052, 0.011) 
Year 0.024*** 0.031***  
 (0.020, 0.027) (0.017, 0.045)  
Age -0.010^   
 (-0.021, 0.001)   
Age2 0.00008 0.000005 -0.0003 
 (-0.00002, 0.0002) (-0.0001, 0.0001) (-0.001, 0.0008) 
Sex (Female) 0.040   
 (-0.014, 0.093)   
Rurality -0.147* -0.197** -0.002 
 (-0.269, -0.025) (-0.337, -0.057) (-0.162, 0.157) 
IMG -0.081***   
 (-0.116, -0.045)   
Group size -0.0006*** -0.0004*** -0.0001 
 (-0.0009, -0.0004) (-0.0006, -0.0002) (-0.0004, 0.0001) 
Avg. patient age -0.004 -0.044*** -0.038** 
 (-0.018, 0.010) (-0.059, -0.029) (-0.062, -0.014) 
Prop. of patients >= 65 -0.006^ 0.007^ 0.008 
 (-0.013, 0.0005) (-0.0001, 0.014) (-0.004, 0.021) 
Avg. ADG score 0.119*** 0.131*** 0.140*** 
 (0.084, 0.155) (0.090, 0.173) (0.091, 0.190) 
Prop. of female patients -0.008*** -0.004 -0.002 
 (-0.010, -0.006) (-0.010, 0.002) (-0.011, 0.008) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation 
Score 
-0.007*** -0.005** -0.009** 
(-0.008, -0.006) (-0.009, -0.001) (-0.014, -0.003) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic 
Concentration Score 
0.006*** 0.005*** 0.002 
(0.005, 0.007) (0.003, 0.007) (-0.0004, 0.005) 
Prop. of rural patients 0.004*** 0.010*** 0.004 
 (0.002, 0.005) (0.005, 0.014) (-0.001, 0.010) 
Prop. of patients with chronic 
mental illness 
0.010*** 0.005*** 0.003 
(0.008, 0.012) (0.003, 0.007) (-0.0008, 0.006) 
Constant -44.77*** -58.47***  
 (-51.02, -38.51) (-85.64, -31.30)  
R2 0.212 0.033 0.005 
# of physicians 2656 2656 2656 
# of observations 23904 23904 23904 
 
OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.  
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters. 
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ̂ : p < 0.1 






Table A3.13b: Log of patients who used the ED for mental health reasons per 1,000 patients (PS-
weighted) 
 
 OLS FE HDFE 
FHO -0.033* -0.040** -0.022 
 (-0.062, -0.004) (-0.065, -0.016) (-0.054, 0.011) 
Year 0.024*** 0.024**  
 (0.020, 0.027) (0.009, 0.040)  
Age -0.004   
 (-0.016, 0.008)   
Age2 0.00004 0.00006 0.0003 
 (-0.00007, 0.0002) (-0.00008, 0.0002) (-0.001, 0.002) 
Sex (Female) 0.036   
 (-0.020, 0.093)   
Rurality -0.103 -0.200** -0.003 
 (-0.279, 0.0719) (-0.339, -0.0602) (-0.161, 0.154) 
IMG -0.048*   
 (-0.086, -0.009)   
Group size -0.0008*** -0.0004*** -0.0002 
 (-0.001, -0.0005) (-0.0005, -0.0002) (-0.0005, 0.0001) 
Avg. patient age -0.004 -0.044*** -0.039** 
 (-0.020, 0.012) (-0.060, -0.029) (-0.065, -0.014) 
Prop. of patients >= 65 -0.007^ 0.006 0.008 
 (-0.015, 0.0008) (-0.002, 0.014) (-0.006, 0.022) 
Avg. ADG score 0.130*** 0.091*** 0.100*** 
 (0.091, 0.168) (0.0467, 0.136) (0.042, 0.157) 
Prop. of female patients -0.008*** -0.003 0.003 
 (-0.010, -0.006) (-0.009, 0.003) (-0.008, 0.013) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation 
Score 
-0.007*** -0.008*** -0.012*** 
(-0.008, -0.006) (-0.013, -0.004) (-0.019, -0.005) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic 
Concentration Score 
0.005*** 0.005*** 0.003* 
(0.004, 0.006) (0.003, 0.007) (0.0004, 0.006) 
Prop. of rural patients 0.004*** 0.009*** 0.002 
 (0.002, 0.006) (0.004, 0.014) (-0.006, 0.009) 
Prop. of patients with chronic 
mental illness 
0.009*** 0.006*** 0.001 
(0.007, 0.012) (0.003, 0.008) (-0.002, 0.005) 
Constant -45.22*** 2.473***  
 (-52.17, -38.27) (1.708,3.237)  
R2 0.249 0.031 0.005 
# of physicians 2656 2656 2656 
# of observations 23904 23904 23904 
 
OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.  
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters. 
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ̂ : p < 0.1 





Table A3.13c: Log of patients who used the ED for mental health reasons per 1,000 patients (EB-
weighted) 
 
 OLS FE HDFE 
FHO -0.039* -0.047*** -0.029^ 
 (-0.073, -0.005) (-0.074, -0.020) (-0.063, 0.005) 
Year 0.025*** 0.031**  
 (0.021, 0.030) (0.010, 0.052)  
Age 0.002   
 (-0.013, 0.017)   
Age2 -0.00002 0.00001 -0.0002 
 (-0.0002, 0.0001) (-0.0002, 0.0002) (-0.002, 0.001) 
Sex (Female) 0.038   
 (-0.0276, 0.104)   
Rurality -0.248* -0.196** -0.010 
 (-0.468, -0.028) (-0.336, -0.057) (-0.170, 0.150) 
IMG -0.048*   
 (-0.087, -0.009)   
Group size -0.0007*** -0.0004*** -0.0003^ 
 (-0.001, -0.0004) (-0.0006, -0.0002) (-0.0006, 0.00002) 
Avg. patient age -0.007 -0.049*** -0.049** 
 (-0.023, 0.009) (-0.067, -0.031) (-0.079, -0.018) 
Prop. of patients >= 65 -0.006 0.010* 0.018* 
 (-0.014, 0.003) (0.001, 0.019) (0.002, 0.033) 
Avg. ADG score 0.146*** 0.105*** 0.090** 
 (0.106, 0.187) (0.059, 0.151) (0.032, 0.149) 
Prop. of female patients -0.008*** -0.004 -0.00006 
 (-0.010, -0.006) (-0.010, 0.003) (-0.012, 0.011) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation 
Score 
-0.008*** -0.010*** -0.014*** 
(-0.009, -0.006) (-0.015, -0.006) (-0.021, -0.007) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic 
Concentration Score 
0.005*** 0.005*** 0.003* 
(0.004, 0.006) (0.003, 0.008) (0.0002, 0.006) 
Prop. of rural patients 0.004** 0.008** 0.002 
 (0.002, 0.007) (0.002, 0.014) (-0.006, 0.010) 
Prop. of patients with chronic 
mental illness 
0.007*** 0.006*** 0.002 
(0.005, 0.010) (0.003, 0.008) (-0.003, 0.006) 
Constant -48.71*** -57.49**  
 (-57.68, -39.74) (-99.12, -15.85)  
R2 0.227 0.034 0.005 
# of physicians 2656 2656 2656 
# of observations 23904 23904 23904 
 
OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.  
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters. 
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ̂ : p < 0.1 





Table A3.14a: Log of patients who used the ED for mental health reasons during regular-hours per 1,000 
patients (unweighted) 
 
 OLS FE HDFE 
FHO -0.005 -0.030* -0.034^ 
 (-0.031, 0.022) (-0.058, -0.002) (-0.072, 0.004) 
Year 0.018*** 0.0230**  
 (0.015, 0.021) (0.006, 0.040)  
Age -0.006   
 (-0.017, 0.005)   
Age2 0.00004 0.00001 -0.0007 
 (-0.00006, 0.0001) (-0.0001, 0.0002) (-0.002, 0.0007) 
Sex (Female) 0.018   
 (-0.034, 0.069)   
Rurality -0.134* -0.201 -0.118 
 (-0.266, -0.002) (-0.447, 0.045) (-0.343, 0.106) 
IMG -0.074***   
 (-0.107, -0.041)   
Group size -0.0006*** -0.0003** -0.0001 
 (-0.0008, -0.0004) (-0.0005, -0.00009) (-0.0004, 0.0002) 
Avg. patient age 0.008 -0.027** -0.024 
 (-0.004, 0.021) (-0.044, -0.010) (-0.055, 0.006) 
Prop. of patients >= 65 -0.009** 0.004 0.004 
 (-0.016, -0.003) (-0.005, 0.012) (-0.012, 0.019) 
Avg. ADG score 0.104*** 0.120*** 0.131*** 
 (0.0706, 0.137) (0.074, 0.166) (0.069, 0.193) 
Prop. of female patients -0.006*** -0.003 0.003 
 (-0.008, -0.004) (-0.009, 0.00367) (-0.008, 0.014) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation 
Score 
-0.007*** -0.007*** -0.011*** 
(-0.007, -0.006) (-0.011, -0.004) (-0.017, -0.005) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic 
Concentration Score 
0.006*** 0.005*** 0.002 
(0.005, 0.007) (0.002, 0.007) (-0.0006, 0.005) 
Prop. of rural patients 0.004*** 0.012*** 0.006 
 (0.002, 0.006) (0.006, 0.018) (-0.003, 0.016) 
Prop. of patients with chronic 
mental illness 
0.008*** 0.004** 0.003 
(0.006, 0.010) (0.001, 0.007) (-0.0009, 0.007) 
Constant -35.08*** -44.01**  
 (-41.72, -28.43) (-76.82, -11.20)  
R2 0.157 0.014  
# of physicians 2656 2656 2656 
# of observations 23904 23904 23904 
 
OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.  
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters. 
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ̂ : p < 0.1 






Table A3.14b: Log of patients who used the ED for mental health reasons during regular-hours per 1,000 
patients (PS-weighted) 
 
 OLS FE HDFE 
FHO -0.039** -0.018 -0.035^ 
 (-0.067, -0.010) (-0.048, 0.012) (-0.074, 0.005) 
Year 0.019*** 0.014  
 (0.015, 0.022) (-0.005, 0.033)  
Age -0.001   
 (-0.013, 0.011)   
Age2 0.0000004 0.00009 -0.00007 
 (-0.0001, 0.0001) (-0.00008, 0.0003) (-0.002, 0.001) 
Sex (Female) 0.016   
 (-0.038, 0.070)   
Rurality -0.098 -0.198 -0.11 
 (-0.265, 0.069) (-0.447, 0.050) (-0.328, 0.108) 
IMG -0.040*   
 (-0.078, -0.003)   
Group size -0.0007*** -0.0002^ -0.00009 
 (-0.001, -0.0005) (-0.0004, 0.000004) (-0.0005, 0.0003) 
Avg. patient age 0.009 -0.028** -0.024 
 (-0.005, 0.023) (-0.047, -0.009) (-0.058, 0.010) 
Prop. of patients >= 65 -0.010** 0.004 0.003 
 (-0.017, -0.003) (-0.005, 0.013) (-0.014, 0.020) 
Avg. ADG score 0.116*** 0.0694* 0.0715* 
 (0.079, 0.154) (0.017, 0.122) (0.0002, 0.143) 
Prop. of female patients -0.006*** -0.0003 0.010 
 (-0.008, -0.004) (-0.007, 0.007) (-0.003, 0.023) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation 
Score 
-0.007*** -0.008*** -0.014*** 
(-0.008, -0.006) (-0.013, -0.004) (-0.021, -0.006) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic 
Concentration Score 
0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004* 
(0.004, 0.006) (0.003, 0.007) (0.0005, 0.007) 
Prop. of rural patients 0.004*** 0.011*** 0.002 
 (0.002, 0.006) (0.005, 0.018) (-0.007, 0.011) 
Prop. of patients with chronic 
mental illness 
0.007*** 0.006*** 0.003 
(0.005, 0.009) (0.003, 0.010) (-0.001, 0.007) 
Constant -36.43*** 1.443**  
 (-44.02, -28.84) (0.523, 2.363)  
R2 0.199 0.013 0.003 
# of physicians 2656 2656 2656 
# of observations 23904 23904 23904 
 
OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.  
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters. 
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ̂ : p < 0.1 





Table A3.14c: Log of patients who used the ED for mental health reasons during regular-hours per 1,000 
patients (EB-weighted) 
 
 OLS FE HDFE 
FHO -0.044* -0.026 -0.037^ 
 (-0.079, -0.009) (-0.060, 0.008) (-0.077, 0.004) 
Year 0.020*** 0.017  
 (0.015, 0.0254) (-0.005, 0.038)  
Age 0.003   
 (-0.013, 0.018)   
Age2 -0.00004 0.00007 -0.00007 
 (-0.0002, 0.0001) (-0.0001, 0.0003) (-0.002, 0.002) 
Sex (Female) 0.020   
 (-0.044, 0.084)   
Rurality -0.216^ -0.172 -0.11 
 (-0.434, 0.002) (-0.407, 0.063) (-0.321, 0.121) 
IMG -0.043*   
 (-0.082, -0.004)   
Group size -0.0006*** -0.0002 -0.0002 
 (-0.0009, -0.0003) (-0.0005, 0.00006) (-0.0006, 0.0002) 
Avg. patient age 0.005 -0.035*** -0.033 
 (-0.009, 0.020) (-0.056, -0.015) (-0.074, 0.008) 
Prop. of patients >= 65 -0.008* 0.009^ 0.012 
 (-0.015, -0.0008) (-0.001, 0.019) (-0.009, 0.032) 
Avg. ADG score 0.130*** 0.081** 0.061 
 (0.092, 0.169) (0.024, 0.138) (-0.015, 0.137) 
Prop. of female patients -0.006*** -0.0009 0.007 
 (-0.008, -0.004) (-0.009, 0.007) (-0.006, 0.021) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation 
Score 
-0.007*** -0.010*** -0.014*** 
(-0.009, -0.006) (-0.015, -0.006) (-0.022, -0.006) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic 
Concentration Score 
0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004* 
(0.004, 0.006) (0.002, 0.007) (0.0003, 0.007) 
Prop. of rural patients 0.005*** 0.007^ -0.0009 
 (0.002, 0.007) (-0.0008, 0.014) (-0.011, 0.009) 
Prop. of patients with chronic 
mental illness 
0.006*** 0.005** 0.002 
(0.004, 0.008) (0.002, 0.009) (-0.002, 0.007) 
Constant -39.84*** -30.58  
 (-50.01, -29.67) (-72.64,11.48)  
R2 0.177 0.014 0.003 
# of physicians 2656 2656 2656 
# of observations 23904 23904 23904 
 
OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.  
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters. 
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ̂ : p < 0.1 





Table A3.15a: Log of patients who used the ED for mental health reasons during after-hours per 1,000 
patients (unweighted) 
 
 OLS FE HDFE 
FHO -0.0009 -0.047*** 0.007 
 (-0.027, 0.025) (-0.074, -0.020) (-0.031, 0.046) 
Year 0.023*** 0.040***  
 (0.020, 0.027) (0.024, 0.055)  
Age -0.005   
 (-0.016, 0.006)   
Age2 0.00005 -0.00008 0.0002 
 (-0.00006, 0.0001) (-0.0002, 0.00006) (-0.00112, 0.00157) 
Sex (Female) 0.015   
 (-0.0376, 0.0672)   
Rurality -0.115^ -0.175 0.043 
 (-0.239, 0.0081 (-0.399, 0.048) (-0.175, 0.261) 
IMG -0.060***   
 (-0.092, -0.027)   
Group size -0.0006*** -0.0004*** -0.0001 
 (-0.0008, -0.0004) (-0.0006, -0.0002) (-0.0004, 0.0002) 
Avg. patient age -0.009 -0.049*** -0.049*** 
 (-0.024, 0.004) (-0.065, -0.034) (-0.078, -0.020) 
Prop. of patients >= 65 -0.005 0.008^ 0.015^ 
 (-0.012, 0.002) (-4.28e-08, 0.016) (-0.0009, 0.030) 
Avg. ADG score 0.104*** 0.118*** 0.126*** 
 (0.070, 0.137) (0.072, 0.164) (0.067, 0.184) 
Prop. of female patients -0.007*** -0.004 -0.005 
 (-0.009, -0.005) (-0.011, 0.003) (-0.016, 0.005) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation 
Score 
-0.006*** -0.003 -0.007* 
(-0.007, -0.006) (-0.008, 0.0008) (-0.013, -0.001) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic 
Concentration Score 
0.005*** 0.005*** 0.003^ 
(0.004, 0.006) (0.002, 0.007) (-0.0002, 0.006) 
Prop. of rural patients 0.002* 0.008* 0.00606 
 (0.0005, 0.004) (0.002, 0.014) (-0.002, 0.014) 
Prop. of patients with chronic 
mental illness 
0.009*** 0.005*** 0.003 
(0.007, 0.011) (0.003, 0.008) (-0.0008, 0.007) 
Constant -44.80*** -75.99***  
 (-51.24, -38.36) (-107.2, -44.72)  
R2 0.14 0.021 0.003 
# of physicians 2656 2656 2656 
# of observations 23904 23904 23904 
 
OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.  
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters. 
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ̂ : p < 0.1 





Table A3.15b: Log of patients who used the ED for mental health reasons during after-hours per 1,000 
patients (PS-weighted) 
 
 OLS FE HDFE 
FHO -0.035* -0.040** 0.009 
 (-0.062, -0.007) (-0.069, -0.011) (-0.031, 0.049) 
Year 0.023*** 0.039***  
 (0.020, 0.027) (0.020, 0.058)  
Age 0.0005   
 (-0.012, 0.013)   
Age2 0.000007 -0.00007 0.0007 
 (-0.0001, 0.0001) (-0.0002, 0.0001) (-0.001, 0.002) 
Sex (Female) 0.014   
 (-0.042, 0.071)   
Rurality -0.067 -0.183 0.0389 
 (-0.249, 0.115) (-0.403, 0.0362) (-0.181, 0.259) 
IMG -0.031^   
 (-0.066, 0.005)   
Group size -0.0007*** -0.0004*** -0.0002 
 (-0.001, -0.0005) (-0.0006, -0.0002) (-0.0006, 0.0001) 
Avg. patient age -0.009 -0.050*** -0.049** 
 (-0.0253, 0.00677) (-0.0680, -0.0313) (-0.0809, -0.0167) 
Prop. of patients >= 65 -0.007 0.006 0.014 
 (-0.015, 0.002) (-0.003, 0.016) (-0.004, 0.031) 
Avg. ADG score 0.111*** 0.094*** 0.110** 
 (0.073, 0.148) (0.043, 0.146) (0.042, 0.179) 
Prop. of female patients -0.008*** -0.005 -0.005 
 (-0.00991, -0.00567) (-0.0116, 0.00195) (-0.0166, 0.00725) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation 
Score 
-0.007*** -0.007** -0.010** 
(-0.007, -0.006) (-0.012, -0.002) (-0.018, -0.002) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic 
Concentration Score 
0.0042 0.004*** 0.003^ 
(0.003, 0.005) (0.002, 0.007) (-0.0002, 0.006) 
Prop. of rural patients 0.002^ 0.007* 0.005 
 (-0.0002, 0.004) (0.0005, 0.013) (-0.006, 0.017) 
Prop. of patients with chronic 
mental illness 
0.008*** 0.004** 0.001 
(0.006, 0.011) (0.002, 0.007) (-0.003, 0.006) 
Constant -45.00*** 1.988***  
 (-52.23, -37.77) (1.117, 2.859)  
R2 0.158 0.019 0.003 
# of physicians 2656 2656 2656 
# of observations 23904 23904 23904 
 
OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.  
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters. 
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ̂ : p < 0.1 





Table A3.15c: Log of patients who used the ED for mental health reasons during after-hours per 1,000 
patients (EB-weighted) 
 
 OLS FE HDFE 
FHO -0.038* -0.042** -0.006 
 (-0.069, -0.006) (-0.073, -0.011) (-0.048, 0.036) 
Year 0.024*** 0.046***  
 (0.020, 0.029) (0.022, 0.071)  
Age 0.008   
 (-0.007, 0.022)   
Age2 -0.00006 -0.0001 -0.0005 
 (-0.0002, 0.00007) (-0.0004, 0.00006) (-0.002, 0.001) 
Sex (Female) 0.018   
 (-0.047, 0.083)   
Rurality -0.231* -0.205^ 0.016 
 (-0.439, -0.0231) (-0.423, 0.012) (-0.206, 0.237) 
IMG -0.032^   
 (-0.068, 0.004)   
Group size -0.0007*** -0.0005*** -0.0004^ 
 (-0.0009, -0.0004) (-0.0007, -0.0003) (-0.0007, 0.00001) 
Avg. patient age -0.013 -0.050*** -0.055** 
 (-0.029, 0.003) (-0.071, -0.030) (-0.094, -0.017) 
Prop. of patients >= 65 -0.005 0.008 0.023* 
 (-0.013, 0.003) (-0.002, 0.018) (0.003, 0.043) 
Avg. ADG score 0.126*** 0.103*** 0.093* 
 (0.087, 0.165) (0.0485, 0.158) (0.016, 0.169) 
Prop. of female patients -0.008*** -0.006 -0.007 
 (-0.010, -0.006) (-0.014, 0.001) (-0.021, 0.006) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation 
Score 
-0.007*** -0.008** -0.011** 
(-0.008, -0.006) (-0.013, -0.003) (-0.019, -0.003) 
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic 
Concentration Score 
0.004*** 0.005*** 0.002 
(0.003, 0.005) (0.002, 0.007) (-0.0008, 0.006) 
Prop. of rural patients 0.003* 0.010** 0.009^ 
 (0.000261, 0.00585) (0.003, 0.018) (-0.002, 0.020) 
Prop. of patients with chronic 
mental illness 
0.007*** 0.005*** 0.002 
(0.004, 0.009) (0.003, 0.008) (-0.004, 0.008) 
Constant -46.89*** -89.12***  
 (-55.74, -38.04) (-137.9, -40.33)  
R2 0.147 0.022 0.004 
# of physicians 2656 2656 2656 
# of observations 23904 23904 23904 
 
OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.  
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters. 
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ̂ : p < 0.1 





Appendix A3.3: Subgroup analyses 
  
Table A3.16a: Coefficient of FHO on the log of the number of mental health services per 1000 enrolled patients, by physician sex 
 
 Male physicians Female physicians  
OLS FE HDFE OLS FE HDFE 















































































































Observations 14,409 14,409 14,409 9,495 9,495 9,495 
Physicians 1,601 1,601 1,601 1,055 1,055 1,055 
 
MH: mental health; OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.  
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 1,601 clusters. 
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1 




Table A3.16c: Coefficient of FHO on the log of the value of mental health services per 1000 enrolled patients, by physician sex 
 
 Male physicians Female physicians  
OLS FE HDFE OLS FE HDFE 















































































































Observations 14,409 14,409 14,409 9,495 9,495 9,495 
Physicians 1,601 1,601 1,601 1,055 1,055 1,055 
 
MH: mental health; OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.  
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 1,601 clusters. 
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1 





Table A3.16e: Coefficient of FHO on the log of ED visits for mental health reasons per 1,000 patients: Male physicians only 
 
 Male physicians Female physicians  
OLS FE HDFE OLS FE HDFE 















































































































Observations 14,409 14,409 14,409 9,495 9,495 9,495 
Physicians 1,601 1,601 1,601 1,055 1,055 1,055 
 
ED: emergency department; OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.  
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 1,601 clusters. 
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1 





Table A3.16g: Coefficient of FHO on the number of patients who used the ED for mental health reasons, per 1,000 patients: Male 
physicians only 
 
 Male physicians Female physicians  
OLS FE HDFE OLS FE HDFE 















































































































Observations 14,409 14,409 14,409 9,495 9,495 9,495 
Physicians 1,601 1,601 1,601 1,055 1,055 1,055 
 
ED: emergency department; OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.  
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters. 
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1 





Table A3.17a: Coefficient of FHO on the log of the number of mental health services per 1000 enrolled patients, by physician age 
 
 Younger physicians Older physicians  
OLS FE HDFE OLS FE HDFE 















































































































Observations 12,312 12,312 12,312 11,592 11,592 11,592 
Physicians 1,368 1,368 1,368 1,288 1,288 1,288 
 
MH: mental health; OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.  
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 1,288 clusters. 
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1 





Table A3.17c: Coefficient of FHO on the log of the value of mental health services per 1000 enrolled patients: Younger (≤ 50) 
physicians only 
 
 Younger physicians Older physicians  
OLS FE HDFE OLS FE HDFE 















































































































Observations 12,312 12,312 12,312 11,592 11,592 11,592 
Physicians 1,368 1,368 1,368 1,288 1,288 1,288 
 
MH: mental health; OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.  
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 1,368 clusters. 
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1 




Table A3.17e: Coefficient of FHO on ED visits for mental health reasons: by physician age 
 
 Younger physicians Older physicians  
OLS FE HDFE OLS FE HDFE 















































































































Observations 12,312 12,312 12,312 11,592 11,592 11,592 
Physicians 1,368 1,368 1,368 1,288 1,288 1,288 
 
MH: mental health; OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.  
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 1,368 clusters. 
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1 





Table A3.17g: Coefficient of FHO on the Log of patients who used the ED for mental health reasons per 1,000 patients: Younger (≤ 
50) physicians only 
 
 Younger physicians Older physicians  
OLS FE HDFE OLS FE HDFE 















































































































Observations 12,312 12,312 12,312 11,592 11,592 11,592 
Physicians 1,368 1,368 1,368 1,288 1,288 1,288 
 
MH: mental health; OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.  
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 1,368 clusters. 
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1 





Table A3.18a: Coefficient of FHO on the log of the number of mental health services per 1000 enrolled patients by time of switch 
 
 Early switchers Late switchers  
OLS FE HDFE OLS FE HDFE 















































































































Observations 17,082 17,082 17,082 17,946 17,946 17,946 
Physicians 1,898 1,898 1,898 1,994 1,994 1,994 
 
MH: mental health; OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.  
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 1,994 clusters. 
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1 





Table A3.18c: Coefficient of FHO on the log of the value of mental health services per 1000 enrolled patients, by time of switch 
 
 Early switchers Late switchers  
OLS FE HDFE OLS FE HDFE 















































































































Observations 17,082 17,082 17,082 17,946 17,946 17,946 
Physicians 1,898 1,898 1,898 1,994 1,994 1,994 
 
MH: mental health; OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.  
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 1,898 clusters. 
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1 




Table A3.18e: Coefficient of FHO on ED visits for mental health reasons: by time of switch 
 
 Early switchers Late switchers  
OLS FE HDFE OLS FE HDFE 















































































































Observations 17,082 17,082 17,082 17,946 17,946 17,946 
Physicians 1,898 1,898 1,898 1,994 1,994 1,994 
 
MH: mental health; OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.  
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 1,898 clusters. 
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1 





Table A3.18g: Coefficient of FHO on the log of patients who used the ED for mental health reasons per 1,000 patients, by time of 
switch 
 
 Early switchers Late switchers  
OLS FE HDFE OLS FE HDFE 















































































































Observations 17,082 17,082 17,082 17,946 17,946 17,946 
Physicians 1,898 1,898 1,898 1,994 1,994 1,994 
 
MH: mental health; OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.  
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 1,898 clusters. 
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1 




Appendix A3.4: Extra Analyses  
 
Table A3.19: Number of enrolled patients with SMI per 1,000 patients 
 
 Unweighted means PS-weighted means t-test p-value 
(weighted) Fiscal year Switcher Non-switcher Switcher Non-switcher 
2007/2008 6.953 5.732 6.953 7.291 0.430 
2008/2009 6.894 5.884 6.894 7.637 0.077 
2009/2010 6.586 5.984 6.586 7.452 0.036 
2010/2011 6.381 6.062 6.381 7.750 0.002 
2011/2012 6.005 6.163 6.005 7.918 <0.001 
2012/2013 5.610 5.925 5.610 7.498 <0.001 
2013/2014 6.038 6.253 6.038 7.900 <0.001 
2014/2015 6.151 6.253 6.151 7.880 <0.001 







Table A3.20: Proportion of FPs who referred at least one patient to a psychiatrist that fiscal year 
 
 Unweighted means PS-weighted means t-test p-value 
(weighted) Fiscal year Switcher Non-switcher Switcher Non-switcher 
2007/2008 0.0169 0.0162 0.0169 0.0163 0.891 
2008/2009 0.0204 0.0170 0.0204 0.0135 0.151 
2009/2010 0.0204 0.0170 0.0204 0.0209 0.936 
2010/2011 0.0218 0.0251 0.0218 0.0293 0.209 
2011/2012 0.0176 0.0218 0.0176 0.0281 0.062 
2012/2013 0.0162 0.0218 0.0162 0.0334 0.003 
2013/2014 0.0204 0.0307 0.0204 0.0538 <0.001 
2014/2015 0.0190 0.0243 0.0190 0.0429 <0.001 
2015/2016 0.0176 0.0324 0.0176 0.0520 <0.001 
 






Table A3.21. Percentage (%) of patients with chronic mental illness.  
 
 Unweighted means PS-weighted means t-test p-value 
(weighted) Fiscal year Switcher Non-switcher Switcher Non-switcher 
2007/2008 27.8 27.4 27.8 28.3 0.123 
2008/2009 26.9 26.8 26.9 27.8 0.015 
2009/2010 25.9 26.6 25.9 27.6 < 0.001 
2010/2011 24.9 26.2 24.9 27.3 < 0.001 
2011/2012 24.1 26.0 24.1 27.2 < 0.001 
2012/2013 23.4 25.8 23.4 27.1 < 0.001 
2013/2014 23.0 25.8 23.0 27.1 < 0.001 
2014/2015 22.7 25.9 22.7 27.3 < 0.001 
2015/2016 22.7 26.0 22.7 27.5 < 0.001 
 







4 Conclusions and Future Research 
 
4.1 Summary 
Mental illnesses affect approximately one in five people around the world; yet in most countries, 
there is a significant gap between the need for mental health services and the number of people 
who receive treatments.1–3 Providing mental health services in primary care setting can improve 
accessibility for people who need them, and also encourage mental health care to be provided 
before a patient’s condition escalates to the point of crisis, requiring ED or hospital-based 
services.4 Early primary care improves outcomes for patients and also helps reduce the costs to 
the healthcare system.5–8 Determining what factors encourage FPs to treat mental illness may 
help towards the integration of mental healthcare in primary care. One factor may be how FPs 
are remunerated: in traditional FFS models, FPs tend to avoid time-consuming services such as 
counselling so that they can provide more services to obtain higher revenues. By comparison, 
capitation does not discourage time-consuming services. However, it may discourage FPs from 
enrolling patients with complex conditions, such as mental illness, and instead may selectively 
enroll healthy patients, known as ‘cream-skimming’.9,10 It has been suggested that blended 
models that combine aspects of the ‘pure’ remunerations may help to attenuate the negative 
effects while enabling provision of quality care.11,12 In the early 2000s, blended remuneration 
models have been introduced for FPs in Ontario, and research assessing the impact of these 
models on patient health is ongoing. However, there has been a paucity of research assessing the 
impact of these models on the provision of mental health services.  
A literature review was conducted to synthesize currently available evidence on the impact of 
remuneration (capitation versus FFS) on provision of mental health services. Usage in primary 
care was assessed to examine the direct effect of remuneration model on provision of mental 
health services by physicians, whereas ED visits for mental health reasons provided some insight 
into the quality of care provided in primary care. Then, the impact of physician switching from 




in Ontario was assessed, using administrative data and a retrospective cohort study design 
combined with propensity score based inverse probability weighting and fixed-effects regression 
models. Inverse probability weighting and fixed effects analyses helped to reduce selection bias 
and control for unobserved physician-specific confounding.13  
4.1.1 Literature Review Findings 
Previous research comparing capitation and FFS on mental health service utilization in primary 
care and EDs were presented in Chapter 2. The existing literature was found to be mixed, and 
complicated by differences across studies and populations assessed, as some studies assess the 
general population while others looked at only patients with serious mental illness (psychosis or 
bipolar disorder) as well as variations in how service utilization was measured.  
In the general population, current evidence indicates no difference between capitated payment 
versus FFS payment on the number of patients who use mental health services.14 When looking 
at volume of mental health services, one found it to be lower in capitation15 and another found no 
difference.16 In studies of patients with SMI, some have found capitation to be associated with 
fewer patients using mental health services,17–19 while others have found no difference;20–22 for 
volume of services, one found no difference23 while others found capitation to be associated with 
fewer services.24,25 Only three studies were found comparing remuneration models and number 
of ED visits for mental health reasons: one assessed the general population and found capitation 
to be associated with fewer ED visits,26 while two studies assessed patients with SMI and found 
no difference.21,25  
Overall, capitation is associated with fewer mental health services in the general population as 
well as patients with SMI, though the effect of remuneration model on the number of patients 
who utilize mental health services in primary care is ambiguous. There was also very limited 
research assessing the association between remuneration model and ED usage for mental health 
reasons, though current evidence suggests that capitation is associated with fewer ED visits for 
mental health reasons other than patients with SMI.  
Notably, there is relatively limited evidence, and most studies are from the US: only one non-US 




clear how provision of mental health services differs between capitation and FFS, particularly on 
Ontarians outside of those with psychosis or bipolar disorder. To assess the impact of blended 
capitation compared to enhanced FFS on mental health services, we used a natural experiment 
framework to compare enrolled patients of FPs who remained in FHG (non-switchers), to 
enrolled patients of FPs who began in FHG but switched to FHO (switchers). Propensity scores 
were generated and then incorporated into multivariate regression analyses using the inverse 
probability weighting method. Fixed-effects analyses were used to control for unmeasured 
physician-specific confounding such as altruism.13   
4.1.2 Comparison of Blended Capitation and Blended Fee-For-Service on Mental Health 
Services in Primary Care and Emergency Departments in Ontario 
In Chapter 3, switchers and non-switchers were compared on their provision of mental health 
services in primary care, enrollment of patients with serious mental illness, and referrals to a 
psychiatrist, as well as their patients’ usage of the ED for mental health reasons. Switching to 
FHO was associated with a decrease in the number of billed mental health services in primary 
care overall and during regular hours, compared to physicians who remained in FHG, but an 
increase in billed mental health services during after-hours was also observed. The value of 
services aligned with the number of services provided: FHO was associated with reduced value 
of services, driven by fewer services during regular hours, but also associated with an increase in 
the value of services provided during after-hours. The decrease in volume of services provided is 
consistent with one previous US study,15 but in contrast with another that found no difference.16 
One potential reason for this discrepancy could be the difference in timing of the studies, as the 
study that did not find a difference was based on data from 1991-1994, while the study that 
found a difference was based on data from 2010-2012. Mental health service utilization may 
have been low in the past due to higher levels of stigma, and thus changes in physician payment 
did not lead to major changes in usage at that time. Reduced mental health-related visits to 
primary care was also found in a previous Ontario study of patients with SMI,25 suggesting that 
reduced service provision occurs for patients with common and severe mental illnesses. We did 
not find significant differences in referrals to a psychiatrist, suggesting that patients under FHO 
FPs are not being offloaded to psychiatrists. While FPs under FHO enrolled slightly fewer 




Finally, switching to FHO was associated with a slight decrease in the total number of ED visits 
for mental health reasons, driven primarily by decreases during regular hours; there was no 
difference between switchers and non-switchers in the number of after-hours ED visits. The 
number of patients who used the ED for mental health reasons did not differ significantly 
between switchers and non-switchers, though there was a significant decrease specifically for 
patients during regular-hours. This is consistent with a previous study that assessed the general 
population,26 but inconsistent with previous studies of the SMI population, including in 
Ontario.21,25 One potential explanation is that capitated payment can lead to better quality of care 
for patients with common mental illnesses and hence they are less likely to use the ED, but this 
benefit may not extend to patients with more severe mental illnesses, perhaps due to the 
difficulty of treating these patients in primary care.  
Overall, our findings indicate that blended capitation appears to be associated with fewer mental 
health services and thus reduced value of services compared to blended FFS based on billings 
database. We did not find evidence of FHO FPs offloading care to psychiatrists, nor did we find 
evidence of a detrimental effect of this reduced service provision, as ED visits for mental health 
reasons did not differ between groups.   
4.2 Future Research  
This study provides evidence on differences in overall mental health service provision between 
two of the most popular remuneration models for FPs in Ontario today. One area of further 
research is to examine whether there are differential effects by d iagnostic category – most studies 
have focused either on SMI or mental health overall, so research is lacking on the specific effects 
of remuneration models on patients with other mental disorders, such as anxiety disorders, mood 
disorders, and substance use disorders. This may help to identify if specific patient groups are 
less likely to receive needed services under different physician payment models. Another area for 
future research is to assess aspects of these models that may influence mental health service 
provision in primary care, as well as ED usage for mental health reasons. One aspect of interest 
is the impact of team-based models. Approximately half of the physicians in FHO are team-
based, and some teams include a mental health worker.29 It is thus likely that some mental health 




FHO may not be receiving fewer services, but simply fewer services from the FP and more 
services from the mental health worker in the team, especially during regular-hours. Patients 
with SMI in team-based capitation with a mental health worker have been found to have slightly 
higher ED visits for mental health reasons, compared to patients who were enrolled in blended 
FFS.25 However, it is not known if these differences apply to patients with mental disorders other 
than psychosis or bipolar disorder. Finally, usage of other mental health services not billed to 
OHIP, such as community services and private psychologists/psychiatrists, should be assessed.  
In conclusion, this study adds to the currently limited body of research on the association 
between physician payment (blended capitation versus blended FFS) and mental health service 
provision in primary care and ED settings, specifically in a universal healthcare system. Our 
findings indicate capitation leads to reduced service provision in primary care, but does not 
appear to lead to increased ED visits for mental health reasons, indicating substitution of care in 
the ED is not occurring. This suggests that capitation model like FHO may help reduce costs to 
the healthcare system without affecting the quality of care. However, further studies are needed 
to better understand what aspects of the blended capitated model are associated with these 
beneficial effects (e.g. teams with a mental health worker versus teams without), if specific 
patient groups are benefiting but not others, and patients’ usage of other sources of care (e.g. 
community services). Developing a clearer understanding of what leads to better quality of care 
for these patients can help guide policymakers to refine these payment models so that more 
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Appendix B: Data Creation Plan  
 
Initiation 
This Section must be Completed Prior to Project Dataset(s) Creation 
Project Title: Use of Mental Health Services in Primary Care, Emergency Departments, and Hospitals: 
Comparison of Ontario’s FHGs and FHOs 
Project TRIM number: 20190906097005 
Research Program: PCPH 
Site: ICES Western 
Project Objectives: Insert Project Objectives as listed in the approved ICES Project PIA 
1. To compare patterns of mental health service utilization by patients enrolled to 
physicians practicing in FHGs and FHOs 
2. To compare mental health related emergency department use and psychiatric 
hospitalizations in FHGs and FHOs 
ICES Project PIA Initial Approval 
Date: 
The ICES Employee or agent who is responsible for creating the Project Dataset(s) is responsible for ensuring 
there is an approved ICES Project PIA and verifying the date of approval prior to creating the Project Dataset(s) 
yyyy-mon-dd  
Principal Investigator (PI):  
Check the applicable box if the PI 
is an ICES Student/Trainee 
☒ ICES Student ☐ ICES Fellow ☐ ICES Post-Doctoral Trainee     ☐ Visiting Scholar 
Responsible ICES Scientist: Name the Responsible ICES Scientist if the PI is not a Full Status ICES Scientist  
Sisira Sarma 
Project Team Member(s) 
Responsible for Project Dataset 
Creation and/or Statistical 
Analysis and date joined (list all): 
All person(s) (ICES Analyst, Appointed Analyst, Analytic Epidemiologist, PI, and/or Student) responsible for 
creating the Project Dataset(s) and/or statistical analysis on the Research Analytics Environment (RAE) and the 
date they joined the project must be recorded 
Sisira Sarma (Responsible ICES Scientist) 
Thy Vu (Principal Investigator) 






Other ICES Project Team Members 
and date joined (list all): 
All other Research Project Team Members (e.g., Research Administrative Assistants, Research Assistants, 
Project Managers, Epidemiologists) and the date they joined the project must be recorded 
Amardeep Thind 2018-NOV-5 
Confirmation that DCP is 
consistent with Project 
Objectives: 
 
NOTE – Project cannot start if this 
section is not complete. 
The following individuals must confirm that the ICES Data provided for in this DCP is relevant (e.g., with respect 
to cohort, timeframe, and concepts) and required to achieve the Project Objectives stated in the ICES Project 
PIA prior to initial Project Dataset creation: 1) PI; 2) Responsible ICES Scientist if the PI is not a Full Status ICES 
Scientist, or a second ICES Scientist or the Scientific Program Lead if the PI is creating both the DCP and the 
Project Dataset[s]; 3) ICES Research Practice Staff creating the DCP; and 4) ICES Analytic Staff (ICES Employee 
or agent responsible for creating the Project Dataset[s]). This may be delegated either verbally or via e-mail. 
Principal Investigator ☒ 2018-NOV-5 
Responsible ICES Scientist or Second ICES Scientist/Lead ☒ 2018-NOV-5 
ICES Research Practice Staff Creating the DCP ☐ yyyy-mon-dd 
ICES Analytic Staff ☐ yyyy-mon-dd 
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Initiation 
This Section must be Completed Prior to Project Dataset(s) Creation 
Designated ICES Research Practice 
Staff accountable for Project 
Documentation: 
The person named (ICES staff) is accountable for ensuring that the approved ICES Project PIA, ICES Project PIA 
Amendments, and DCP are saved on the T Drive, ensuring ICES Project PIA Amendments are submitted as 
required, ensuring DCP Amendments are documented, and sharing the final DCP with the PI/Responsible ICES 
Scientist at project completion 
 
DCP Creation Date and Author: Date DCP was finalized prior to Project 
Dataset(s) creation Name of person who created the DCP 
Date Name 




This Section must be Completed Prior to Project Dataset(s) Creation 
The ICES Employee or agent who is responsible for creating the Project Dataset(s) must ensure that 
this list includes only data listed in the ICES Project PIA 
Changes to this list after initial ICES Project PIA approval require an ICES Project PIA Amendment 
Mandatory for all datasets that are available by 
individual year 
General Use Datasets – Health Services Years (where applicable) 
ODB 2006 to 2016   
NACRS 2006 to 2016 
OHIP 2006 to 2016  
OMHRS 2006 to 2016 
CIHI DAD 2006 to 2016 
CIHI SDS 2006 to 2016  
General Use Datasets – Care Providers  
IPDB 2006 to 2013   
CPDB 2006 to 2016 
General Use Datasets – Population  
RPDB 2006 to 2016 
CENSUS 2006, 2011, 2016 
General Use Datasets – Coding/Geography  
PCCF 2006 to 2013 
LHIN 2009  
General Use Datasets - Facilities  
See list  
General Use Datasets - Other  
CAPE 2006 to 2016 
ONMARG 2006, 2011 
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ICES Data 
This Section must be Completed Prior to Project Dataset(s) Creation 
See list  
Controlled Use Datasets  
See list  
See list  




Project Amendments and Reconciliation 











Date Programs/DCP reconciled The person(s) creating the dataset and/or analyzing the data are responsible for ensuring that the  final DCP 




Study Design and Project Time Frame Definitions 
Study Design ☒ Cohort study  ☐ Matched cohort study  ☐ Case-control study 







Accrual Start/End Dates April 1st, 2006/March 31st, 2016 
Max Follow-up Date March 31st, 2016 
When does observation window 
terminate? 
March 31st 2016 (Window: April 1st, 2006 to March 31st, 2016) 
Lookback Window(s)  
 
 
Look-back Window Observation Window 
(in which to look for outcomes) 
Index Event Date 
Accrual Window 
Max Follow-up Date 
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Cohort Build 
Note: Include a cohort build table in appendices. 
Index Event / Inclusion Criteria Overall cohort description:  
Rostered patients in Ontario’s Family Health Group (FHG) and Family Health Organization 
(FHO) primary care models from April 1st, 2006 to March 31st, 2016 
For each year 
▪ Using Client Agency Program Enrollment (CAPE) registry, identify all Ontario 
family physicians (FPs) in Family Health Groups (FHGs) as of April 1st 2006 and 
follow these FPs and their enrolled patients in each fiscal year until March 31 st 
2016. Within the window of April 1st, 2006 to March 31st, 2016 (i.e., 10 fiscal 
years), identify: 
o FPs who remained in Family Health Groups (FHGs) and 
o FPs who switched from the Family Health Groups (FHGs) to Family 
Health Organizations (FHOs) 
 
Estimated Size of Cohort  
(if known) 
N/A 
Exclusions (in order) Step Exclusions of FPs’ rostered patients (in order, assessed at start of each fiscal year)  
1 Data cleaning:  
a) Missing or invalid IKN  
b) Missing age  
c) Missing or invalid sex 
d) Death on or before the index date 
e) Non-Ontario residents  




Concept Definitions (add additional rows as needed) 
Note: Include concept definition details in appendices. 
Main Exposure or Risk Factor Main exposure is rostered patients’ physician who switched from FHG to the FHO 
model, exposure will be defined using STRTCAPE and ENDCAPE from the CAPE database  
• STRTCAPE and ENDCAPE will be used to determine whether a patient 
is enrolled to a physician during each fiscal year of the study and the 
model type  
 
Primary Outcome Definition 1. Primary care services  (OHIP) 
1a. Number and value of mental health services provided at primary care 
• Calculate per physician: (1) the annual number of services, and  
 (2) annual values of mental health services (in 2006 dollars), provided 
to rostered patients 
• Primary care visits for mental health reasons will be identified using 
OHIP billing codes (see Appendix A: OUT_PRIM_CARE_MH for specific 
codes) 
1b. Number and value of after-hours and regular-hours mental health 
services provided at primary care (subset of 1a)  
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Concept Definitions (add additional rows as needed) 
• From the services identified in 1a, identify the services that were billed 
with the after-hours premium incentive code (FEECODE=Q012) and 
those without Q012 code.  
• Calculate per physician: (1) the annual number of after -hours services 
(2) the annual average number of regular-hours services, and (3) the 
corresponding value of mental health services during after -hours and 
regular-hours  
 
1c. Referrals to a psychiatrist  
• Identify per physician (1) the annual number of referrals FPs made to a 
psychiatrist (provided to rostered patients), and (2) the annual 
number of rostered patients who received a referral to a psychiatrist 
 
2. Emergency department (ED) use for mental health reasons (NACRS) 
• Calculate per physician, including only rostered patients: (1) the 
annual number of ED visits for mental health reasons, and (2) the 
annual average number of unique patients who used the ED for 
mental health reasons , provided to rostered patients 
• ED visits will be identified using the EDVISIT and appropriate codes 
from the NACRS database (see Appendix A: OUT_ED_VISIT)  
• ED visits will be grouped into two categories: (1) regular-hours defined 
as 8:00AM – 5:00PM on weekdays without statutory holidays, and (2) 
after-hours defined as 5:00PM – 8:00AM on weekdays, weekends and 
statutory holidays.  
 
3. Hospitalizations for mental health reasons (DAD, OMHRS) 
• Calculate per physician: (1) the annual number of hospitalizations for 
mental health reasons, and (2) the annual average number of unique 
patients who were hospitalized for mental health reasons, including 
only rostered patients 
• Hospitalizations will be identified using appropriate codes from DAD 
and OMHRS (see Appendix A: OUT_HOSP. Note that in the case of 
prefixes provided, e.g. F1x includes F10, F100) 
 
4. Physician follow-up within 14 days of discharge from a hospitalization for a 
mental health reason (DAD, OMHRS, OHIP) 
• Calculate per physician the proportion of hospitalizations for mental 
health reasons that had a follow-up visit with the FP within 14 days of 
discharge (see Appendix A: OUT_FOLLOWUP14) , including only 
rostered patients 
• Calculate the proportion of follow-up visits that had the incentive 
billing code applied (FEECODE = E080) 
 
5. Usage of pay-for-performance (P4P) incentives for registering patients with 
serious mental illness (OHIP) 
• Calculate per physician the annual number of rostered patients with 
serious mental illness (FEECODE = Q020 or Q021 for FHG; FEECODE = 
Q020 or diagnostic code 295 for FHO) 
 
 




Dataset Creation Plan 
Concept Definitions (add additional rows as needed) 
 
Secondary Outcome Definition(s) N/A 
Baseline Characteristics Assessed at each fiscal year starting from 2006 to 2016. 
 
Baseline characteristics of Ontario FPs in FHGs and FHOs 
1. Encrypted physician billing number (PHYSNUM)  
2. Average number of FPs per practice (CPDB) 
3. Age (BDATE from IPDB) 
4. Sex (IPDB) 
5. Canadian or international medical graduate status (IMG from IPDB) 
6. Year of graduation (GRADYEAR from IPDB) 
7. Physician’s practice location (LHIN from IPDB) 
8. Primary care model (PROGTYPE from CAPE) 
9. Expected gain in income (based on algorithm used at ICES Western) 
10. Within the year FHO physicians switched from FHG, the date FHO physicians 
switched from FHG (i.e. adjust the first year of switching to appropriate 
fractional) 
11. Rurality (IPDB) 
12. Number of patients rostered (CAPE) 
 
Baseline characteristics of PCPs’ patients in FHGs and FHOs  
1. Mean age (RPDB) 
2. Proportion of senior patients (65+) (RPDB) 
3. Proportion of female patients (RPDB) 
4. Proportion in lowest two quintiles of Residential Instability Score (CENSUS) 
5. Proportion in lowest two quintiles of Material Deprivation Score (CENSUS) 
6. Proportion in lowest two quintiles of Dependency Score (CENSUS) 
7. Proportion in lowest two quintiles of Ethnic Concentration Score (CENSUS)  
8. Proportion in lowest two neighbourhood income quintiles from INQUINT 
(RPDB, CENSUS) 
9. Proportion from Rural areas (RPDB, CENSUS) 
10. Mean comorbidity using John Hopkins Adjusted Clinical Groups (ACG) 
methodology (i.e. average ADG score) 
11. Proportion with a chronic mental illness (over last two years) (PCPOP) 
 
NOTE: Organizing your baselines by the timeframe in which they will be captured is 
helpful. E.g. at index, 120d, in the last year, etc.    
Propensity Score Definition Construct a propensity score model using baseline variables (i.e. pre -treatment 
covariates)  
Propensity Score Weighting Inverse probability weighting (IPW) approach will be used to derive propensity score 
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Analysis Plan and Dummy Tables  
(Below is a guide – please MODIFY/EXPAND as appropriate) 
Step 0: Cohort Codes 
 
I. Review cohort code list. 
a. Use %assign to obtain the cohort code list. 
 
***STOP FOR REVIEW*** 
 
Step 1: Cohort Build 
 
I. Apply inclusion criteria. 
a. Keep all records. 
II. Obtain data for exclusions. 
a. Use %getdemo to obtain demographic variables from RPDB: bdate, dthdate, sex, prcddablk, pstlcode, 
prcdcsd 
III. Apply each exclusion in order and track number excluded at each step. 
a. Complete exclusion flow table (Appendix B: S0_ExcInc_Flow) 
 
***STOP FOR REVIEW*** 
 
Step 2: Define Baselines, Exposures, and Outcomes 
 
I. Define baseline characteristics: details provided in Appendix C, Table C2. 
II. Define outcome concepts: details provided in Appendix C, Table C3. 
 
***STOP FOR REVIEW*** 
 
Step 3: Descriptive Analyses 
 
I. Create baseline tables reporting requested information for each baseline characteristic, sorted by exposure group 
(FHG vs FHO): details provided in Appendix B: S1_Baseline_Pat.  
II. Create baseline tables reporting the characteristics of FPs included in the study: details provided in Appendix B: 
S2_Baseline_Phys. 
a. Compare differences across groups using t-tests and Chi-square tests. 
 
***STOP FOR REVIEW*** 
 
Step 4: Primary Outcomes Analysis 
 
I. Use a logistic regression model to assess the FPs who switched from FHG to FHO, compared to those who 
remained in FHG, while accounting for observed physician and practice characteristics, on outcomes: details 
provided in Appendix B: S3_Out_PrimCare, S4_Out_Hosp, S5_Out_FollowUp, S6_Out_ED, S7_RegSMI, and 
S8_Multivariate. 
a. Propensity score matching will be used to adjust for systematic differences between FPs that remain in 
FHG and FPs that switch from FHG to FHO.  
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Analysis Plan and Dummy Tables  
(Below is a guide – please MODIFY/EXPAND as appropriate) 
Step 6: Sensitivity / Additional Analysis Under Consideration, if applicable  
 
I. Repeat analysis, but restrict data to physicians with a relatively high proportion of patients considered to have 
chronic mental illness (using PCPOP, CDC_MH indicator).  
II. Compare primary care service provision and hospital/ED outcomes between (subject to sufficient sample size):  
a. Urban versus rural physicians 
i. If too few rural physicians: Repeat analysis, but restrict data to urban physicians 
b. Male physicians and female physicians 
c. Younger physicians versus older physicians 
d. More recently graduated physicians (within less than 10 years) compared to physicians who graduated at 
least 10 years ago 
e. Early switchers versus later switchers 
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Quality Assurance Activities  
RAE Directory of SAS Programs  
RAE Directory of Final Dataset(s) The final analytic dataset for each cohort includes all the data required to create the baseline tables and run 
all the models. It should include all covariates for all models such as patient risk factors, hospital 
characteristics, physician characteristics, exposure measures (continuous, categorical) and outcomes. It 
should include covariates that were considered but didn’t make the final cut. This wou ld permit an analyst 
to easily re-run the models in the future. 
 
RAE README file available: ☐Yes ☐No 
Date results of quality assurance tools for final dataset shared with project team (where applicable):   
 %assign yyyy-mon-dd 
 %evolution yyyy-mon-dd 
 %dinexplore yyyy-mon-dd 
 %track / %exclude yyyy-mon-dd 
 %codebook yyyy-mon-dd 
Additional comments:  
 
 
Appendices (add appendices as needed) 
Appendix A: Codes Refer to the “DCP - Appendix A” document 
 




Appendix C: Additional detail for inclusion, exclusion, baseline, and outcome definitions 
  
Table C1. Inclusion/Exclusion Criteria  
Concept Data 
Sources  
Code Type Window Notes 
(including algorithm details) 
Inclusion Criteria for FP cohort 
FP enrolled in FHG  CAPE PROGTYPE = FHG April 1st 2006  
FP enrollment in FHG 
or FHO 
CAPE PROGTYPE = FHG, 
FHO 
Accrual Window  
Exclusion Criteria for patients 
Missing or invalid IKN RPDB  Each fiscal year starting 
from 2006 to 2016 
See the tab of “EXC_IKN” in 
Appendix A 
Missing age  RPDB Age (algorithmn) Each fiscal year starting 
from 2006 to 2016 
See the tab of “EXC_MAGE” in 
Appendix A 
Missing sex RPDB SEX = Sex on RPDB Each fiscal year starting 
from 2006 to 2016 
See the tab of “EXC_MSEX” in 
Appendix A 
Death on or before 
the index date 




Each fiscal year starting 
from 2006 to 2016 
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MOHDATE = Death 
date from RPDB 
data 
 
OTHERDTH = Most 
recent death date 
from Admin data  
Non-Ontario 
residents 
RPDB  Each fiscal year starting 
from 2006 to 2016 
See the tab of “EXC_NOR” in 
Appendix A 
Invalid age  RPDB Age (algorithmn) Each fiscal year starting 
from 2006 to 2016 
Exclude patients < 16 and > 105.  
See the tab of “EXC_IAGE” in 
Appendix A. 
 








(including algorithm details) 
Patient characteristics 
Age RPDB  Each fiscal year 
starting from 




Sex RPDB  Each fiscal year 
starting from 
2006 to 2016 
N (%) female  
Income quintile RPDB  Each fiscal year 
starting from 
2006 to 2016 






RPDB  Each fiscal year 
starting from 
2006 to 2016 
N (%)   
Material Deprivation 
Score 
CENSUS  Each fiscal year 
starting from 
2006 to 2016 
N (%) in 
lowest two 
quintiles  
One of the four dimensions from 
the Ontario Marginalization Index. 
Residential 
Instability Score 
CENSUS  Each fiscal year 
starting from 
2006 to 2016 
N (%) in 
lowest two 
quintiles  
One of the four dimensions from 
the Ontario Marginalization Index. 
Dependency Score CENSUS  Each fiscal year 
starting from 
2006 to 2016 
N (%) in 
lowest two 
quintiles  
One of the four dimensions from 
the Ontario Marginalization Index. 
Ethnic 
Concentration Score 
CENSUS  Each fiscal year 
starting from 
2006 to 2016 
N (%) in 
lowest two 
quintiles  
One of the four dimensions from 
the Ontario Marginalization Index. 
Comorbidity  Johns 
Hopkins 
ACGs 
 Each fiscal year 
starting from 
2006 to 2016 
Mean number 




PCPOP CDC_MH Each fiscal year 
starting from 
2006 to 2016 
N (%) yes Defined as at least two outpatient 
visits or one hospitalization for 
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Physician characteristics 
Age IPDB  Each fiscal year 
starting from 
2006 to 2016 
Mean (SD), 
Median (IQR) 













IPDB  Each fiscal year 
starting from 
2006 to 2016 
N(%) of each 












Rurality (rural vs. 
urban) 
RPDB  Each fiscal year 
starting from 
2006 to 2016 
N (%) rural, 
urban, missing 
 
LHIN RPDB  2009 N (%) each 
category 
 
Number of rostered 
patients 
CAPE  Each fiscal year 
starting from 
2006 to 2016 
N  
 
Table C3. Outcome Definition 
Concept Data 
Sources 
Code Type Window Reporting 
Detail 
Notes 
(including algorithm details) 
Primary care 
mental health 
services (Cost and 
number) 












Mean (SD) Rostered patients only.  
See Appendix A, sheet 
OUT_PRIM_CARE_MH 
 
Cost calculated from the services 





and billed with 
after-hours 
premium (cost 
and number)  












Mean (SD) Rostered patients only. A subset of 
all primary care mental health 
services. From all the billings for 
mental health services provided in 
primary care, identify the billings 
that include the after hours 
premium feecode Q012 alongside 
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Cost calculated from the services 
provided and the CPI_HEALTH_COST 
Number of 
referrals to a 
psychiatrist 
OHIP, IPDB OHIP FEECODE = 
Q630 (code for 
referral) 
 
OHIP REFPHYS = 
encrypted number 











Mean (SD) Rostered patients only. For 
physicians identified as the referring 
physician, include only referrals to 
psychiatrists. 
 
See Appendix A: OUT_PSYCHREF 
Emergency 
department use 
for mental health 
reasons (number 
of visits: total and 
after-hours)  
NACRS TRIAGETIME= 













Mean (SD) Rostered patients only. Any ED visit 
with any of the listed diagnostic 
codes (see Appendix A: 
OUT_ED_VISIT). Exclude scheduled 
ED visits (INCLSCHEDULED = “F” in  
%getnacrs). For visits that have any 
of the listed X or Y codes in 
DX10CODE2 to DX10CODE10, only 
include if DX10CODE1 is not 
between F04 to F99. 
 
Identify visits that occurred during 




for mental health 
reasons (number 
of visits and 












Mean (SD)  Rostered patients only. Number of 
hospitalizations with any of the 
listed diagnostic codes (see 
Appendix A: OUT_HOSP).  
 
For visits that have any of the listed 
X or Y codes in DX10CODE2 to 
DX10CODE10, only include if 
DX10CODE1 is not between F04 to 
F99. 
FP follow-up with 
14 days of 
discharge from 
hospital/ED 
(Number of follow 
up visits, number 
of follow-up visits 
that used the 
incentive code)  
OHIP, 
OMHRS 
DAD DDATE = date 
of discharge from 
hospital 
 
OMHRS DDATE = 






Mean (SD)  Rostered patients only. From all of 
the hospitalizations for mental 
health reasons found (above), 
determine how many of these 
hospitalizations were followed by a 
visit to the FP within 14 days of 
discharge using discharge date and 
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from hospital for 
psychiatric reasons 
 
OHIP SERVDATE = 
date of visit to FP 
 
OHIP FEECODE = 
OHIP fee code 
Of the follow-up visits found, 
determine if the feecode for the 
incentive was utilized or not 








OHIP OHIP FEECODE = 






N (%)  Rostered patients only. For 
physicians in FHG: determine the 
number of billings and unique 
patients that are billed with either 
the fee code Q020A or a diagnostic 
code of 295 
 
 
For physicians in FHO: determine 
the number of billings and unique 
patients that are billed with either 
the fee code Q020 or Q021 
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